

APPENDIX A.
Legal Framework and Analysis

Oklahoma Department of Transportation

HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP

**APPENDIX A
OKLAHOMA DOT**

**REPORT ON LEGAL FRAMEWORK
AND ANALYSIS**

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APPENDIX A.

Legal Framework and Analysis

A. Introduction

In this section Holland & Knight LLP analyzes recent cases regarding the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) as amended and reauthorized (“SAFETEA” and “SAFETEA-LU”),¹ the United States Department of Transportation regulations promulgated to implement the TEA-21 known as the Federal Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (“DBE”) Program,² and local minority and women-owned business enterprise (“MBE/WBE”) programs to provide a summary of the legal framework for the disparity study as applicable to the Oklahoma DOT (“ODOT”).

This section begins with a review of the landmark United States Supreme Court decision in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson.³ Croson sets forth the strict scrutiny constitutional analysis applicable in the legal framework for conducting a disparity study. This section also notes the United States Supreme Court decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña,⁴ (“Adarand I”), which applied the strict scrutiny analysis set forth in Croson to federal programs that provide federal assistance to a recipient of federal funds. The Supreme Court’s decision in Adarand I, provides the basis for the legal analysis in connection with ODOT’s participation in the Federal DBE Program.

The legal framework then analyzes and reviews significant recent court decisions that have followed, interpreted and applied Croson and Adarand I to the present and that are applicable to ODOT’s disparity study and the strict scrutiny analysis. In particular, this analysis reviews the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decisions in Adarand Construction, Inc. v. Slater⁵ (“Adarand VII”) and Concrete Works of Colorado v. City and County of Denver,⁶ and the Federal District Court decision in Kornhass Construction, Inc. v. State of Oklahoma, Department of Central Services.⁷ In addition, the analysis reviews the recent federal cases that have considered the validity of the Federal DBE Program and a state’s implementation of the DBE program, including Northern Contracting, Inc. v. Illinois DOT,⁸ Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn DOT and Gross Seed v. Nebraska Department of Roads,⁹ and Western States Paving Co. v. Washington State DOT.¹⁰

¹ Pub L. 109-59, Title I, § 1101(b), August 10, 2005, 119 Stat. 1156; preceded by Pub L. 105-178, Title I, § 1101(b), June 9, 1998, 112 Stat. 107.

² 49 CFR Part 26 (Participation by Disadvantaged Business Enterprises in Department of Transportation Financial Assistance Programs (“Federal DBE Program”).

³ City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).

⁴ Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).

⁵ 228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Adarand VII”).

⁶ Concrete Works of Colorado v. City and County of Denver, 321 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1027 (2003).

⁷ 140 F.Supp. 2d 1232 (W.D.OK 2001).

⁸ 473 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2007).

⁹ 345 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1041 (2004).

The analyses of Adarand VII and these other recent cases are instructive to ODOT and the disparity study because they are the most recent and significant decisions by federal courts setting forth the legal framework applied to the Federal DBE Program and its implementation by recipients of federal financial assistance governed by 49 CFR Part 26.¹¹

Following Western States Paving, it is noteworthy that the USDOT, in particular for states in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, recommended the use of disparity studies by recipients of Federal financial assistance to examine whether or not there is evidence of discrimination and its effects, and how remedies might be narrowly tailored in developing their DBE Program to comply with the Federal DBE Program.¹² The USDOT suggests consideration of both statistical and anecdotal evidence. The USDOT instructs that recipients should ascertain evidence for discrimination and its effects separately for each group presumed to be disadvantaged in 49 CFR Part 26. The USDOT's Guidance provides that recipients should consider evidence of discrimination and its effects.¹³ The USDOT's "Guidance" is recognized by the federal regulations as "valid and binding, and constitutes the official position of the Department of Transportation"¹⁴ for states in the Ninth Circuit. Although ODOT is not in the Ninth Circuit, this Guidance along with the cases discussed below are instructive.

¹⁰ Western States Paving Co. v. Washington State DOT, 407 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2005).

¹¹ See Northern Contracting, Inc. v. Illinois DOT, 473 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2007); Western States Paving, 407 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2005); Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. DOT, 345 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1041 (2004); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000) ("Adarand VII").

¹² Questions and Answers Concerning Response to Western States Paving Company v. Washington State Department of Transportation (January 2006) [hereinafter USDOT Guidance], available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/civilrights/dbe_memo_a5.htm; see 49 CFR § 26.9.

¹³ Id.

¹⁴ Id., 49 C.F.R. § 26.9.

B. U.S. Supreme Court Cases

1. City of Richmond V. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)

In Croson, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the City of Richmond’s “set-aside” program as unconstitutional because it did not satisfy the strict scrutiny analysis applied to “race-based” governmental programs. J.A. Croson Co. (“Croson”) challenged the City of Richmond’s minority contracting preference plan, which required prime contractors to subcontract at least 30 percent of the dollar amount of contracts to one or more Minority Business Enterprises (“MBE”). In enacting the plan, the City cited past discrimination and an intent to increase minority business participation in construction projects as motivating factors.

The Supreme Court held the City of Richmond’s “set-aside” action plan violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court applied the “**strict scrutiny**” standard, generally applicable to any race-based classification, which requires a governmental entity to have a “**compelling governmental interest**” in remedying past identified discrimination and that any program adopted by a local or state government must be “**narrowly tailored**” to achieve the goal of remedying the identified discrimination.

The Court determined that the plan neither served a “compelling governmental interest” nor offered a “narrowly tailored” remedy to past discrimination. The Court found no “compelling governmental interest” because the City had not provided “a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that [race-based] remedial action was necessary.” The Court held the City presented no direct evidence of any race discrimination on its part in awarding construction contracts or any evidence that the City’s prime contractors had discriminated against minority-owned subcontractors. The Court also found there were only generalized allegations of societal and industry discrimination coupled with positive legislative motives. The Court concluded that this was insufficient evidence to demonstrate a compelling interest in awarding public contracts on the basis of race.

Similarly, the Court held the City failed to demonstrate that the plan was “narrowly tailored” for several reasons, including because there did not appear to have been any consideration of race-neutral means to increase minority business participation in city contracting, and because of the over inclusiveness of certain minorities in the “preference” program (for example, Aleuts) without any evidence they suffered discrimination in Richmond.

The Court further found “if the City could show that it had essentially become a ‘passive participant’ in a system of racial exclusion practiced by elements of the local construction industry, ... [i]t could take affirmative steps to dismantle such a system.” The Court held that “[w]here there is a significant statistical disparity between the number of qualified minority contractors willing and able to perform a particular service and the number of such contractors actually engaged by the locality or the locality’s prime contractors, an inference of discriminatory exclusion could arise.” The Supreme Court noted that it did not intend its decision to preclude a state or local government from “taking action to rectify the effects of identified discrimination within its jurisdiction.”

2. Adarand Constructors, Inc. V. Pena (“Adarand I”), 515 U.S. 200 (1995)

In Adarand I, the U.S. Supreme Court extended the holding in Croson and ruled that all federal government programs that use racial or ethnic criteria as factors in procurement decisions must pass a test of strict scrutiny in order to survive constitutional muster. The cases interpreting Adarand I are the most recent and significant decisions by federal courts setting forth the legal framework for disparity studies as well as the predicate constitutional strict scrutiny standard of review, which applies to the implementation of the Federal DBE Program by recipients of federal funds.

C. The Legal Framework Applied to the Federal DBE Program and State and Local Government MBE/WBE Programs

The following provides an analysis for the legal framework focusing on recent key cases regarding the Federal DBE Program and state and local MBE/WBE programs, and their implications for a disparity study. The recent decisions involving the Federal DBE Program are instructive to the ODOT and the disparity study because they concern the strict scrutiny analysis and legal framework in this area, and implementation of the DBE Program by recipients of federal financial assistance (like ODOT) based on 49 C.F.R. Part 26.

After the Adarand decision, the U.S. Department of Justice in 1996 conducted a study of evidence on the issue of discrimination in government construction procurement contracts, which Congress relied upon as documenting a compelling governmental interest to have a federal program to remedy the effects of current and past discrimination in the transportation contracting industry for federally funded contracts.¹⁵ Subsequently, in 1998, Congress passed the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (“TEA-21”), which authorized the United States Department of Transportation to expend funds for federal highway programs for 1998 - 2003. Pub.L. 105-178, Title I, § 1101(b), 112 Stat. 107, 113 (1998). The USDOT promulgated new regulations in 1999 contained at 49 C.F.R. Part 26 to establish the current Federal DBE Program. The TEA-21 was subsequently extended in both 2003 and 2005. The reauthorization of TEA-21 in 2005 was for a five year period from 2005 to 2009. Pub.L. 109-59, Title I, § 1101(b), August 10, 2005, 119 Stat. 1153-57 (“SAFETEA”).

The Federal DBE Program as amended changed certain requirements for federal aid recipients and accordingly changed how recipients of federal funds implemented the Federal DBE Program for federally-assisted contracts. The federal government determined that there is a compelling governmental interest for race- and gender-based programs at the national level, and that the program is narrowly tailored because of the federal regulations, including the flexibility in implementation provided to individual federal aid recipients by the regulations. State and local governments are not required to implement race- and gender-based measures where they are not necessary to achieve DBE goals and those goals may be achieved by race- and gender-neutral measures. 49 C.F.R. § 26.51.

The Federal DBE Program established responsibility for implementing the DBE Program to state and local government recipients of federal funds. A recipient of federal financial assistance must set an annual DBE goal specific to conditions in the relevant marketplace. Even though an overall annual 10 percent aspirational goal applies at the federal level, it does not affect the goals established by individual state or local governmental recipients. The new Federal DBE Program outlines certain steps a state or local government recipient can follow in establishing a goal, and USDOT considers and must approve the goal and the recipient’s DBE program. The implementation of the Federal DBE Program is substantially in the hands of the state or local government recipient and is set forth in detail in the federal regulations, including 49 C.F.R. § 26.45.

¹⁵ Appendix-The Compelling Interest for Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,050, 26,051-63 & nn. 1-136 (May 23, 1996) (hereinafter “The Compelling Interest”); see Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1167-1176, citing The Compelling Interest.

Provided in 49 C.F.R. § 26.45 are instructions as to how recipients of federal funds should set the overall goals for their DBE programs. In summary, the recipient establishes a base figure for relative availability of DBEs. 49 C.F.R. § 26.45(a), (b), (c). This is accomplished by determining the relative number of ready, willing, and able DBEs in the recipient's market. *Id.* Second, the recipient must determine an appropriate adjustment, if any, to the base figure to arrive at the overall goal. *Id.* at § 26.45(d). There are many types of evidence considered when determining if an adjustment is appropriate, according to 49 C.F.R. § 26.45(d). These include, among other types, the current capacity of DBEs to perform work on the recipient's contracts as measured by the volume of work DBEs have performed in recent years. If available, recipients consider evidence from related fields that affect the opportunities for DBEs to form, grow, and compete, such as statistical disparities between the ability of DBEs to obtain financing, bonding, and insurance, as well as data on employment, education, and training. *Id.* This process, based on the federal regulations, aims to establish a goal that reflects a determination of the level of DBE participation one would expect absent the effects of discrimination. 49 C.F.R. § 26.45(b)-(d).

Further, the Federal DBE Program requires state and local government recipients of federal funds to assess how much of the DBE goal can be met through race- and gender-neutral efforts and what percentage, if any, should be met through race- and gender-based efforts. 49 C.F.R. § 26.51.

A state or local government recipient is responsible for seriously considering and determining race- and gender-neutral measures that can be implemented. 49 C.F.R. § 26.51(b). A recipient of federal funds must establish a contract clause requiring prime contractors to promptly pay subcontractors in the Federal DBE Program (42 C.F.R. § 26.29). The Federal DBE Program also established certain record-keeping requirements, including maintaining a bidders list containing data on contractors and subcontractors seeking federally-assisted contracts from the agency (42 C.F.R. § 26.11). There are multiple administrative requirements that recipients must comply with in accordance with the regulations. 49 C.F.R. §§ 26.21-26.37.

Federal aid recipients are to certify DBEs according to their race/gender, size, net worth and other factors related to defining an economically and socially disadvantaged business as outlined in 49 C.F.R. §§ 26.61-26.73.

1. Strict Scrutiny Analysis

A race- and ethnicity-based program implemented by a state or local government is subject to the strict scrutiny constitutional analysis.¹⁶ ODOT's implementation of the Federal DBE Program also is subject to the strict scrutiny analysis if it utilizes race- and ethnicity-based efforts. The strict scrutiny analysis is comprised of two prongs:

- The program must serve an established compelling governmental interest; and
- The program must be narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling government interest.¹⁷

¹⁶ *Crosby*, 448 U.S. at 493.

¹⁷ *N. Contracting*, 473 F.3d at 721; *Western States Paving*, 407 F.3d at 991; *Sherbrooke Turf*, 345 F.3d at 969; *Adarand VII*, 228 F.3d at 1176.; *Associated Gen. Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik ("Drabik II")*, 214 F.3d 730 (6th Cir. 2000); *Eng'g Contractors Ass'n of South Florida, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County*, 122 F.3d 895 (11th Cir. 1997); *Contractors*

a. The Compelling Governmental Interest Requirement

The first prong of the strict scrutiny analysis requires a governmental entity to have a “**compelling governmental interest**” in remedying past identified discrimination in order to implement a race- and ethnicity-based program. State and local governments cannot rely on national statistics of discrimination in an industry to draw conclusions about the prevailing market conditions in their own regions.¹⁸ Rather, state and local governments must measure discrimination in their state or local market, however, that is not necessarily confined by the jurisdiction’s boundaries.¹⁹

The federal courts have held that, with respect to the Federal DBE Program, recipients of federal funds do not need to independently satisfy this prong because Congress has satisfied the compelling interest test of the strict scrutiny analysis.²⁰ The federal courts have held that Congress had ample evidence of discrimination in the transportation contracting industry to justify the Federal DBE Program (TEA-21), and the federal regulations implementing the program (49 C.F.R. Part 26).²¹ Specifically, the federal courts found Congress “spent decades compiling evidence of race discrimination in government highway contracting, of barriers to the formation of minority-owned construction businesses, and of barriers to entry.”²² The evidence found to satisfy the compelling interest standard included numerous congressional investigations and hearings, and outside studies of statistical and anecdotal evidence (e.g. disparity studies).²³

Ass’n of E. Pa. v. City of Philadelphia (“CAEP I”), 6 F.3d 990 (3d Cir. 1993); Kornhass Construction, Inc. v. State of Oklahoma, Department of Central Services, 140 F.Supp. 1232, 1237-1238.

¹⁸ See e.g., Concrete Works, Inc. v. City and County of Denver (“Concrete Works I”), 36 F.3d 1513, 1520 (10th Cir. 1994).

¹⁹ Id.

²⁰ N. Contracting, 473 F.3d at 721; Western States Paving, 407 F.3d at 991; Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F.3d at 969; Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1176.

²¹ Id. In the case of Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, 545 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2008), the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out it had questioned in its earlier decision whether the evidence of discrimination before Congress was in fact so “outdated” so as to provide an insufficient basis in evidence for the Department of Defense program (i.e. whether a compelling interest was satisfied). 413 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals after its 2005 decision remanded the case to the district court to rule on this issue. Rothe considered the validity of race- and gender-conscious Department of Defense (“DOD”) regulations (2006 Reauthorization of the 1207 Program). The decisions in N. Contracting, Sherbrooke Turf, Adarand VII, and Western States Paving held the evidence of discrimination nationwide in transportation contracting was sufficient to find the Federal DBE Program on its face was constitutional. On remand, the district court in Rothe on August 10, 2007 issued its order denying plaintiff Rothe’s Motion for Summary Judgment and granting Defendant United States Department of Defense’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, holding the 2006 Reauthorization of the 1207 DOD Program constitutional. Rothe Devel. Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, 499 F.Supp.2d 775 (W.D.Tex. Aug 10, 2007). The district court found the data contained in the Appendix (The Compelling Interest, 61 Fed. Reg. 26050 (1996)), the Urban Institute Report, and the Benchmark Study – relied upon in part by the courts in Sherbrooke Turf, Adarand VII, and Western States Paving in upholding the constitutionality of the Federal DBE Program – was “stale” as applied to and for purposes of the 2006 Reauthorization of the 1207 DOD Program. This district court finding was not appealed or considered by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. 545 F.3d 1023, 1037. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court decision in part and held invalid the DOD Section 1207 program as enacted in 2006. 545 F.3d 1023, 1050. See the discussion of the 2008 Federal Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Rothe below in Section G.

²² Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F.3d at 970, (citing Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1167 – 76); Western States Paving, 407 F.3d at 992-93.

²³ See, e.g., Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1167– 76; see also Western States Paving, 407 F.3d at 992 (Congress “explicitly relied upon” the Department of Justice study that “documented the discriminatory hurdles that minorities must overcome to secure federally funded contracts”).

The evidentiary basis on which Congress relied to support its finding of discrimination includes:

- **Barriers to minority business formation.** Congress found that discrimination by prime contractors, unions, and lenders has woefully impeded the formation of qualified minority business enterprises in the subcontracting market nationwide, noting the existence of “old boy” networks, from which minority firms have traditionally been excluded, and the race-based denial of access to capital, which affects the formation of minority subcontracting enterprise.²⁴
- **Barriers to competition for existing minority enterprises.** Congress found evidence showing systematic exclusion and discrimination by prime contractors, private sector customers, business networks, suppliers, and bonding companies precluding minority enterprises from opportunities to bid. When minority firms are permitted to bid on subcontracts, prime contractors often resist working with them. Congress found evidence of the same prime contractor using a minority business enterprise on a government contract not using that minority business enterprise on a private contract, despite being satisfied with that subcontractor’s work. Congress found that informal, racially exclusionary business networks dominate the subcontracting construction industry.²⁵
- **Local disparity studies.** Congress found that local studies throughout the country tend to show a disparity between utilization and availability of minority-owned firms, raising an inference of discrimination.²⁶
- **Results of removing affirmative action programs.** Congress found evidence that when race-conscious public contracting programs are struck down or discontinued, minority business participation in the relevant market drops sharply or even disappears, which courts have found strongly supports the government’s claim that there are significant barriers to minority competition, raising the specter of discrimination.²⁷

Burden of proof. Under the strict scrutiny analysis, and to the extent a state or local governmental entity has implemented a race- and gender-conscious program, the governmental entity has the initial burden of showing a strong basis in evidence (including statistical and anecdotal evidence) to support its remedial action.²⁸ If the government makes its initial showing, the burden shifts to the challenger to rebut that showing.²⁹ The challenger bears the ultimate burden of showing that the governmental entity’s evidence “did not support an inference of prior discrimination.”³⁰

²⁴ Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1168-70; Western States Paving, 407 F.3d at 992.

²⁵ Adarand VII, at 1170-72.

²⁶ Id. at 1172-74.

²⁷ Id. at 1174-75.

²⁸ See Rothe Development Corp. v. Department of Defense, 545 F.3d 1023, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 2008); N. Contracting, Inc. Illinois, 473 F.3d at 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2007) (Federal DBE Program); Western States Paving Co. v. Washington State DOT, 407 F.3d 983, 991 (9th Cir. 2005) (Federal DBE Program); Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minnesota DOT, 345 F.3d 964, 969 (8th Cir. 2003) (Federal DBE Program); Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Slater (“Adarand VII”), 228 F.3d 1147, 1166 (10th Cir. 2000) (Federal DBE Program); Eng’g Contractors Ass’n, 122 F.3d at 916; Hershell Gill Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County, 333 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1316 (S.D. Fla. 2004).

²⁹ Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1166; Eng’g Contractors Ass’n, 122 F.3d at 916.

³⁰ See, e.g., Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1166; Eng’g Contractors Ass’n, 122 F.3d at 916; see also Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F.3d at 971; N. Contracting, 473 F.3d at 721.

Statistical evidence. Statistical evidence of discrimination is a primary method used to determine whether or not a strong basis in evidence exists to develop, adopt and support a remedial program (i.e. to prove a compelling governmental interest), or in the case of a recipient complying with the Federal DBE Program, to prove narrow tailoring of program implementation at the state recipient level.³¹ “Where gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone in a proper case may constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination.”³²

One form of statistical evidence is the comparison of a government’s utilization of MBE/WBEs compared to the relative availability of qualified, willing and able MBE/WBEs.³³ The federal courts have held that a significant statistical disparity between the utilization and availability of minority- and women-owner firms may raise an inference of discriminatory exclusion.³⁴ However, a small statistical disparity, standing alone, may be insufficient to establish discrimination.³⁵

Other considerations regarding statistical evidence include:

- **Availability analysis.** A disparity index requires an availability analysis. MBE/WBE and DBE availability measures the relative number of MBE/WBEs and DBEs among all firms ready, willing and able to perform a certain type of work within a particular geographic market area.³⁶ There is authority that measures of availability may be approached with different levels of specificity and the practicality of various approaches must be considered.³⁷ “An analysis is not devoid of probative value simply because it may theoretically be possible to adopt a more refined approach.”³⁸
- **Utilization analysis.** Courts have accepted measuring utilization based on the proportion of an agency’s contract dollars going to MBE/WBEs and DBEs.³⁹
- **Disparity index.** An important component of statistical evidence is the “disparity index.”⁴⁰ A disparity index is defined as the ratio of the percentage utilization to the percentage availability

³¹ See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 509; N. Contracting, 473 F.3d at 718-19, 723-24; Western States Paving, 407 F.3d at 991; Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1166.

³² Croson, 488 U.S. at 501, quoting Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977).

³³ Croson, 448 U.S. at 509; see Rothe, 545 F.3d at 1041-1042; Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City and County of Denver (“Concrete Works II”), 321 F.3d 950, 959 (10th Cir. 2003); Drabik II, 214 F.3d 730, 734-736.

³⁴ See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 509; Rothe, 545 F.3d at 1041; Concrete Works II, 321 F.3d at 970; see Western States Paving, 407 F.3d at 1001.

³⁵ Western States Paving, 407 F.3d at 1001.

³⁶ See, e.g., Croson, 448 U.S. at 509; 49 C.F.R. § 26.35; Rothe, 545 F.3d at 1041-1042; N. Contracting, 473 F.3d at 718, 722-23; Western States Paving, 407 F.3d at 995.

³⁷ Contractors Ass’n of Eastern Pennsylvania, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia (“CAEP II”), 91 F.3d 586, 603 (3d Cir. 1996).

³⁸ Id.

³⁹ See Eng’g Contractors Ass’n, 122 F.3d at 912; N. Contracting, 473 F.3d at 717-720; Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F.3d at 973.

⁴⁰ Eng’g Contractors Ass’n, 122 F.3d at 914; W.H. Scott Constr. Co. v. City of Jackson, 199 F.3d 206, 218 (5th Cir. 1999); Contractors Ass’n of Eastern Pennsylvania, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990 at 1005 (3rd Cir. 1993).

times 100. A disparity index below 80 has been accepted as evidence of adverse impact. This has been referred to as “The Rule of Thumb” or “The 80 percent Rule.”⁴¹

- **Two standard deviation test.** The standard deviation figure describes the probability that the measured disparity is the result of mere chance. Some courts have held that a statistical disparity corresponding to a standard deviation of less than two is not considered statistically significant.⁴²

Anecdotal evidence. Anecdotal evidence includes personal accounts of incidents, including of discrimination, told from the witness’ perspective. Anecdotal evidence of discrimination, standing alone, generally is insufficient to show a systematic pattern of discrimination.⁴³ But personal accounts of actual discrimination may complement empirical evidence and play an important role in bolstering statistical evidence.⁴⁴ It has been held that anecdotal evidence of a local or state government’s institutional practices that exacerbate discriminatory market conditions are often particularly probative.⁴⁵

Examples of anecdotal evidence may include:

- Testimony of MBE/WBE or DBE owners regarding whether they face difficulties or barriers;
- Descriptions of instances in which MBE/WBE or DBE owners believe they were treated unfairly or were discriminated against based on their race, ethnicity, or gender or believe they were treated fairly without regard to race, ethnicity, or gender;
- Statements regarding whether firms solicit, or fail to solicit, bids or price quotes from MBE/WBE’s or DBEs on non-goal projects; and
- Statements regarding whether there are instances of discrimination in bidding on specific contracts and in the financing and insurance markets.⁴⁶

⁴¹ See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2678, 2009 WL 1835138 at 18, 77 USLW 4639 (June 29, 2009); Rothe, 545 F.3d at 1041; Eng’g Contractors Ass’n, 122 F.3d at 914, 923; Concrete Works I, 36 F.3d at 1524.

⁴² Eng’g Contractors Ass’n, 122 F.3d at 914, 917, 923. The Eleventh Circuit found that a disparity greater than two or three standard deviations has been held to be statistically significant and may create a presumption of discriminatory conduct.; Peightal v. Metropolitan Eng’g Contractors Ass’n, 26 F.3d 1545, 1556 (11th Cir. 1994). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Kadas v. MCI Systemhouse Corp., 255 F.3d 359 (7th Cir. 2001), raised questions as to the use of the standard deviation test alone as a controlling factor in determining the admissibility of statistical evidence to show discrimination. Rather, the Court concluded it is for the judge to say, on the basis of the statistical evidence, whether a particular significance level, in the context of a particular study in a particular case, is too low to make the study worth the consideration of judge or jury. 255 F.3d at 363.

⁴³ Eng’g Contractors Ass’n, 122 F.3d at 924-25; Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 919 (9th Cir. 1991); O’Donnel Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

⁴⁴ See, e.g., Eng’g Contractors Ass’n, 122 F.3d at 925-26; Concrete Works, 36 F.3d at 1520; Contractors Ass’n, 6 F.3d at 1003; Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 919 (9th Cir. 1991).

⁴⁵ Concrete Works I, 36 F.3d at 1520.

⁴⁶ See, Northern Contracting, 2005 WL 2230195, at 13-15 (N.D. Ill. 2005), affirmed, 473 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2007); e.g., Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 989; Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1166-76. For additional examples of anecdotal evidence, see Eng’g Contractors Ass’n, 122 F.3d at 924; Florida A.G.C. Council, Inc. v. State of Florida, 303 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1325 (N.D. Fla. 2004); Concrete Works, 36 F.3d at 1520; Cone Corp. v. Hillsborough County, 908 F.2d 908, 915 (11th Cir. 1990).

Courts have accepted and recognize that anecdotal evidence is the witness' narrative of incidents told from his or her perspective, including the witness' thoughts, feelings, and perceptions, and thus anecdotal evidence need not be verified.⁴⁷

b. The Narrow Tailoring Requirement

The second prong of the strict scrutiny analysis requires that a race- or ethnicity-based program or legislation implemented to remedy past identified discrimination in the relevant market be “**narrowly tailored**” to reach that objective.

The narrow tailoring requirement has several components and the courts analyze several criteria or factors in determining whether a program or legislation satisfies this requirement including:

- The necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative race-, ethnicity-, and gender-neutral remedies;
- The flexibility and duration of the relief, including the availability of waiver provisions;
- The relationship of numerical goals to the relevant labor market; and
- The impact of a race-, ethnicity-, or gender-conscious remedy on the rights of third parties.⁴⁸

The second prong of the strict scrutiny analysis requires the implementation of the Federal DBE Program by recipients of federal funds be “narrowly tailored” to remedy identified discrimination in the particular recipient’s contracting and procurement market.⁴⁹ The narrow tailoring requirement has several components.

It should be pointed out that in the Northern Contracting decision (2007), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals cited its earlier precedent in Milwaukee County Pavers v. Fielder to hold “that a state is insulated from [a narrow tailoring] constitutional attack, absent a showing that the state exceeded its federal authority. IDOT [Illinois DOT] here is acting as an instrument of federal policy and Northern Contracting (NCI) cannot collaterally attack the federal regulations through a challenge to IDOT’s program.”⁵⁰ The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished both the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Western States Paving and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Sherbrooke Turf, relating to an as-applied narrow tailoring analysis.

⁴⁷ See, e.g., Concrete Works II, 321 F.3d at 989; Eng'g Contractors Ass'n, 122 F.3d at 924-26; Cone Corp., 908 F.2d at 915; Northern Contracting, Inc. v. Illinois, 2005 WL 2230195 at *21, N. 32 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2005), aff'd 473 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2007).

⁴⁸ See, e.g., Rothe, 545 F.3d at 1036; Eng'g Contractors Ass'n, 122 F.3d at 927 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

⁴⁹ Western States Paving, 407 F.3d at 995-998; Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F.3d at 970-71.

⁵⁰ 473 F.3d at 722

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the state DOT's [Illinois DOT] application of a federally mandated program is limited to the question of whether the state exceeded its grant of federal authority under the Federal DBE Program.⁵¹ The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed IDOT's compliance with the federal regulations regarding calculation of the availability of DBEs, adjustment of its goal based on local market conditions and its use of race-neutral methods set forth in the federal regulations.⁵² The court held NCI failed to demonstrate that IDOT did not satisfy compliance with the federal regulations (49 C.F.R. Part 26).⁵³ Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision upholding the validity of IDOT's DBE program. See the discussion of the Northern Contracting decision below in Section E.

According to Western States Paving, the recipient of federal funds must have independent evidence of discrimination within the recipient's own transportation contracting and procurement marketplace in order to determine whether or not there is the need for race-, ethnicity-, or gender-conscious remedial action.⁵⁴ Thus, the Ninth Circuit held in Western States Paving that mere compliance with the Federal DBE Program does not satisfy strict scrutiny.⁵⁵

In Western States Paving, the court found that even where evidence of discrimination is present in a recipient's market, a narrowly tailored program must apply only to those minority groups who have actually suffered discrimination. Thus, under a race- or ethnicity-conscious program, for each of the minority groups to be included in any race- or ethnicity-conscious elements in a recipient's implementation of the Federal DBE Program, there must be evidence that the minority group suffered discrimination within the recipient's marketplace.

To satisfy the narrowly tailored prong of the strict scrutiny analysis in the context of the Federal DBE Program, the federal courts, which evaluated state DOT DBE Programs and their implementation of the Federal DBE Program, have held the following factors are pertinent:

- Evidence of discrimination or its effects in the state transportation contracting industry;
- Flexibility and duration of a race- or ethnicity-conscious remedy;
- Relationship of any numerical DBE goals to the relevant market;
- Effectiveness of alternative race- and ethnicity-neutral remedies;
- Impact of a race- or ethnicity-conscious remedy on third parties; and
- Application of any race- or ethnicity-conscious program to only those minority groups who have actually suffered discrimination.⁵⁶

⁵¹ Id. at 722.

⁵² Id. at 723-24.

⁵³ Id.

⁵⁴ Western States Paving, 407 F.3d at 997-98, 1002-03.

⁵⁵ Id. at 995-1003. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated in a footnote that the court in Western States Paving "misread" the decision in Milwaukee County Pavers. 473 F.3d at 722, n.5.

⁵⁶ See, e.g., Western States Paving, 407 F.3d at 998; Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F.3d at 971; Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1181; Kornhass Construction, Inc. v. State of Oklahoma, Department of Central Services, 140 F.Supp. 2d at 1247-1248.

The Eleventh Circuit described the “the essence of the ‘narrowly tailored’ inquiry [as] the notion that explicitly racial preferences ... must only be a ‘last resort’ option.”⁵⁷ Courts have found that “[w]hile narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative, it does require serious, good faith consideration of whether such alternatives could serve the governmental interest at stake.”⁵⁸

Similarly, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Associated Gen. Contractors v. Drabik (“Drabik II”), stated: “Adarand teaches that a court called upon to address the question of narrow tailoring must ask, “for example, whether there was ‘any consideration of the use of race-neutral means to increase minority business participation’ in government contracting ... or whether the program was appropriately limited such that it ‘will not last longer than the discriminatory effects it is designed to eliminate.””⁵⁹

The Supreme Court in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District, 127 S.Ct. 2738, 2760-61 (2007) also found that race- and ethnicity-based measures should be employed as a last resort. The majority opinion stated: “Narrow tailoring requires ‘serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives,’ and yet in Seattle several alternative assignment plans—many of which would not have used express racial classifications—were rejected with little or no consideration.” 127 S.Ct. at 2760-61; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 305 (2003). The Court found that the District failed to show it seriously considered race-neutral measures.

The “narrowly tailored” analysis is instructive in terms of developing any potential legislation or programs that involve DBEs implementing the Federal DBE Program, or in connection with determining appropriate remedial measures to achieve legislative objectives.

Race-, ethnicity-, and gender-neutral measures. To the extent a “strong basis in evidence” exists concerning discrimination in a local or state government’s relevant contracting and procurement market, the courts analyze several criteria or factors to determine whether a state’s implementation of a race- or ethnicity-conscious program is necessary and thus narrowly tailored to achieve remedying identified discrimination. One of the key factors discussed above is consideration of race-, ethnicity- and gender-neutral measures.

The courts require that a local or state government seriously consider race-, ethnicity- and gender-neutral efforts to remedy identified discrimination.⁶⁰ And the courts have held unconstitutional those race- and ethnicity-conscious programs implemented without consideration of race- and ethnicity-neutral alternatives to increase minority business participation in state and local contracting.⁶¹

⁵⁷ Eng’g Contractors Ass’n, 122 F.3d at 926 (internal citations omitted); see also Virdi v. DeKalb County School District, 135 Fed. Appx. 262, 264, 2005 WL 138942 (11th Cir. 2005) (unpublished opinion); Webster v. Fulton County, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1380 (N.D. Ga. 1999), aff’d per curiam 218 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2000).

⁵⁸ See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003), and Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509-10 (1989).

⁵⁹ Associated Gen. Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik (“Drabik II”), 214 F.3d 730, 738 (6th Cir. 2000).

⁶⁰ See, e.g., Western States Paving, 407 F.3d at 993; Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F.3d at 972; Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1179; Eng’g Contractors Ass’n, 122 F.3d at 927; Coral Constr., 941 F.2d at 923.

⁶¹ See Croson, 488 U.S. at 507; Drabik I, 214 F.3d at 738 (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Eng’g Contractors Ass’n, 122 F.3d at 927; Virdi, 135 Fed. Appx. At 268.

The Court in Croson followed by decisions from federal courts of appeal found that local and state governments have at their disposal a “whole array of race-neutral devices to increase the accessibility of city contracting opportunities to small entrepreneurs of all races.”⁶²

The federal regulations and the courts require that recipients of federal financial assistance governed by 49 C.F.R. Part 26 implement or seriously consider race-, ethnicity-, and gender-neutral remedies prior to the implementation of race-, ethnicity-, and gender-conscious remedies.⁶³ The courts have also found “the regulations require a state to ‘meet the maximum feasible portion of [its] overall goal by using race neutral means.’⁶⁴

Examples of race-, ethnicity-, and gender-neutral alternatives include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Providing assistance in overcoming bonding and financing obstacles;
- Relaxation of bonding requirements;
- Providing technical, managerial and financial assistance;
- Establishing programs to assist start-up firms;
- Simplification of bidding procedures;
- Training and financial aid for all disadvantaged entrepreneurs;
- Non-discrimination provisions in contracts and in state law;
- Mentor-protégé programs and mentoring;
- Efforts to address prompt payments to smaller businesses;
- Small contract solicitations to make contracts more accessible to smaller businesses;
- Expansion of advertisement of business opportunities;

⁶² Croson, 488 U.S. at 509-510.

⁶³ 49 C.F.R. § 26.51(a) requires recipients of federal funds to “meet the maximum feasible portion of your overall goal by using race-neutral means of facilitating DBE participation.” See, e.g., Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1179; Western States Paving, 407 F.3d at 993; Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F.3d at 972. Additionally, in September of 2005, the United States Commission on Civil Rights (the “Commission”) issued its report entitled “Federal Procurement After Adarand” setting forth its findings pertaining to federal agencies’ compliance with the constitutional standard enunciated in Adarand. United States Commission on Civil Rights: Federal Procurement After Adarand (Sept. 2005), available at <http://www.usccr.gov>. The Commission found that 10 years after the Court’s Adarand decision, federal agencies have largely failed to narrowly tailor their reliance on race-conscious programs and have failed to seriously consider race-neutral measures that would effectively redress discrimination. See discussion of USCCR Report at Section G. below. See also the discussion of Rothe below at Section G., which notes the dissenting opinion by Commissioner Yaki. 499 F.Supp.2d at 864-66.

⁶⁴ See, e.g., Northern Contracting, 473 F.3d at 723 – 724; Western States Paving, 407 F.3d at 993 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 26.51(a)).

- Outreach programs and efforts;
- “How to do business” seminars;
- Sponsoring networking sessions throughout the state acquaint small firms with large firms;
- Creation and distribution of MBE/WBE and DBE directories; and
- Streamlining and improving the accessibility of contracts to increase small business participation.⁶⁵

49 C.F.R. § 26.51(b) provides examples of race-, ethnicity-, and gender-neutral measures that should be seriously considered and utilized. The courts have held that while the narrow tailoring analysis does not require a governmental entity to exhaust every possible race-, ethnicity-, and gender-neutral alternative, it does “require serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives.”⁶⁶

Additional factors considered under narrow tailoring. In addition to the required consideration of the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies (race- and ethnicity-neutral efforts), the courts require evaluation of additional factors as listed above.⁶⁷ For example, to be considered narrowly tailored, courts have held that a MBE/WBE- or DBE-type program should include: (1) built-in flexibility;⁶⁸ (2) a good faith efforts provisions;⁶⁹ (3) waiver provisions;⁷⁰ (4) a rational basis for goals;⁷¹ (5) graduation provisions;⁷² (6) remedies only for groups for which there were findings of discrimination;⁷³ (7) sunset provisions;⁷⁴ and (8) limitation in its geographical scope to the boundaries of the enacting jurisdiction.⁷⁵

⁶⁵ See 49 C.F.R. § 26.51(b); see, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 509-510; N. Contracting, 473 F.3d at 724; Adarand VII, 228 F.3d 1179; 49 C.F.R. § 26.51(b); Eng'g Contractors Ass'n, 122 F.3d at 927-29.

⁶⁶ Western States Paving, 407 F.3d at 993.

⁶⁷ Eng'g Contractors Ass'n, 122 F.3d at 927.

⁶⁸ CAEP I, 6 F.3d at 1009; Associated Gen. Contractors of Ca., Inc. v. Coalition for Economic Equality ("AGC of Ca."), 950 F.2d 1401, 1417 (9th Cir. 1991); Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 923 (9th Cir. 1991); Cone Corp. v. Hillsborough County, 908 F.2d 908, 917 (11th Cir. 1990).

⁶⁹ CAEP I, 6 F.3d at 1019; Cone Corp., 908 F.2d at 917.

⁷⁰ CAEP I, 6 F.3d at 1009; AGC of Ca., 950 F.2d at 1417; Cone Corp., 908 F.2d at 917.

⁷¹ Id.

⁷² Id.

⁷³ Western States Paving, 407 F.3d at 998; AGC of Ca., 950 F.2d at 1417.

⁷⁴ Peightal, 26 F.3d at 1559.

⁷⁵ Coral Constr., 941 F.2d at 925.

2. Intermediate Scrutiny Analysis.

Certain Federal Courts of Appeal apply intermediate scrutiny to gender-conscious programs.⁷⁶ The courts have interpreted this standard to require that gender-based classifications be:

1. Supported by both “sufficient probative” evidence or “exceedingly persuasive justification” in support of the stated rationale for the program; and
2. Substantially related to the achievement of that underlying objective.⁷⁷

Under the traditional intermediate scrutiny standard, the court reviews a gender-conscious program by analyzing whether the state actor has established a sufficient factual predicate for the claim that female-owned businesses have suffered discrimination, and whether the gender-conscious remedy is an appropriate response to such discrimination. This standard requires the state actor to present “sufficient probative” evidence in support of its stated rationale for the program.⁷⁸

Intermediate scrutiny, as interpreted by certain federal circuit courts of appeal, requires a direct, substantial relationship between the objective of the gender preference and the means chosen to accomplish the objective. The measure of evidence required to satisfy intermediate scrutiny is less than that necessary to satisfy strict scrutiny. Unlike strict scrutiny, the intermediate scrutiny standard it has been held does not require a showing of government involvement, active or passive, in the discrimination it seeks to remedy.⁷⁹ And the Eleventh Circuit has held that “[w]hen a gender-conscious affirmative action program rests on sufficient evidentiary foundation, the government is not required to implement the program only as a last resort Additionally, under intermediate scrutiny, a gender-conscious program need not closely tie its numerical goals to the proportion of qualified women in the market.”⁸⁰

Ongoing Review. The above represents a brief summary of the legal framework pertinent to implementation of MBE/WBE, DBE, or race-, ethnicity-, or gender-neutral programs. Because this is a dynamic area of the law, the framework is subject to ongoing review as the law continues to evolve. The following provides more detailed summaries of key recent decisions.

⁷⁶ See generally, Western States Paving, 407 F.3d at 990 n. 6; Coral Constr. Co., 941 F.2d at 931-932 (9th Cir. 1991); Equal. Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997); Eng'g Contractors Ass'n, 122 F.3d at 905, 908, 910; Ensley Branch N.A.A.C.P. v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir. 1994); see also U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 and n.6 (1996) (“exceedingly persuasive justification.”)

⁷⁷ Id.

⁷⁸ Id. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, however, in Builders Ass'n of Greater Chicago v. County of Cook, Chicago, did not hold there is a different level of scrutiny for gender discrimination or gender based programs. 256 F.3d 642, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2001). The Court in Builders Ass'n rejected the distinction applied by the Eleventh Circuit in Engineering Contractors.

⁷⁹ See Eng'g Contractors Ass'n, 122 F.3d at 910.

⁸⁰ Id. at 929 (internal citations omitted.)

D. Recent Decisions Involving State or Local Government MBE/WBE Programs and the Federal DBE Program In The Ninth Circuit.

1. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000) cert. granted then dismissed as improvidently granted sub nom. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 532 U.S. 941, 534 U.S. 103 (2001)

This is the Adarand decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which was on remand from the earlier Supreme Court decision applying the strict scrutiny analysis to any constitutional challenge to the Federal DBE Program. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). The decision of the Tenth Circuit in this case was considered by the United States Supreme Court, after that court granted certiorari to consider certain issues raised on appeal. The Supreme Court subsequently dismissed the writ of certiorari “as improvidently granted” without reaching the merits of the case. The court did not decide the constitutionality of the Federal DBE Program as it applies to state DOTs or local governments.

The Supreme Court held that the Tenth Circuit had not considered the issue before the Supreme Court on certiorari, namely whether a race-based program applicable to direct federal contracting is constitutional. This issue is distinguished from the issue of the constitutionality of the United States DOT DBE Program as it pertains to procurement of federal funds for highway projects let by states, and the implementation of the Federal DBE Program by state DOTs. Therefore, the Supreme Court held it would not reach the merits of a challenge to federal laws relating to direct federal procurement.

Turning to the Tenth Circuit decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000), the Tenth Circuit upheld in general the facial constitutionality of the Federal DBE Program. The court found that the federal government had a compelling interest in not perpetuating the effects of racial discrimination in its own distribution of federal funds and in remediating the effects of past discrimination in government contracting, and that the evidence supported the existence of past and present discrimination sufficient to justify the Federal DBE Program. The court also held that the Federal DBE Program is “narrowly tailored,” and therefore upheld the constitutionality of the Federal DBE Program.

It is significant to note that the court in determining the Federal DBE Program is “narrowly tailored” focused on the current regulations, 49 C.F.R. Part 26, and in particular § 26.1(a), (b), and (f). The court pointed out that the federal regulations instruct recipients as follows:

[y]ou must meet the maximum feasible portion of your overall goal by using race-neutral means of facilitating DBE participation, 49 C.F.R. § 26.51(a)(2000); see also 49 C.F.R. § 26.51(f)(2000) (if a recipient can meet its overall goal through race-neutral means, it must implement its program without the use of race-conscious contracting measures), and enumerate a list of race-neutral measures, see 49 C.F.R. § 26.51(b)(2000). The current regulations also outline several race-neutral means available to program recipients including assistance in overcoming bonding

and financing obstacles, providing technical assistance, establishing programs to assist start-up firms, and other methods. See 49 C.F.R. § 26.51(b). We therefore are dealing here with revisions that emphasize the continuing need to employ non-race-conscious methods even as the need for race-conscious remedies is recognized. 228 F.3d at 1178-1179.

In considering whether the Federal DBE Program is narrowly tailored, the court also addressed the argument made by the contractor that the program is over- and under-inclusive for several reasons, including that Congress did not inquire into discrimination against each particular minority racial or ethnic group. The court held that insofar as the scope of inquiry suggested was a particular state's construction industry alone, this would be at odds with its holding regarding the compelling interest in Congress's power to enact nationwide legislation. *Id.* at 1185-1186. The court held that because of the "unreliability of racial and ethnic categories and the fact that discrimination commonly occurs based on much broader racial classifications," extrapolating findings of discrimination against the various ethnic groups "is more a question of nomenclature than of narrow tailoring." *Id.* The court found that the "Constitution does not erect a barrier to the government's effort to combat discrimination based on broad racial classifications that might prevent it from enumerating particular ethnic origins falling within such classifications." *Id.*

Finally, the Tenth Circuit did not specifically address a challenge to the letting of federally-funded construction contracts by state departments of transportation. The court pointed out that plaintiff Adarand "conceded that its challenge in the instant case is to 'the federal program, implemented by federal officials,' and not to the letting of federally-funded construction contracts by state agencies." 228 F.3d at 1187. The court held that it did not have before it a sufficient record to enable it to evaluate the separate question of Colorado DOT's implementation of race-conscious policies. *Id.* at 1187-1188.

2. Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 321 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1027, 124 S. Ct. 556 (2003) (Scalia, Justice with whom the Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined, dissenting from the denial of certiorari)

This case is instructive to the disparity study because it is one of the only recent decisions to uphold the validity of a local government MBE/WBE program. It is significant to note that the Tenth Circuit did not apply the narrowly tailored test and thus did not rule on an application of the narrowly tailored test, instead finding that the plaintiff had waived that challenge in one of the earlier decisions in the case. This case also is one of the only cases to have found private sector marketplace discrimination as a basis to uphold an MBE/WBE-type program.

In Concrete Works the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the City and County of Denver had a compelling interest in limiting race discrimination in the construction industry, that the City had an important governmental interest in remedying gender discrimination in the construction industry, and found that the City and County of Denver had established a compelling governmental interest to have a race- and gender-based program. In Concrete Works, the Court of Appeals did not address the issue of whether the MWBE Ordinance was narrowly tailored because it held the district court was barred under the law of the case doctrine from considering that

issue since it was not raised on appeal by the plaintiff construction companies after they had lost that issue on summary judgment in an earlier decision. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not reach a decision as to narrowly tailoring or consider that issue in the case.

Case history. Plaintiff, Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc. (“CWC”) challenged the constitutionality of an “affirmative action” ordinance enacted by the City and County of Denver (hereinafter the “City” or “Denver”). 321 F.3d 950, 954 (10th Cir. 2003). The ordinance established participation goals for racial minorities and women on certain City construction and professional design projects. Id.

The City enacted an Ordinance No. 513 (“1990 Ordinance”) containing annual goals for MBE/WBE utilization on all competitively bid projects. Id. at 956. A prime contractor could also satisfy the 1990 Ordinance requirements by using “good faith efforts.” Id. In 1996, the City replaced the 1990 Ordinance with Ordinance No. 304 (the “1996 Ordinance”). The district court stated that the 1996 Ordinance differed from the 1990 Ordinance by expanding the definition of covered contracts to include some privately financed contracts on City-owned land; added updated information and findings to the statement of factual support for continuing the program; refined the requirements for W/MBE certification and graduation; mandated the use of MBEs and WBEs on change orders; and expanded sanctions for improper behavior by MBEs, WBEs or majority-owned contractors in failing to perform the affirmative action commitments made on City projects. Id. at 956-57.

The 1996 Ordinance was amended in 1998 by Ordinance No. 948 (the “1998 Ordinance”). The 1998 Ordinance reduced annual percentage goals and prohibited an MBE or a WBE, acting as a bidder, from counting self-performed work toward project goals. Id. at 957.

CWC filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the 1990 Ordinance. Id. The district court conducted a bench trial on the constitutionality of the three ordinances. Id. The district court ruled in favor of CWC and concluded that the ordinances violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The City then appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. Id. at 954.

The Court of Appeals applied strict scrutiny to race-based measures and intermediate scrutiny to the gender-based measures. Id. at 957-58, 959. The Court of Appeals also cited Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., for the proposition that a governmental entity “can use its spending powers to remedy private discrimination, if it identifies that discrimination with the particularity required by the Fourteenth Amendment.” 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989) (plurality opinion). Because “an effort to alleviate the effects of *societal* discrimination is not a compelling interest,” the Court of Appeals held that Denver could demonstrate that its interest is compelling only if it (1) identified the past or present discrimination “with some specificity,” and (2) demonstrated that a “strong basis in evidence” supports its conclusion that remedial action is necessary. Id. at 958, quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909-10 (1996).

The court held that Denver could meet its burden without conclusively proving the existence of past or present racial discrimination. Id. Rather, Denver could rely on “empirical evidence that demonstrates ‘a significant statistical disparity between the number of qualified minority contractors ... and the number of such contractors actually engaged by the locality or the locality’s prime

contractors.” Id., quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 509 (plurality opinion). Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that Denver could rely on statistical evidence gathered from the six-county Denver Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and could supplement the statistical evidence with anecdotal evidence of public and private discrimination. Id.

The Court of Appeals held that Denver could establish its compelling interest by presenting evidence of its own direct participation in racial discrimination or its passive participation in private discrimination. Id. The Court of Appeals held that once Denver met its burden, CWC had to introduce “credible, particularized evidence to rebut [Denver’s] initial showing of the existence of a compelling interest, which could consist of a neutral explanation for the statistical disparities.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Court of Appeals held that CWC could also rebut Denver’s statistical evidence “by (1) showing that the statistics are flawed; (2) demonstrating that the disparities shown by the statistics are not significant or actionable; or (3) presenting contrasting statistical data.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Court of Appeals held that the burden of proof at all times remained with CWC to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the ordinances. Id. at 960.

The Court of Appeals held that to meet its burden of demonstrating an important governmental interest per the intermediate scrutiny analysis, Denver must show that the gender-based measures in the ordinances were based on “reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions.” Id., quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982).

The studies. Denver presented historical, statistical and anecdotal evidence in support of its MBE/WBE programs. Denver commissioned a number of studies to assess its MBE/WBE programs. Id. at 962. The consulting firm hired by Denver utilized disparity indices in part. Id. at 962. The 1990 Study also examined MBE and WBE utilization in the overall Denver MSA construction market, both public and private. Id. at 963.

The consulting firm also interviewed representatives of MBEs, WBEs, majority-owned construction firms, and government officials. Id. Based on this information, the 1990 Study concluded that, despite Denver’s efforts to increase MBE and WBE participation in DPW projects, some Denver employees and private contractors engaged in conduct designed to circumvent the goals program. Id. After reviewing the statistical and anecdotal evidence contained in the 1990 Study, the City Council enacted the 1990 Ordinance. Id.

After the Tenth Circuit decided Concrete Works II, Denver commissioned another study (the “1995 Study”). Id. at 963. Using 1987 Census Bureau data, the 1995 Study again examined utilization of MBEs and WBEs in the construction and professional design industries within the Denver MSA. Id. The 1995 Study concluded that MBEs and WBEs were more likely to be one-person or family-run businesses. The Study concluded that Hispanic-owned firms were less likely to have paid employees than white-owned firms but that Asian/Native American-owned firms were more likely to have paid employees than white- or other minority-owned firms. To determine whether these factors explained overall market disparities, the 1995 Study used the Census data to calculate disparity indices for all firms in the Denver MSA construction industry and separately calculated disparity indices for firms with paid employees and firms with no paid employees. Id. at 964.

The Census Bureau information was also used to examine average revenues per employee for Denver MSA construction firms with paid employees. Hispanic-, Asian-, Native American-, and women-owned firms with paid employees all reported lower revenues per employee than majority-owned firms. The 1995 Study also used 1990 Census data to calculate rates of self-employment within the Denver MSA construction industry. The Study concluded that the disparities in the rates of self-employment for blacks, Hispanics, and women persisted even after controlling for education and length of work experience. The 1995 Study controlled for these variables and reported that blacks and Hispanics working in the Denver MSA construction industry were less than half as likely to own their own businesses as were whites of comparable education and experience. Id.

In late 1994 and early 1995, a telephone survey of construction firms doing business in the Denver MSA was conducted. Id. at 965. Based on information obtained from the survey, the consultant calculated percentage utilization and percentage availability of MBEs and WBEs. Percentage utilization was calculated from revenue information provided by the responding firms. Percentage availability was calculated based on the number of MBEs and WBEs that responded to the survey question regarding revenues. Using these utilization and availability percentages, the 1995 Study showed disparity indices of 0.64 for MBEs and 0.70 for WBEs in the construction industry. In the professional design industry, disparity indices were 0.67 for MBEs and 0.69 for WBEs. The 1995 Study concluded that the disparity indices obtained from the telephone survey data were more accurate than those obtained from the 1987 Census data because the data obtained from the telephone survey were more recent, had a narrower focus, and included data on C corporations. Additionally, it was possible to calculate disparity indices for professional design firms from the survey data. Id.

In 1997, the City conducted another study to estimate the availability of MBEs and WBEs and to examine, *inter alia*, whether race and gender discrimination limited the participation of MBEs and WBEs in construction projects of the type typically undertaken by the City (the “1997 Study”). Id. at 966. The 1997 Study used geographic and specialization information to calculate MBE/WBE availability. Availability was defined as “the ratio of MBE/WBE firms to the total number of firms in the four-digit SIC codes and geographic market area relevant to the City’s contracts.” Id.

The 1997 Study compared MBE/WBE availability and utilization in the Colorado construction industry. Id. The statewide market was used because necessary information was unavailable for the Denver MSA. Id. at 967. Additionally, data collected in 1987 by the Census Bureau was used because more current data was unavailable. The Study calculated disparity indices for the statewide construction market in Colorado as follows: 0.41 for African American firms, 0.40 for Hispanic firms, 0.14 for Asian and other minorities, and 0.74 for women-owned firms. Id.

The 1997 Study also contained an analysis of whether African Americans, Hispanics, or Asian Americans working in the construction industry are less likely to be self-employed than similarly situated whites. Id. Using data from the Public Use Microdata Samples (“PUMS”) of the 1990 Census of Population and Housing, the Study used a sample of individuals working in the construction industry. The Study concluded that in both Colorado and the Denver MSA, African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans working in the construction industry had lower self-employment rates than whites. Asian Americans had higher self-employment rates than whites.

Using the availability figures calculated earlier in the Study, the Study then compared the actual availability of MBE/WBEs in the Denver MSA with the potential availability of MBE/WBEs if they formed businesses at the same rate as whites with the same characteristics. Id. Finally, the Study examined whether self-employed minorities and women in the construction industry have lower earnings than white males with similar characteristics. Id. at 968. Using linear regression analysis, the Study compared business owners with similar years of education, of similar age, doing business in the same geographic area, and having other similar demographic characteristics. Even after controlling for several factors, the results showed that self-employed African Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans, and women had lower earnings than white males. Id.

The 1997 Study also conducted a mail survey of both MBE/WBEs and non-MBE/WBEs to obtain information on their experiences in the construction industry. Of the MBE/WBEs who responded, 35 percent indicated that they had experienced at least one incident of disparate treatment within the last five years while engaged in business activities. The survey also posed the following question: “How often do prime contractors who use your firm as a subcontractor on public sector projects with [MBE/WBE] goals or requirements ... also use your firm on public sector or private sector projects without [MBE/WBE] goals or requirements?” Fifty-eight percent of minorities and 41 percent of white women who responded to this question indicated they were “seldom or never” used on non-goals projects. Id.

MBE/WBEs were also asked whether the following aspects of procurement made it more difficult or impossible to obtain construction contracts: (1) bonding requirements, (2) insurance requirements, (3) large project size, (4) cost of completing proposals, (5) obtaining working capital, (6) length of notification for bid deadlines, (7) prequalification requirements, and (8) previous dealings with an agency. This question was also asked of non-MBE/WBEs in a separate survey. With one exception, MBE/WBEs considered each aspect of procurement more problematic than non-MBE/WBEs. To determine whether a firm’s size or experience explained the different responses, a regression analysis was conducted that controlled for age of the firm, number of employees, and level of revenues. The results again showed that with the same, single exception, MBE/WBEs had more difficulties than non-MBE/WBEs with the same characteristics. Id. at 968-69.

After the 1997 Study was completed, the City enacted the 1998 Ordinance. The 1998 Ordinance reduced the annual goals to 10 percent for both MBEs and WBEs and eliminated a provision which previously allowed MBE/WBEs to count their own work toward project goals. Id. at 969.

The anecdotal evidence included the testimony of the senior vice-president of a large, majority-owned construction firm who stated that when he worked in Denver, he received credible complaints from minority and women-owned construction firms that they were subject to different work rules than majority-owned firms. Id. He also testified that he frequently observed graffiti containing racial or gender epithets written on job sites in the Denver metropolitan area. Further, he stated that he believed, based on his personal experiences, that many majority-owned firms refused to hire minority- or women-owned subcontractors because they believed those firms were not competent. Id.

Several MBE/WBE witnesses testified that they experienced difficulty prequalifying for private sector projects and projects with the City and other governmental entities in Colorado. One individual testified that her company was required to prequalify for a private sector project while no similar requirement was imposed on majority-owned firms. Several others testified that they attempted to

prequalify for projects but their applications were denied even though they met the prequalification requirements. Id.

Other MBE/WBEs testified that their bids were rejected even when they were the lowest bidder; that they believed they were paid more slowly than majority-owned firms on both City projects and private sector projects; that they were charged more for supplies and materials; that they were required to do additional work not part of the subcontracting arrangement; and that they found it difficult to join unions and trade associations. Id. There was testimony detailing the difficulties MBE/WBEs experienced in obtaining lines of credit. One WBE testified that she was given a false explanation of why her loan was declined; another testified that the lending institution required the co-signature of her husband even though her husband, who also owned a construction firm, was not required to obtain her co-signature; a third testified that the bank required her father to be involved in the lending negotiations. Id.

The court also pointed out anecdotal testimony involving recitations of racially- and gender-motivated harassment experienced by MBE/WBEs at work sites. There was testimony that minority and female employees working on construction projects were physically assaulted and fondled, spat upon with chewing tobacco, and pelted with two-inch bolts thrown by males from a height of 80 feet. Id. at 969-70.

The legal framework applied by the court. The court held that the district court incorrectly believed Denver was required to prove the existence of discrimination. Instead of considering whether Denver had demonstrated strong evidence from which an inference of past or present discrimination could be drawn, the district court analyzed whether Denver's evidence showed that there is pervasive discrimination. Id. at 970. The court, quoting Concrete Works II, stated that "the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a court to make an ultimate finding of discrimination before a municipality may take affirmative steps to eradicate discrimination." Id. at 970, quoting Concrete Works II, 36 F.3d 1513, 1522 (10th Cir. 1994). Denver's initial burden was to demonstrate that strong evidence of discrimination supported its conclusion that remedial measures were necessary. Strong evidence is that "approaching a prima facie case of a constitutional or statutory violation," not irrefutable or definitive proof of discrimination. Id. at 97, quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 500. The burden of proof at all times remained with the contractor plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Denver's "evidence did not support an inference of prior discrimination and thus a remedial purpose." Id., quoting Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1176.

Denver, the court held, did introduce evidence of discrimination against each group included in the ordinances. Id. at 971. Thus, Denver's evidence did not suffer from the problem discussed by the court in Croson. The court held the district court erroneously concluded that Denver must demonstrate that the private firms directly engaged in any discrimination in which Denver passively participates do so intentionally, with the purpose of disadvantaging minorities and women. The Croson majority concluded that a "city would have a compelling interest in preventing its tax dollars from assisting [local trade] organizations in maintaining a racially segregated construction market." Id. at 971, quoting Croson, 488 U.S. 503. Thus, the court held Denver's burden was to introduce evidence which raised the inference of discriminatory exclusion in the local construction industry and linked its spending to that discrimination. Id.

The court noted the Supreme Court has stated that the inference of discriminatory exclusion can arise from statistical disparities. *Id.*, citing *Croson*, 488 U.S. at 503. Accordingly, it concluded that Denver could meet its burden through the introduction of statistical and anecdotal evidence. To the extent the district court required Denver to introduce additional evidence to show discriminatory motive or intent on the part of private construction firms, the district court erred. Denver, according to the court, was under no burden to identify any specific practice or policy that resulted in discrimination. Neither was Denver required to demonstrate that the purpose of any such practice or policy was to disadvantage women or minorities. *Id.* at 972.

The court found Denver's statistical and anecdotal evidence relevant because it identifies discrimination in the local construction industry, not simply discrimination in society. The court held the genesis of the identified discrimination is irrelevant and the district court erred when it discounted Denver's evidence on that basis. *Id.*

The court held the district court erroneously rejected the evidence Denver presented on marketplace discrimination. *Id.* at 973. The court rejected the district court's erroneous legal conclusion that a municipality may only remedy its own discrimination. The court stated this conclusion is contrary to the holdings in *Concrete Works II* and the plurality opinion in *Croson*. *Id.* The court held it previously recognized in this case that "a municipality has a compelling interest in taking affirmative steps to remedy both public *and private* discrimination specifically identified in its area." *Id.*, quoting *Concrete Works II*, 36 F.3d at 1529 (emphasis added). In *Concrete Works II*, the court stated that "we do not read *Croson* as requiring the municipality to identify an exact linkage between its award of public contracts and private discrimination." *Id.*, quoting *Concrete Works II*, 36 F.3d at 1529.

The court stated that Denver could meet its burden of demonstrating its compelling interest with evidence of private discrimination in the local construction industry coupled with evidence that it has become a passive participant in that discrimination. *Id.* at 973. Thus, Denver was not required to demonstrate that it is "guilty of prohibited discrimination" to meet its initial burden. *Id.*

Additionally, the court had previously concluded that Denver's statistical studies, which compared utilization of MBE/WBEs to availability, supported the inference that "local prime contractors" are engaged in racial and gender discrimination. *Id.* at 974, quoting *Concrete Works II*, 36 F.3d at 1529. Thus, the court held Denver's disparity studies should not have been discounted because they failed to specifically identify those individuals or firms responsible for the discrimination. *Id.*

The Court's rejection of CWC's arguments and the district court findings

Use of marketplace data. The court held the district court, inter alia, erroneously concluded that the disparity studies upon which Denver relied were significantly flawed because they measured discrimination in the overall Denver MSA construction industry, not discrimination by the City itself. *Id.* at 974. The court found that the district court's conclusion was directly contrary to the holding in *Adarand VII* that evidence of both public and private discrimination in the construction industry is relevant. *Id.*, citing *Adarand VII*, 228 F.3d at 1166-67).

The court held the conclusion reached by the majority in *Croson* that marketplace data are relevant in equal protection challenges to affirmative action programs was consistent with the approach later taken by the court in *Shaw v. Hunt*. *Id.* at 975. In *Shaw*, a majority of the court relied on the majority opinion in *Croson* for the broad proposition that a governmental entity's "interest in

remediating the effects of past or present racial discrimination may in the proper case justify a government's use of racial distinctions." *Id.*, quoting *Shaw*, 517 U.S. at 909. The *Shaw* court did not adopt any requirement that only discrimination by the governmental entity, either directly or by utilizing firms engaged in discrimination on projects funded by the entity, was remediable. The court, however, did set out two conditions that must be met for the governmental entity to show a compelling interest. "First, the discrimination must be identified discrimination." *Id.* at 976, quoting *Shaw*, 517 U.S. at 910. The City can satisfy this condition by identifying the discrimination, "'public or private, with some specificity.'" *Id.* at 976, citing *Shaw*, 517 U.S. at 910, quoting *Croson*, 488 U.S. at 504 (emphasis added). The governmental entity must also have a "strong basis in evidence to conclude that remedial action was necessary." *Id.* Thus, the court concluded *Shaw* specifically stated that evidence of either public or private discrimination could be used to satisfy the municipality's burden of producing strong evidence. *Id.* at 976.

In *Adarand VII*, the court noted it concluded that evidence of marketplace discrimination can be used to support a compelling interest in remediating past or present discrimination through the use of affirmative action legislation. *Id.*, citing *Adarand VII*, 228 F.3d at 1166-67 ("[W]e may consider public and private discrimination not only in the specific area of government procurement contracts but also in the construction industry generally; thus *any findings Congress has made as to the entire construction industry are relevant.*" (emphasis added)). Further, the court pointed out in this case it earlier rejected the argument CWC reasserted here that marketplace data are irrelevant and remanded the case to the district court to determine whether Denver could link its public spending to "the Denver MSA evidence of industry-wide discrimination." *Id.*, quoting *Concrete Works II*, 36 F.3d at 1529. The court stated that evidence explaining "the Denver government's role in contributing to the underutilization of MBEs and WBEs in the *private construction market in the Denver MSA*" was relevant to Denver's burden of producing strong evidence. *Id.*, quoting *Concrete Works II*, 36 F.3d at 1530 (emphasis added).

Consistent with the court's mandate in *Concrete Works II*, the City attempted to show at trial that it "indirectly contributed to private discrimination by awarding public contracts to firms that in turn discriminated against MBE and/or WBE subcontractors in other private portions of their business." *Id.* The City can demonstrate that it is a "passive participant" in a system of racial exclusion practiced by elements of the local construction industry" by compiling evidence of marketplace discrimination and then linking its spending practices to the private discrimination. *Id.*, quoting *Croson*, 488 U.S. at 492.

The court rejected CWC's argument that the lending discrimination studies and business formation studies presented by Denver were irrelevant. In *Adarand VII*, the court concluded that evidence of discriminatory barriers to the formation of businesses by minorities and women and fair competition between MBE/WBEs and majority-owned construction firms shows a "strong link" between a government's "disbursements of public funds for construction contracts and the channeling of those funds due to private discrimination." *Id.* at 977, quoting *Adarand VII*, 228 F.3d at 1167-68. The court found that evidence that private discrimination resulted in barriers to business formation is relevant because it demonstrates that MBE/WBEs are precluded *at the outset* from competing for public construction contracts. The court also found that evidence of barriers to fair competition is relevant because it again demonstrates that *existing* MBE/WBEs are precluded from competing for public contracts. Thus, like the studies measuring disparities in the utilization of MBE/WBEs in the Denver MSA construction industry, studies showing that discriminatory barriers to business

formation exist in the Denver construction industry are relevant to the City's showing that it indirectly participates in industry discrimination. Id. at 977.

The City presented evidence of lending discrimination to support its position that MBE/WBEs in the Denver MSA construction industry face discriminatory barriers to business formation. Denver introduced a disparity study prepared in 1996 and sponsored by the Denver Community Reinvestment Alliance, Colorado Capital Initiatives, and the City. The Study ultimately concluded that “despite the fact that loan applicants of three different racial/ethnic backgrounds in this sample were not appreciably different as businesspeople, they were ultimately treated differently by the lenders on the crucial issue of loan approval or denial.” Id. at 977-78. In Adarand VII, the court concluded that this study, among other evidence, “strongly support[ed] an initial showing of discrimination in lending.” Id. at 978, quoting Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1170, n. 13 (“Lending discrimination alone of course does not justify action in the construction market. However, the persistence of such discrimination ... supports the assertion that the formation, as well as utilization, of minority-owned construction enterprises has been impeded.”). The City also introduced anecdotal evidence of lending discrimination in the Denver construction industry.

CWC did not present any evidence that undermined the reliability of the lending discrimination evidence but simply repeated the argument, foreclosed by circuit precedent, that it is irrelevant. The court rejected the district court criticism of the evidence because it failed to determine whether the discrimination resulted from discriminatory attitudes or from the neutral application of banking regulations. The court concluded, that discriminatory motive can be inferred from the results shown in disparity studies. The court held the district court's criticism did not undermine the study's reliability as an indicator that the City is passively participating in marketplace discrimination. The court noted that, in Adarand VII it took “judicial notice of the obvious causal connection between access to capital and ability to implement public works construction projects.” Id. at 978, quoting Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1170.

Denver also introduced evidence of discriminatory barriers to competition faced by MBE/WBEs in the form of business formation studies. The 1990 Study and the 1995 Study both showed that all minority groups in the Denver MSA formed their own construction firms at rates lower than the total population but that women formed construction firms at higher rates. The 1997 Study examined self-employment rates and controlled for gender, marital status, education, availability of capital, and personal/family variables. As discussed, *supra*, the Study concluded that African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans working in the construction industry have lower rates of self-employment than similarly situated whites. Asian Americans had higher rates. The 1997 Study also concluded that minority and female business owners in the construction industry, with the exception of Asian American owners, have lower earnings than white male owners. This conclusion was reached after controlling for education, age, marital status, and disabilities. Id. at 978.

The court held that the district court's conclusion that the business formation studies could not be used to justify the ordinances conflicts with its holding in Adarand VII. “[T]he existence of evidence indicating that the number of [MBEs] would be significantly (but unquantifiably) higher but for such barriers is nevertheless relevant to the assessment of whether a disparity is sufficiently significant to give rise to an inference of discriminatory exclusion.” Id. at 979, quoting Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1174.

In sum, the court held the district court erred when it refused to consider or give sufficient weight to the lending discrimination study, the business formation studies, and the studies measuring marketplace discrimination. That evidence was legally relevant to the City's burden of demonstrating a strong basis in evidence to support its conclusion that remedial legislation was necessary. Id. at 979-80.

Variables. CWC challenged Denver's disparity studies as unreliable because the disparities shown in the studies may be attributable to firm size and experience rather than discrimination. Denver countered, however, that a firm's size has little effect on its qualifications or its ability to provide construction services and that MBE/WBEs, like all construction firms, can perform most services either by hiring additional employees or by employing subcontractors. CWC responded that elasticity itself is relative to size and experience; MBE/WBEs are less capable of expanding because they are smaller and less experienced. Id. at 980.

The court concluded that even if it assumed that MBE/WBEs are less able to expand because of their smaller size and more limited experience, CWC did not respond to Denver's argument and the evidence it presented showing that experience and size are not race- and gender-neutral variables and that MBE/WBE construction firms are generally smaller and less experienced *because* of industry discrimination. Id. at 981. The lending discrimination and business formation studies, according to the court, both strongly supported Denver's argument that MBE/WBEs are smaller and less experienced because of marketplace and industry discrimination. In addition, Denver's expert testified that discrimination by banks or bonding companies would reduce a firm's revenue and the number of employees it could hire. Id.

Denver also argued its Studies controlled for size and the 1995 Study controlled for experience. It asserted that the 1990 Study measured revenues per employee for construction for MBE/WBEs and concluded that the resulting disparities, "suggest[] that even among firms of the same employment size, industry utilization of MBEs and WBEs was lower than that of non-minority male-owned firms." Id. at 982. Similarly, the 1995 Study controlled for size, calculating, *inter alia*, disparity indices for firms with no paid employees which presumably are the same size.

Based on the uncontroverted evidence presented at trial, the court concluded that the district court did not give sufficient weight to Denver's disparity studies because of its erroneous conclusion that the studies failed to adequately control for size and experience. The court held that Denver is permitted to make assumptions about capacity and qualification of MBE/WBEs to perform construction services if it can support those assumptions. The court found the assumptions made in this case were consistent with the evidence presented at trial and supported the City's position that a firm's size does not affect its qualifications, willingness, or ability to perform construction services and that the smaller size and lesser experience of MBE/WBEs are, themselves, the result of industry discrimination. Further, the court pointed out CWC did not conduct its own disparity study using marketplace data and thus did not demonstrate that the disparities shown in Denver's studies would decrease or disappear if the studies controlled for size and experience to CWC's satisfaction. Consequently, the court held CWC's rebuttal evidence was insufficient to meet its burden of discrediting Denver's disparity studies on the issue of size and experience. Id. at 982.

Specialization. The district court also faulted Denver’s disparity studies because they did not control for firm specialization. The court noted the district court’s criticism would be appropriate only if there was evidence that MBE/WBEs are more likely to specialize in certain construction fields. Id. at 982.

The court found there was no identified evidence showing that certain construction specializations require skills less likely to be possessed by MBE/WBEs. The court found relevant the testimony of the City’s expert, that the data he reviewed showed that MBEs were represented “widely across the different [construction] specializations.” Id. at 982-83. There was no contrary testimony that aggregation bias caused the disparities shown in Denver’s studies. Id. at 983.

The court held that CWC failed to demonstrate that the disparities shown in Denver’s studies are eliminated when there is control for firm specialization. In contrast, one of the Denver studies, which controlled for SIC-code subspecialty and still showed disparities, provided support for Denver’s argument that firm specialization does not explain the disparities. Id. at 983.

The court pointed out that disparity studies may make assumptions about availability as long as the same assumptions can be made for all firms. Id. at 983.

Utilization of MBE/WBEs on City projects. CWC argued that Denver could not demonstrate a compelling interest because it overutilized MBE/WBEs on City construction projects. This argument, according to the court, was an extension of CWC’s argument that Denver could justify the ordinances only by presenting evidence of discrimination by the City itself or by contractors while working on City projects. Because the court concluded that Denver could satisfy its burden by showing that it is an indirect participant in industry discrimination, CWC’s argument relating to the utilization of MBE/WBEs on City projects goes only to the weight of Denver’s evidence. Id. at 984.

Consistent with the court’s mandate in Concrete Works II, at trial Denver sought to demonstrate that the utilization data from projects subject to the goals program were tainted by the program and “reflect[ed] the intended remedial effect on MBE and WBE utilization.” Id. at 984, quoting Concrete Works II, 36 F.3d at 1526. Denver argued that the non-goals data were the better indicator of past discrimination in public contracting than the data on all City construction projects. Id. at 984-85. The court concluded that Denver presented ample evidence to support the conclusion that the evidence showing MBE/WBE utilization on City projects not subject to the ordinances or the goals programs is the better indicator of discrimination in City contracting. Id. at 985.

The court rejected CWC’s argument that the marketplace data were irrelevant but agreed that the non-goals data were also relevant to Denver’s burden. The court noted that Denver did not rely heavily on the non-goals data at trial but focused primarily on the marketplace studies to support its burden. Id. at 985.

In sum, the court held Denver demonstrated that the utilization of MBE/WBEs on City projects had been affected by the affirmative action programs that had been in place in one form or another since 1977. Thus, the non-goals data were the better indicator of discrimination in public contracting. The court concluded that, on balance, the non-goals data provided some support for Denver’s position that racial and gender discrimination existed in public contracting before the enactment of the ordinances. Id. at 987-88.

Anecdotal evidence. The anecdotal evidence, according to the court, included several incidents involving profoundly disturbing behavior on the part of lenders, majority-owned firms, and individual employees. *Id.* at 989. The court found that the anecdotal testimony revealed behavior that was not merely sophomoric or insensitive, but which resulted in real economic or physical harm. While CWC also argued that all new or small contractors have difficulty obtaining credit and that treatment the witnesses characterized as discriminatory is experienced by all contractors, Denver’s witnesses specifically testified that they believed the incidents they experienced were motivated by race or gender discrimination. The court found they supported those beliefs with testimony that majority-owned firms were not subject to the same requirements imposed on them. *Id.*

The court held there was no merit to CWC’s argument that the witnesses’ accounts must be verified to provide support for Denver’s burden. The court stated that anecdotal evidence is nothing more than a witness’ narrative of an incident told from the witness’ perspective and including the witness’ perceptions. *Id.*

After considering Denver’s anecdotal evidence, the district court found that the evidence “shows that race, ethnicity and gender affect the construction industry and those who work in it” and that the egregious mistreatment of minority and women employees “had direct financial consequences” on construction firms. *Id.* at 989, quoting *Concrete Works III*, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 1074, 1073. Based on the district court’s findings regarding Denver’s anecdotal evidence and its review of the record, the court concluded that the anecdotal evidence provided persuasive, un rebutted support for Denver’s initial burden. *Id.* at 989-90, citing *Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States*, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) (concluding that anecdotal evidence presented in a pattern or practice discrimination case was persuasive because it “brought the cold [statistics] convincingly to life”).

Summary. The court held the record contained extensive evidence supporting Denver’s position that it had a strong basis in evidence for concluding that the 1990 Ordinance and the 1998 Ordinance were necessary to remediate discrimination against both MBEs and WBEs. *Id.* at 990. The information available to Denver and upon which the ordinances were predicated, according to the court, indicated that discrimination was persistent in the local construction industry and that Denver was, at least, an indirect participant in that discrimination.

To rebut Denver’s evidence, the court stated CWC was required to “establish that Denver’s evidence did not constitute strong evidence of such discrimination.” *Id.* at 991, quoting *Concrete Works II*, 36 F.3d at 1523. CWC could not meet its burden of proof through conjecture and unsupported criticisms of Denver’s evidence. Rather, it must present “credible, particularized evidence.” *Id.*, quoting *Adarand VII*, 228 F.3d at 1175. The court held that CWC did not meet its burden. CWC *hypothesized* that the disparities shown in the studies on which Denver relies could be explained by any number of factors other than racial discrimination. However, the court found it did not conduct its own marketplace disparity study controlling for the disputed variables and presented no other evidence from which the court could conclude that such variables explain the disparities. *Id.* at 991-92.

Narrow tailoring. Having concluded that Denver demonstrated a compelling interest in the race-based measures and an important governmental interest in the gender-based measures, the court held it must examine whether the ordinances were narrowly tailored to serve the compelling interest and are substantially related to the achievement of the important governmental interest. *Id.* at 992.

The court stated it had previously concluded in its earlier decisions that Denver’s program was narrowly tailored. CWC appealed the grant of summary judgment and that appeal culminated in the decision in Concrete Works II. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the compelling-interest issue and concluded that CWC had waived any challenge to the narrow tailoring conclusion reached by the district court. Because the court found Concrete Works did not challenge the district court’s conclusion with respect to the second prong of Croson’s strict scrutiny standard — i.e., that the Ordinance is narrowly tailored to remedy past and present discrimination — the court held it need not address this issue. Id. at 992, citing Concrete Works II, 36 F.3d at 1531, n. 24.

The court concluded that the district court lacked authority to address the narrow tailoring issue on remand because none of the exceptions to the law of the case doctrine are applicable. The district court’s earlier determination that Denver’s affirmative-action measures were narrowly tailored is law of the case and binding on the parties.

3. Kornhass Construction, Inc. v. State of Oklahoma, Department of Central Services, 140 F.Supp.2d 1232 (W.D. OK. 2001)

Plaintiffs, non-minority contractors, brought this action against the State of Oklahoma challenging minority bid preference provisions in the Oklahoma Minority Business Enterprise Assistance Act (“MBE Act”). The Oklahoma MBE Act established a bid preference program by which certified minority business enterprises are given favorable treatment on competitive bids submitted to the state. 140 F.Supp.2d at 1235–36. Under the MBE Act, the bids of non-minority contractors were raised by 5 percent, placing them at a competitive disadvantage according to the district court. Id. at 1235–1236.

The named plaintiffs bid on state contracts in which their bids were increased by 5 percent as they were non-minority business enterprises. Although the plaintiffs actually submitted the lowest dollar bids, once the 5 percent factor was applied, minority bidders became the successful bidders on certain contracts. 140 F.Supp. at 1237.

In determining the constitutionality or validity of the Oklahoma MBE Act, the district court was guided in its analysis by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 288 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Adarand VII”). The district court pointed out that in Adarand VII, the Tenth Circuit found compelling evidence of barriers to both minority business formation and existing minority businesses. Id. at 1238. In sum, the district court noted that the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Government had met its burden of presenting a strong basis in evidence sufficient to support its articulated, constitutionally valid, compelling interest. 140 F.Supp. 2d at 1239, citing Adarand VII, 228 F.3d 1147, 1174.

Compelling state interest. The district court, following Adarand VII, applied the strict scrutiny analysis, arising out of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, in which a race-based affirmative action program withstands strict scrutiny only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Id. at 1239. The district court pointed out that it is clear from Supreme Court precedent, there may be a compelling interest sufficient to justify race-conscious affirmative action measures. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment permits race-conscious programs that seek both to eradicate discrimination by the governmental entity itself and to prevent the governmental entity from becoming a “passive participant” in a system of racial exclusion practiced

by private businesses. Id. at 1240. Therefore, the district court concluded that both the federal and state governments have a compelling interest assuring that public dollars do not serve to finance the evil of private prejudice. Id.

The district court stated that a “mere statistical disparity in the proportion of contracts awarded to a particular group, standing alone, does not demonstrate the evil of private or public racial prejudice.” Id. Rather, the court held that the “benchmark for judging the adequacy of a state’s factual predicate for affirmative action legislation is whether there exists a strong basis in the evidence of the state’s conclusion that remedial action was necessary.” Id. The district court found that the Supreme Court made it clear that the state bears the burden of demonstrating a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary by proving either that the state itself discriminated in the past or was “a passive participant” in private industry’s discriminatory practices. Id. at 1240, citing to Associated General Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730, 735 (6th Cir. 2000) and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company, 488 U.S. 469 at 486-492 (1989).

With this background, the State of Oklahoma stated that its compelling state interest “is to promote the economy of the State and to ensure that minority business enterprises are given an opportunity to compete for state contracts.” Id. at 1240. Thus, the district court found the State admitted that the MBE Act’s bid preference “is not based on past discrimination,” rather, it is based on a desire to “encourag[e] economic development of minority business enterprises which in turn will benefit the State of Oklahoma as a whole.” Id. In light of Adarand VII, and prevailing Supreme Court case law, the district court found that this articulated interest is not “compelling” in the absence of evidence of past or present racial discrimination. Id.

The district court considered testimony presented by Intervenors who participated in the case for the defendants and asserted that the Oklahoma legislature conducted an interim study prior to adoption of the MBE Act, during which testimony and evidence were presented to members of the Oklahoma Legislative Black Caucus and other participating legislators. The study was conducted more than 14 years prior to the case and the Intervenors did not actually offer any of the evidence to the court in this case. The Intervenors submitted an affidavit from the witness who serves as the Title VI Coordinator for the Oklahoma Department of Transportation. The court found that the affidavit from the witness averred in general terms that minority businesses were discriminated against in the awarding of state contracts. The district court found that the Intervenors have not produced — or indeed even described — the evidence of discrimination. Id. at 1241. The district court found that it cannot be discerned from the documents which minority businesses were the victims of discrimination, or which racial or ethnic groups were targeted by such alleged discrimination. Id.

The court also found that the Intervenors’ evidence did not indicate what discriminatory acts or practices allegedly occurred, or when they occurred. Id. The district court stated that the Intervenors did not identify “a single qualified, minority-owned bidder who was excluded from a state contract.” Id. The district court, thus, held that broad allegations of “systematic” exclusion of minority businesses were not sufficient to constitute a compelling governmental interest in remedying past or current discrimination. Id. at 1242. The district court stated that this was particularly true in light of the “State’s admission here that the State’s governmental interest was not in remedying past discrimination in the state competitive bidding process, but in ‘encouraging economic development of minority business enterprises which in turn will benefit the State of Oklahoma as a whole.’” Id. at 1242.

The court found that the State defendants failed to produce any admissible evidence of a single, specific discriminatory act, or any substantial evidence showing a pattern of deliberate exclusion from state contracts of minority-owned businesses. Id. at 1241 - 1242, footnote 11.

The district court also noted that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Drabik rejected Ohio's statistical evidence of underutilization of minority contractors because the evidence did not report the actual use of minority firms; rather, they reported only the use of those minority firms that had gone to the trouble of being certified and listed by the state. Id. at 1242, footnote 12. The district court stated that, as in Drabik, the evidence presented in support of the Oklahoma MBE Act failed to account for the possibility that some minority contractors might not register with the state, and the statistics did not account for any contracts awarded to businesses with minority ownership of less than 51 percent, or for contracts performed in large part by minority-owned subcontractors where the prime contractor was not a certified minority-owned business. Id.

The district court found that the MBE Act's minority bidding preference was not predicated upon a finding of discrimination in any particular industry or region of the state, or discrimination against any particular racial or ethnic group. The court stated that there was no evidence offered of actual discrimination, past or present, against the specific racial and ethnic groups to whom the preference was extended, other than an attempt to show a history of discrimination against African Americans. Id. at 1242.

Narrow tailoring. The district court found that even if the State's goals could be considered "compelling," the State did not show that the MBE Act was narrowly tailored to serve those goals. The court pointed out that the Tenth Circuit in Adarand VII identified six factors the court must consider in determining whether the MBE Act's minority preference provisions were sufficiently narrowly tailored to satisfy equal protection: (1) the availability of race-neutral alternative remedies; (2) limits on the duration of the challenged preference provisions; (3) flexibility of the preference provisions; (4) numerical proportionality; (5) the burden on third parties; and (6) over- or under-inclusiveness. Id. at 1242-1243.

First, in terms of race-neutral alternative remedies, the court found that the evidence offered showed, at most, that nominal efforts were made to assist minority-owned businesses prior to the adoption of the MBE Act's racial preference program. Id. at 1243. The court considered evidence regarding the Minority Assistance Program, but found that to be primarily informational services only, and was not designed to actually assist minorities or other disadvantaged contractors to obtain contracts with the State of Oklahoma. Id. at 1243. In contrast to this "informational" program, the court noted the Tenth Circuit in Adarand VII favorably considered the federal government's use of racially neutral alternatives aimed at disadvantaged businesses, including assistance with obtaining project bonds, assistance with securing capital financing, technical assistance, and other programs designed to assist start-up businesses. Id. at 1243 citing Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1178-1179.

The district court found that it does not appear from the evidence that Oklahoma's Minority Assistance Program provided the type of race-neutral relief required by the Tenth Circuit in Adarand VII, in the Supreme Court in the Croson decision, nor does it appear that the Program was racially neutral. Id. at 1243. The court found that the State of Oklahoma did not show any meaningful form of assistance to new or disadvantaged businesses prior to the adoption of the MBE Act, and thus, the court found that the state defendants had not shown that Oklahoma considered race-neutral

alternative means to achieve the state's goal prior to adoption of the minority bid preference provisions. *Id.* at 1243.

In a footnote, the district court pointed out that the Tenth Circuit has recognized racially neutral programs designed to assist *all* new or financially disadvantaged businesses in obtaining government contracts tend to benefit minority-owned businesses, and can help alleviate the effects of past and present-day discrimination. *Id.* at 1243, footnote 15 citing Adarand VII.

The court considered the evidence offered of post-enactment efforts by the State to increase minority participation in State contracting. The court found that most of these efforts were directed toward encouraging the participation of certified minority business enterprises, "and are thus not racially neutral. This evidence fails to demonstrate that the State employed race-neutral alternative measures prior to or after adopting the Minority Business Enterprise Assistance Act." *Id.* at 1244. Some of the efforts the court found were directed toward encouraging the participation of certified minority business enterprises and thus not racially neutral, included mailing vendor registration forms to minority vendors, telephoning and mailing letters to minority vendors, providing assistance to vendors in completing registration forms, assuring the vendors received bid information, preparing a minority business directory and distributing it to all state agencies, periodically mailing construction project information to minority vendors, and providing commodity information to minority vendors upon request. *Id.* at 1244, footnote 16.

In terms of durational limits and flexibility, the court found that the "goal" of 10 percent of the state's contracts being awarded to certified minority business enterprises had never been reached, or even approached, during the thirteen years since the MBE Act was implemented. *Id.* at 1244. The court found the defendants offered no evidence that the bid preference was likely to end at any time in the foreseeable future, or that it is otherwise limited in its duration. *Id.* Unlike the federal programs at issue in Adarand VII, the court stated the Oklahoma MBE Act has no inherent time limit, and no provision for disadvantaged minority-owned businesses to "graduate" from preference eligibility. *Id.* The court found the MBE Act was not limited to those minority-owned businesses which are shown to be economically disadvantaged. *Id.*

The court stated that the MBE Act made no attempt to address or remedy any actual, demonstrated past or present racial discrimination, and the MBE Act's duration was not tied in any way to the eradication of such discrimination. *Id.* Instead, the court found the MBE Act rests on the "questionable assumption that 10 percent of all state contract dollars should be awarded to certified minority-owned and operated businesses, without any showing that this assumption is reasonable." *Id.* at 1244.

By the terms of the MBE Act, the minority preference provisions would continue in place for five years after the goal of 10 percent minority participation was reached, and thus the district court concluded that the MBE Act's minority preference provisions lacked reasonable durational limits. *Id.* at 1245.

With regard to the factor of "numerical proportionality" between the MBE Act's aspirational goal and the number of existing available minority-owned businesses, the court found the MBE Act's 10 percent goal was not based upon demonstrable evidence of the availability of minority contractors who were either qualified to bid or who were ready, willing and able to become qualified to bid on

state contracts. Id. at 1246–1247. The court pointed out that the MBE Act made no attempt to distinguish between the four minority racial groups, so that contracts awarded to members of all of the preferred races were aggregated in determining whether the 10 percent aspirational goal had been reached. Id. at 1246. In addition, the court found the MBE Act aggregated all state contracts for goods and services, so that minority participation was determined by the total number of dollars spent on state contracts. Id.

The court stated that in Adarand VII, the Tenth Circuit rejected the contention that the aspirational goals were required to correspond to an actual finding as to the number of existing minority-owned businesses. Id. at 1246. The court noted that the government submitted evidence in Adarand VII, that the effects of past discrimination had excluded minorities from entering the construction industry, and that the number of available minority subcontractors reflected that discrimination. Id. In light of this evidence, the district court said the Tenth Circuit held that the existing percentage of minority-owned businesses is “not necessarily an absolute cap” on the percentage that a remedial program might legitimately seek to achieve. Id. at 1246, citing Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1181.

Unlike Adarand VII, the court found that the Oklahoma State defendants did not offer “substantial evidence” that the minorities given preferential treatment under the MBE Act were prevented, through past discrimination, from entering any particular industry, or that the number of available minority subcontractors in that industry reflects that discrimination. 140 F.Supp.2d at 1246. The court concluded that the Oklahoma State defendants did not offer any evidence of the number of minority-owned businesses doing business in any of the many industries covered by the MBE Act. Id. at 1246–1247.

With regard to the impact on third parties factor, the court pointed out the Tenth Circuit in Adarand VII stated the mere possibility that innocent parties will share the burden of a remedial program is itself insufficient to warrant the conclusion that the program is not narrowly tailored. Id. at 1247. The district court found the MBE Act’s bid preference provisions prevented non-minority businesses from competing on an equal basis with certified minority business enterprises, and that in some instances plaintiffs had been required to lower their intended bids because they knew minority firms were bidding. Id. The court pointed out that the 5 percent preference is applicable to *all* contracts awarded under the state’s Central Purchasing Act with no time limitation. Id.

In terms of the “under- and over-inclusiveness” factor, the court observed that the MBE Act extended its bidding preference to several racial minority groups without regard to whether each of those groups had suffered from the effects of past or present racial discrimination. Id. at 1247. The district court reiterated the Oklahoma State defendants did not offer any evidence at all that the minority racial groups identified in the Act had actually suffered from discrimination. Id.

Second, the district court found the MBE Act’s bidding preference extends to all contracts for goods and services awarded under the State’s Central Purchasing Act, without regard to whether members of the preferred minority groups had been the victims of past or present discrimination within that particular industry or trade. Id.

Third, the district court noted the preference extends to all businesses certified as minority-owned and controlled, without regard to whether a particular business is economically or socially disadvantaged, or has suffered from the effects of past or present discrimination. Id. The court thus

found that the factor of over-inclusiveness weighs against a finding that the MBE Act was narrowly tailored. Id.

The district court in conclusion found that the Oklahoma MBE Act violated the Constitution's Fifth Amendment guarantee of equal protection and granted the plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.

E. Recent Decisions Involving the Federal DBE Program and Federally-Funded Projects in Other Jurisdictions

There are several recent and pending cases involving challenges to the United States Federal DBE Program and its implementation by the states and their governmental entities for federally-funded projects. These cases could have a significant impact on the nature and provisions of contracting and procurement on federally-funded projects, including and relating to the utilization of DBEs. In addition, these cases provide an instructive analysis of the recent application of the strict scrutiny test to MBE/WBE- and DBE-type programs.

1. Northern Contracting, Inc. v. Illinois, 473 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2007).

In Northern Contracting, Inc. v. Illinois, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court decision upholding the validity and constitutionality of the Illinois Department of Transportation's ("IDOT") DBE Program. Plaintiff Northern Contracting Inc. ("NCI") was a white male-owned construction company specializing in the construction of guardrails and fences for highway construction projects in Illinois. 473 F.3d 715, 717 (7th Cir. 2007). Initially, NCI challenged the constitutionality of both the federal regulations and the Illinois statute implementing these regulations. Id. at 719. The district court granted the USDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment, concluding that the federal government had demonstrated a compelling interest and that TEA-21 was sufficiently narrowly tailored. NCI did not challenge this ruling and thereby forfeited the opportunity to challenge the federal regulations. Id. at 720. NCI also forfeited the argument that IDOT's DBE program did not serve a compelling government interest. Id. The sole issue on appeal to the Seventh Circuit was whether IDOT's program was narrowly tailored. Id.

IDOT typically adopted a new DBE plan each year. Id. at 718. In preparing for Fiscal Year 2005, IDOT retained a consulting firm to determine DBE availability. Id. The consultant first identified the relevant geographic market (Illinois) and the relevant product market (transportation infrastructure construction). Id. The consultant then determined availability of minority- and women-owned firms through analysis of Dun & Bradstreet's Marketplace data. Id. This initial list was corrected for errors in the data by surveying the D&B list. Id. In light of these surveys, the consultant arrived at a DBE availability of 22.77 percent. Id. The consultant then ran a regression analysis on earnings and business information and concluded that in the absence of discrimination, relative DBE availability would be 27.5 percent. Id. IDOT considered this, along with other data, including DBE utilization on IDOT's "zero goal" experiment conducted in 2002 to 2003, in which IDOT did not use DBE goals on 5 percent of its contracts (1.5% utilization) and data of DBE utilization on projects for the Illinois State Toll Highway Authority which does not receive federal funding and whose goals are completely voluntary (1.6% utilization). Id. at 719. On the basis of all of this data, IDOT adopted a 22.77 percent goal for 2005. Id.

Despite the fact the NCI forfeited the argument that IDOT's DBE program did not serve a compelling state interest, the Seventh Circuit briefly addressed the compelling interest prong of the strict scrutiny analysis, noting that IDOT had satisfied its burden. Id. at 720. The court noted that, post-Adarand, two other circuits have held that a state may rely on the federal government's compelling interest in implementing a local DBE plan. Id. at 720-21, citing Western States Paving Co., Inc. v. Washington State DOT, 407 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 1332 (Feb. 21, 2006) and Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minnesota DOT, 345 F.3d 964, 970 (8th Cir. 2003),

cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1041 (2004). The court stated that NCI had not articulated any reason to break ranks from the other circuits and explained that “[i]nsofar as the state is merely complying with federal law it is acting as the agent of the federal government If the state does exactly what the statute expects it to do, and the statute is conceded for purposes of litigation to be constitutional, we do not see how the state can be thought to have violated the Constitution.” Id. at 721, quoting Milwaukee County Pavers Association v. Fielder, 922 F.2d 419, 423 (7th Cir. 1991). The court did not address whether IDOT had an independent interest that could have survived constitutional scrutiny.

In addressing the narrowly tailored prong with respect to IDOT’s DBE program, the court held that IDOT had complied. Id. The court concluded its holding in Milwaukee that a state is insulated from a constitutional attack absent a showing that the state exceeded its federal authority remained applicable. Id. at 721-22. The court noted that the Supreme Court in Adarand Constructors v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) did not seize the opportunity to overrule that decision, explaining that the Court did not invalidate its conclusion that a challenge to a state’s application of a federally mandated program must be limited to the question of whether the state exceeded its authority. Id. at 722.

The court further clarified the Milwaukee opinion in light of the interpretations of the opinions offered in by the Ninth Circuit in Western States and Eighth Circuit in Sherbrooke. Id. The court stated that the Ninth Circuit in Western States misread the Milwaukee decision in concluding that Milwaukee did not address the situation of an as-applied challenge to a DBE program. Id. at 722, n.5. Relatedly, the court stated that the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Sherbrooke (that the Milwaukee decision was compromised by the fact that it was decided under the prior law “when the 10 percent federal set-aside was more mandatory”) was unconvincing since all recipients of federal transportation funds are still required to have compliant DBE programs. Id. at 722. Federal law makes more clear now that the compliance could be achieved even with no DBE utilization if that were the result of a good faith use of the process. Id. at 722, n.5. The court stated that IDOT in this case was acting as an instrument of federal policy and NCI’s collateral attack on the federal regulations was impermissible. Id. at 722.

The remainder of the court’s opinion addressed the question of whether IDOT exceeded its grant of authority under federal law, and held that all of NCI’s arguments failed. Id. First, NCI challenged the method by which the local base figure was calculated, the first step in the goal-setting process. Id. NCI argued that the number of registered and prequalified DBEs in Illinois should have simply been counted. Id. The court stated that while the federal regulations list several examples of methods for determining the local base figure, Id. at 723, these examples are not intended as an exhaustive list. The court pointed out that the fifth item in the list is entitled “Alternative Methods,” and states: “You may use other methods to determine a base figure for your overall goal. Any methodology you choose must be based on demonstrable evidence of local market conditions and be designated to ultimately attain a goal that is rationally related to the relative availability of DBEs in your market.” Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 26.45©(5)). According to the court, the regulations make clear that “relative availability” means “the availability of ready, willing and able DBEs relative to all business ready, willing, and able to participate” on DOT contracts. Id. The court stated NCI pointed to nothing in the federal regulations that indicated that a recipient must so narrowly define the scope of the ready, willing, and available firms to a simple count of the number of registered and prequalified DBEs. Id.

The court agreed with the district court that the remedial nature of the federal scheme militates in favor of a method of DBE availability calculation that casts a broader net. Id.

Second, NCI argued that the IDOT failed to properly adjust its goal based on local market conditions. Id. The court noted that the federal regulations do not require any adjustments to the base figure, but simply provide recipients with authority to make such adjustments if necessary. Id. According to the court, NCI failed to identify any aspect of the regulations requiring IDOT to separate prime contractor availability from subcontractor availability, and pointed out that the regulations require the local goal to be focused on overall DBE participation. Id.

Third, NCI contended that IDOT violated the federal regulations by failing to meet the maximum feasible portion of its overall goal through race-neutral means of facilitating DBE participation. Id. at 723-24. NCI argued that IDOT should have considered DBEs who had won subcontracts on goal projects where the prime contractor did not consider DBE status, instead of only considering DBEs who won contracts on no-goal projects. Id. at 724. The court held that while the regulations indicate that where DBEs win subcontracts on goal projects strictly through low bid this can be counted as race-neutral participation, the regulations did not require IDOT to search for this data, for the purpose of calculating past levels of race-neutral DBE participation. Id. According to the court, the record indicated that IDOT used nearly all the methods described in the regulations to maximize the portion of the goal that will be achieved through race-neutral means. Id.

The court affirmed the decision of the district court upholding the validity of the IDOT DBE program and found that it was narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. Id.

2. Northern Contracting, Inc. v. Illinois, 2005 WL 2230195 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2005), aff'd 473 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2007).

This decision is the district court's order that was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. This decision is instructive in that it is one of the recent cases to address the validity of the Federal DBE Program and local and state governments' implementation of the program as recipients of federal funds. The case also is instructive in that the court set forth a detailed analysis of race-, ethnicity-, and gender-neutral measures as well as evidentiary data required to satisfy constitutional scrutiny.

The district court conducted a trial after denying the parties' Motions for Summary Judgment in Northern Contracting, Inc. v. State of Illinois, Illinois DOT, and USDOT, 2004 WL 422704 (N.D. Ill. March 3, 2004), discussed infra. The following summarizes the opinion of the district court.

Northern Contracting, Inc. (the "plaintiff"), an Illinois highway contractor, sued the State of Illinois, the Illinois DOT, the United States DOT, and federal and state officials seeking a declaration that federal statutory provisions, the federal implementing regulations ("TEA-21"), the state statute authorizing the DBE program, and the Illinois DBE program itself were unlawful and unconstitutional. 2005 WL 2230195 at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2005).

Under TEA-21, a recipient of federal funds is required to meet the "maximum feasible portion" of its DBE goal through race-neutral means. Id. at *4 (citing regulations). If a recipient projects that it cannot meet its overall DBE goal through race-neutral means, it must establish contract goals to the extent necessary to achieve the overall DBE goal. Id. (citing regulation). [The court provided an

overview of the pertinent regulations including compliance requirements and qualifications for DBE status.]

Statistical evidence. To calculate its 2005 DBE participation goals, IDOT followed the two-step process set forth in TEA-21: (1) calculation of a base figure for the relative availability of DBEs, and (2) consideration of a possible adjustment of the base figure to reflect the effects of the DBE program and the level of participation that would be expected but for the effects of past and present discrimination. Id. at *6. IDOT engaged in a study to calculate its base figure and conduct a custom census to determine whether a more reliable method of calculation existed as opposed to IDOT's previous method of reviewing a bidder's list. Id.

In compliance with TEA-21, IDOT used a study to evaluate the base figure using a six-part analysis: (1) the study identified the appropriate and relevant geographic market for IDOT's contracting activity and its prime contractors as the State of Illinois; (2) the study identified the relevant product markets in which IDOT and its prime contractors contract; (3) the study sought to identify all available contractors and subcontractors in the relevant industries within Illinois using Dun & Bradstreet's Marketplace; (4) the study collected lists of DBEs from IDOT and twenty other public and private agencies; (5) the study attempted to correct for the possibility that certain businesses listed as DBEs were no longer qualified or, alternatively, businesses not listed as DBEs but qualified as such under the federal regulations; and (6) the study attempted to correct for the possibility that not all DBE businesses were listed in the various directories. Id. at *6-7. The study utilized a standard statistical sampling procedure to correct for the latter two biases. Id. at *7. The study thus calculated a weighted average base figure of 22.7 percent. Id.

IDOT then adjusted the base figure based upon two disparity studies and some reports considering whether the DBE availability figures were artificially low due to the effects of past discrimination. Id. at *8. One study examined disparities in earnings and business formation rates as between DBEs and their white male-owned counterparts. Id. Another study included a survey reporting that DBEs are rarely utilized in non-goals projects. Id.

IDOT considered three reports prepared by expert witnesses. Id. at *9. The first report concluded that minority- and women-owned businesses were underutilized relative to their capacity and that such underutilization was due to discrimination. Id. The second report concluded, after controlling for relevant variables such as credit worthiness, "that minorities and women are less likely to form businesses, and that when they do form businesses, those businesses achieve lower earnings than did businesses owned by white males." Id. The third report, again controlling for relevant variables (education, age, marital status, industry and wealth), concluded that minority- and female-owned businesses formation rates are lower than those of their white male counterparts, and that such businesses engage in a disproportionate amount of government work and contracts as a result of their inability to obtain private sector work. Id.

IDOT also conducted a series of public hearings in which a number of DBE owners who testified that they "were rarely, if ever, solicited to bid on projects not subject to disadvantaged-firm hiring goals." Id. Additionally, witnesses identified twenty prime contractors in IDOT District 1 alone who rarely or never solicited bids from DBEs on non-goals projects. Id. The prime contractors did not respond to IDOT's requests for information concerning their utilization of DBEs. Id.

Finally, IDOT reviewed unremediated market data from four different markets (the Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, the Missouri DOT, Cook County’s public construction contracts, and a “non-goals” experiment conducted by IDOT between 2001 and 2002), and considered past utilization of DBEs on IDOT projects. Id. at *11. After analyzing all of the data, the study recommended an upward adjustment to 27.51 percent, however, IDOT decided to maintain its figure at 22.77 percent. Id.

IDOT’s representative testified that the DBE program was administered on a “contract-by-contract basis.” Id. She testified that DBE goals have no effect on the award of prime contracts but that contracts are awarded exclusively to the “lowest responsible bidder.” IDOT also allowed contractors to petition for a waiver of individual contract goals in certain situations (e.g., where the contractor has been unable to meet the goal despite having made reasonable good faith efforts). Id. at *12. Between 2001 and 2004, IDOT received waiver requests on 8.53 percent of its contracts and granted three out of four; IDOT also provided an appeal procedure for a denial from a waiver request. Id.

IDOT implemented a number of race- and gender-neutral measures both in its fiscal year 2005 plan and in response to the district court’s earlier summary judgment order, including:

1. A “prompt payment provision” in its contracts, requiring that subcontractors be paid promptly after they complete their work, and prohibiting prime contractors from delaying such payments;
2. An extensive outreach program seeking to attract and assist DBE and other small firms DBE and other small firms enter and achieve success in the industry (including retaining a network of consultants to provide management, technical and financial assistance to small businesses, and sponsoring networking sessions throughout the state to acquaint small firms with larger contractors and to encourage the involvement of small firms in major construction projects);
3. Reviewing the criteria for prequalification to reduce any unnecessary burdens;
4. “Unbundling” large contracts; and
5. Allocating some contracts for bidding only by firms meeting the SBA’s definition of small businesses.

Id. (internal citations omitted). IDOT was also in the process of implementing bonding and financing initiatives to assist emerging contractors obtain guaranteed bonding and lines of credit, and establishing a mentor-protégé program. Id.

The court found that IDOT attempted to achieve the “maximum feasible portion” of its overall DBE goal through race- and gender-neutral measures. Id. at *13. The court found that IDOT determined that race- and gender-neutral measures would account for 6.43 percent of its DBE goal, leaving 16.34 percent to be reached using race- and gender-conscious measures. Id.

Anecdotal evidence. A number of DBE owners testified to instances of perceived discrimination and to the barriers they face. Id. The DBE owners also testified to difficulties in obtaining work in the private sector and “unanimously reported that they were rarely invited to bid on such contracts.” Id. The DBE owners testified to a reluctance to submit unsolicited bids due to the expense involved and identified specific firms that solicited bids from DBEs for goals projects but not for non-goals projects. Id. A number of the witnesses also testified to specific instances of discrimination in

bidding, on specific contracts, and in the financing and insurance markets. Id. at *13-14. One witness acknowledged that all small firms face difficulties in the financing and insurance markets, but testified that it is especially burdensome for DBEs who “frequently are forced to pay higher insurance rates due to racial and gender discrimination.” Id. at *14. The DBE witnesses also testified they have obstacles in obtaining prompt payment. Id.

The plaintiff called a number of non-DBE business owners who unanimously testified that they solicit business equally from DBEs and non-DBEs on non-goals projects. Id. Some non-DBE firm owners testified that they solicit bids from DBEs on a goals project for work they would otherwise complete themselves absent the goals; others testified that they “occasionally award work to a DBE that was not the low bidder in order to avoid scrutiny from IDOT.” Id. A number of non-DBE firm owners accused of failing to solicit bids from DBEs on non-goals projects, testified and denied the allegations. Id. at *15.

Strict scrutiny. The court applied strict scrutiny to the program as a whole (including the gender-based preferences). Id. at *16. The court, however, set forth a different burden of proof, finding that the government must demonstrate identified discrimination with specificity and must have a “‘strong basis in evidence’ to conclude that remedial action was necessary, *before* it embarks on an affirmative action program ... If the government makes such a showing, the party challenging the affirmative action plan bears the ‘ultimate burden’ of demonstrating the unconstitutionality of the program.” Id. The court held that challenging party’s burden “can only be met by presenting credible evidence to rebut the government’s proffered data.” Id. at *17.

To satisfy strict scrutiny, the court found that IDOT did not need to demonstrate an independent compelling interest; however, as part of the narrowly tailored prong, IDOT needed to show “that there is a demonstrable need for the implementation of the Federal DBE Program within its jurisdiction.” Id. at *16.

The court found that IDOT presented “an abundance” of evidence documenting the disparities between DBEs and non-DBEs in the construction industry. Id. at *17. The plaintiff argued that the study was “erroneous because it failed to limit its DBE availability figures to those firms ... registered and pre-qualified with IDOT.” Id. The plaintiff also alleged the calculations of the DBE utilization rate were incorrect because the data included IDOT subcontracts and prime contracts, despite the fact that the latter are awarded to the lowest bidder as a matter of law. Id. Accordingly, the plaintiff alleged that IDOT’s calculation of DBE availability and utilization rates was incorrect. Id.

The court found that other jurisdictions had utilized the custom census approach without successful challenge. Id. at *18. Additionally, the court found “that the remedial nature of the federal statutes counsels for the casting of a broader net when measuring DBE availability.” Id. at *19. The court found that IDOT presented “an array of statistical studies concluding that DBEs face disproportionate hurdles in the credit, insurance, and bonding markets.” Id. at *21. The court also found that the statistical studies were consistent with the anecdotal evidence. Id. The court did find, however, that “there was no evidence of even a single instance in which a prime contractor failed to award a job to a DBE that offered the low bid. This ... is [also] supported by the statistical data ... which shows that at least at the level of subcontracting, DBEs are generally utilized at a rate in line with their ability.” Id. at *21, n. 31. Additionally, IDOT did not verify the anecdotal testimony of

DBE firm owners who testified to barriers in financing and bonding, however, the court found that such verification was unnecessary. *Id.* at *21, n. 32.

The court further found:

That such discrimination indirectly affects the ability of DBEs to compete for prime contracts, despite the fact that they are awarded solely on the basis of low bid, cannot be doubted: ‘[E]xperience and size are not race- and gender-neutral variables ... [DBE] construction firms are generally smaller and less experienced *because* of industry discrimination.’

Id. at *21, citing *Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc. v. City and County of Denver*, 321 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2003).

The parties stipulated to the fact that DBE utilization goals exceed DBE availability for 2003 and 2004. *Id.* at *22. IDOT alleged, and the court so found, that the high utilization on goals projects was due to the success of the DBE program, and not to an absence of discrimination. *Id.* The court found that the statistical disparities coupled with the anecdotal evidence indicated that IDOT’s fiscal year 2005 goal was a “‘plausible lower-bound estimate’ of DBE participation in the absence of discrimination.” *Id.* The court found that the plaintiff did not present persuasive evidence to contradict or explain IDOT’s data. *Id.*

The plaintiff argued that even if accepted at face value, IDOT’s marketplace data did not support the imposition of race- and gender-conscious remedies because there was no evidence of direct discrimination by prime contractors. *Id.* The court found first that IDOT’s indirect evidence of discrimination in the bonding, financing, and insurance markets was sufficient to establish a compelling purpose. *Id.* Second, the court found:

[M]ore importantly, Plaintiff fails to acknowledge that, in enacting its DBE program, IDOT acted not to remedy its own prior discriminatory practices, but pursuant to federal law, which both authorized and required IDOT to remediate the effects of *private* discrimination on federally-funded highway contracts. This is a fundamental distinction ... [A] state or local government need not independently identify a compelling interest when its actions come in the course of enforcing a federal statute.

Id. at *23. The court distinguished *Builders Ass’n of Greater Chicago v. County of Cook*, 123 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (N.D. Ill. 2000), *aff’d* 256 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2001), noting that the program in that case was not federally-funded. *Id.* at *23, n. 34.

The court also found that “IDOT has done its best to maximize the portion of its DBE goal” through race- and gender-neutral measures, including anti-discrimination enforcement and small business initiatives. *Id.* at *24. The anti-discrimination efforts included: an internet website where a DBE can file an administrative complaint if it believes that a prime contractor is discriminating on the basis of race or gender in the award of sub-contracts; and requiring contractors seeking

prequalification to maintain and produce solicitation records on all projects, both public and private, with and without goals, as well as records of the bids received and accepted. *Id.* The small business initiative included: “unbundling” large contracts; allocating some contracts for bidding only by firms meeting the SBA’s definition of small businesses; a “prompt payment provision” in its contracts, requiring that subcontractors be paid promptly after they complete their work, and prohibiting prime contractors from delaying such payments; and an extensive outreach program seeking to attract and assist DBE and other small firms DBE and other small firms enter and achieve success in the industry (including retaining a network of consultants to provide management, technical and financial assistance to small businesses, and sponsoring networking sessions throughout the state to acquaint small firms with larger contractors and to encourage the involvement of small firms in major construction projects). *Id.*

The court found “[s]ignificantly, Plaintiff did not question the efficacy or sincerity of these race- and gender-neutral measures.” *Id.* at *25. Additionally, the court found the DBE program had significant flexibility in that utilized contract-by-contract goal setting (without a fixed DBE participation minimum) and contained waiver provisions. *Id.* The court found that IDOT approved 70 percent of waiver requests although waivers were requested on only 8 percent of all contracts. *Id.*, citing *Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater* “Adarand VII”, 228 F.3d 1147, 1177 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing for the proposition that flexibility and waiver are critically important).

The court held that IDOT’s DBE plan was narrowly tailored to the goal of remedying the effects of racial and gender discrimination in the construction industry, and was therefore constitutional.

3. Northern Contracting, Inc. v. State of Illinois, Illinois DOT, and USDOT, 2004 WL 422704 (N.D. Ill. March 3, 2004)

This is the earlier decision in *Northern Contracting, Inc.*, 2005 WL 2230195 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2005), *see* above, which resulted in the remand of the case to consider the implementation of the Federal DBE Program by the Illinois DOT. This case involves the challenge to the Federal DBE Program. The plaintiff contractor sued the Illinois Department of Transportation and the USDOT challenging the facial constitutionality of the Federal DBE Program (TEA-21 and 49 C.F.R. Part 26) as well as the implementation of the Federal Program by the Illinois Department of Transportation (i.e., the IDOT DBE Program). The court held valid the Federal DBE Program, finding there is a compelling governmental interest and the federal program is narrowly tailored. The court also held there are issues of fact regarding whether Illinois DOT’s (“IDOT”) DBE Program is narrowly tailored to achieve the federal government’s compelling interest. The court denied the Motions for Summary Judgment filed by the plaintiff and by IDOT, finding there were issues of material fact relating to IDOT’s implementation of the Federal DBE Program.

The court in *Northern Contracting*, held that there is an identified compelling governmental interest for implementing the Federal DBE Program and that the Federal DBE Program is narrowly tailored to further that interest. Therefore, the court granted the Federal defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment challenging the validity of the Federal DBE Program. In this connection, the district court followed the decisions and analysis in *Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minnesota Department of Transportation*, 345 F. 3d 964 (8th Cir. 2003) and *Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater*, 228 F. 3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Adarand VII”), *cert. granted then dismissed as improvidently granted*, 532 U.S. 941, 534 U.S. 103 (2001). The court held, like these two Courts of Appeals that have addressed

this issue, that Congress had a strong basis in evidence to conclude that the DBE Program was necessary to redress private discrimination in federally-assisted highway subcontracting. The court agreed with the Adarand VII and Sherbrooke Turf courts that the evidence presented to Congress is sufficient to establish a compelling governmental interest, and that the contractors had not met their burden of introducing credible particularized evidence to rebut the Government's initial showing of the existence of a compelling interest in remedying the nationwide effects of past and present discrimination in the federal construction procurement subcontracting market. 2004 WL422704 at *34, citing Adarand VII, 228 F. 3d at 1175.

In addition, the court analyzed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, whether the government provided sufficient evidence that its program is narrowly tailored. In making this determination, the court looked at several factors, such as the efficacy of alternative remedies; the flexibility and duration of the race-conscious remedies, including the availability of waiver provisions; the relationships between the numerical goals and relevant labor market; the impact of the remedy on third parties; and whether the program is over-or-under-inclusive. The narrow tailoring analysis with regard to the as-applied challenge focused on Illinois' implementation of the Federal DBE Program.

First, the court held that the Federal DBE Program does not mandate the use of race-conscious measures by recipients of federal dollars, but in fact requires only that the goal reflect the recipient's determination of the level of DBE participation it would expect absent the effects of the discrimination. 49 C.F.R. § 26.45(b). The court recognized, as found in the Sherbrooke Turf and Adarand VII cases, that the Federal Regulations place strong emphasis on the use of race-neutral means to increase minority business participation in government contracting, that although narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative, it does require "serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives." 2004 WL422704 at *36, citing and quoting Sherbooke Turf, 345 F. 3d at 972, quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). The court held that the Federal regulations, which prohibit the use of quotas and severely limit the use of set-asides meet this requirement. The court agreed with the Adarand VII and Sherbrooke Turf courts that the Federal DBE Program does require recipients to make a serious good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives before turning to race-conscious measures.

Second, the court found that because the Federal DBE Program is subject to periodic reauthorization, and requires recipients of Federal dollars to review their programs annually, the Federal DBE scheme is appropriately limited to last no longer than necessary.

Third, the court held that the Federal DBE Program is flexible for many reasons, including that the presumption that women and minority are socially disadvantaged is deemed rebutted if an individual's personal net worth exceeds \$750,000.00, and a firm owned by individual who is not presumptively disadvantaged may nevertheless qualify for such status if the firm can demonstrate that its owners are socially and economically disadvantaged. 49 C.F.R. § 26.67(b)(1)(d). The court found other aspects of the Federal Regulations provide ample flexibility, including recipients may obtain waivers or exemptions from any requirements. Recipients are not required to set a contract goal on every USDOT-assisted contract. If a recipient estimates that it can meet its entire overall goals for a given year through race-neutral means, it must implement the Program without setting contract goals during the year. If during the course of any year in which it is using contract goals a recipient determines that it will exceed its overall goals, it must adjust the use of race-conscious contract goals accordingly. 49 C.F.R. § 26.51(e)(f). Recipients also administering a DBE Program in good faith can

not be penalized for failing to meet their DBE goals, and a recipient may terminate its DBE Program if it meets its annual overall goal through race-neutral means for two consecutive years. 49 C.F.R. § 26.51(f). Further, a recipient may award a contract to a bidder/offeror that does not meet the DBE Participation goals so long as the bidder has made adequate good faith efforts to meet the goals. 49 C.F.R. § 26.53(a)(2). The regulations also prohibit the use of quotas. 49 C.F.R. § 26.43.

Fourth, the court agreed with the Sherbrooke Turf court's assessment that the Federal DBE Program requires recipients to base DBE goals on the number of ready, willing and able disadvantaged business in the local market, and that this exercise requires recipients to establish realistic goals for DBE participation in the relevant labor markets.

Fifth, the court found that the DBE Program does not impose an unreasonable burden on third parties, including non-DBE subcontractors and taxpayers. The court found that the Federal DBE Program is a limited and properly tailored remedy to cure the effects of prior discrimination, a sharing of the burden by parties such as non-DBEs is not impermissible.

Finally, the court found that the Federal DBE Program was not over-inclusive because the regulations do not provide that every woman and every member of a minority group is disadvantaged. Preferences are limited to small businesses with a specific average annual gross receipts over three fiscal years of \$16.6 million or less (at the time of this decision), and businesses whose owners' personal net worth exceed \$750,000.00 are excluded. 49 C.F.R. § 26.67(b)(1). A firm owned by a white male may qualify as social and economically disadvantaged. 49 C.F.R. § 26.67(d).

The court analyzed the constitutionality of the Illinois DBE Program. The court adopted the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit in Sherbrooke Turf, that a recipient's implementation of the Federal DBE Program must be analyzed under the narrow tailoring analysis but not the compelling interest inquiry. Therefore, the court agreed with Sherbrooke Turf that a recipient need not establish a distinct compelling interest before implementing the Federal DBE Program, but did conclude that a recipient's implementation of the Federal DBE Program must be narrowly tailored. The court found that issues of fact remain in terms of the validity of the Illinois DOT's DBE Program as implemented in terms of whether it was narrowly tailored to achieve the Federal Government's compelling interest. The court, therefore, denied the contractor plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and the Illinois DOT's Motion for Summary Judgment.

4. Western States Paving Co. v. Washington State DOT, 407 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1170 (2006)

This case out of the Ninth Circuit struck down a state's implementation of the Federal DBE Program for failure to pass constitutional muster. In Western States, the Ninth Circuit held that the State of Washington's implementation of the Federal DBE Program was unconstitutional because it did not satisfy the narrow tailoring element of the constitutional test. The Ninth Circuit held that the State must present its own evidence of past discrimination within its own boundaries in order to survive constitutional muster and could not merely rely upon data supplied by Congress. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. The analysis in the decision also is instructive in particular as to the application of the narrowly tailored prong of the strict scrutiny test.

Plaintiff Western States Paving Co. ("plaintiff") was a white male-owned asphalt and paving company. 407 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2005). In July of 2000, plaintiff submitted a bid for a project

for the City of Vancouver; the project was financed with federal funds provided to the Washington State DOT (“WSDOT”) under the Transportation Act for the 21st Century (“TEA-21”). Id.

Congress enacted TEA-21 in 1991 and after multiple renewals, it was set to expire on May 31, 2004. Id. at 988. TEA-21 established minimum minority-owned business participation requirements (10%) for certain federally-funded projects. Id. The regulations require each state accepting federal transportation funds to implement a DBE program that comports with the TEA-21. Id. TEA-21 indicates the 10 percent DBE utilization requirement is “aspirational,” and the statutory goal “does not authorize or require recipients to set overall or contract goals at the 10 percent level, or any other particular level, or to take any special administrative steps if their goals are above or below 10 percent.” Id.

TEA-21 sets forth a two-step process for a state to determine its own DBE utilization goal: (1) the state must calculate the relative availability of DBEs in its local transportation contracting industry (one way to do this is to divide the number of ready, willing and able DBEs in a state by the total number of ready, willing and able firms); and (2) the state is required to “adjust this base figure upward or downward to reflect the proven capacity of DBEs to perform work (as measured by the volume of work allocated to DBEs in recent years) and evidence of discrimination against DBEs obtained from statistical disparity studies.” Id. at 989 (citing regulation). A state is also permitted to consider discrimination in the bonding and financing industries and the present effects of past discrimination. Id. (citing regulation). TEA-21 requires a generalized, “undifferentiated” minority goal and a state is prohibited from apportioning their DBE utilization goal among different minority groups (e.g., between Hispanics, blacks, and women). Id. at 990 (citing regulation).

“A state must meet the maximum feasible portion of this goal through race- [and gender-] neutral means, including informational and instructional programs targeted toward all small businesses.” Id. (citing regulation). Race- and sex-conscious contract goals must be used to achieve any portion of the contract goals not achievable through race- and gender-neutral measures. Id. (citing regulation). However, TEA-21 does not require that DBE participation goals be used on every contract or at the same level on every contract in which they are used; rather, the overall effect must be to “obtain that portion of the requisite DBE participation that cannot be achieved through race- [and gender-] neutral means.” Id. (citing regulation).

A prime contractor must use “good faith efforts” to satisfy a contract’s DBE utilization goal. Id. (citing regulation). However, a state is prohibited from enacting rigid quotas that do not contemplate such good faith efforts. Id. (citing regulation).

Under the TEA-21 minority utilization requirements, the City set a goal of 14 percent minority participation on the first project plaintiff bid on; the prime contractor thus rejected plaintiff’s bid in favor of a higher bidding minority-owned subcontracting firm. Id. at 987. In September of 2000, plaintiff again submitted a bid on project financed with TEA-21 funds and was again rejected in favor of a higher bidding minority-owned subcontracting firm. Id. The prime contractor expressly stated that he rejected plaintiff’s bid due to the minority utilization requirement. Id.

Plaintiff filed suit against the WSDOT, Clark County, and the City, challenging the minority preference requirements of TEA-21 as unconstitutional both facially and as applied. Id. The district court rejected both of plaintiff’s challenges. The district court held the program was facially

constitutional because it found that Congress had identified significant evidence of discrimination in the transportation contracting industry and the TEA-21 was narrowly tailored to remedy such discrimination. Id. at 988. The district court rejected the as-applied challenge concluding that Washington’s implementation of the program comported with the federal requirements and the state was not required to demonstrate that its minority preference program independently satisfied strict scrutiny. Id. Plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id.

The Ninth Circuit considered whether the TEA-21, which authorizes the use of race- and gender-based preferences in federally-funded transportation contracts, violated equal protection, either on its face or as applied by the State of Washington.

The court applied a strict scrutiny analysis to both the facial and as-applied challenges to TEA-21. Id. at 990-91. The court did not apply a separate intermediate scrutiny analysis to the gender-based classifications because it determined that it “would not yield a different result.” Id. at 990, n. 6.

Facial challenge (Federal Government). The court first noted that the federal government has a compelling interest in “ensuring that its funding is not distributed in a manner that perpetuates the effects of either public or private discrimination within the transportation contracting industry.” Id. at 991, citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989) and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater (“Adarand VII”), 228 F.3d 1147, 1176 (10th Cir. 2000). The court found that “[b]oth statistical and anecdotal evidence are relevant in identifying the existence of discrimination.” Id. at 991. The court found that although Congress did not have evidence of discrimination against minorities in every state, such evidence was unnecessary for the enactment of nationwide legislation. Id. However, citing both the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, the court found that Congress had ample evidence of discrimination in the transportation contracting industry to justify TEA-21. Id. The court also found that because TEA-21 set forth flexible race-conscious measures to be used only when race-neutral efforts were unsuccessful, the program was narrowly tailored and thus satisfied strict scrutiny. Id. at 992-93. The court accordingly rejected plaintiff’s facial challenge. Id.

As-applied challenge (State of Washington). Plaintiff alleged TEA-21 was unconstitutional as-applied because there was no evidence of discrimination in Washington’s transportation contracting industry. Id. at 995. The State alleged that it was not required to independently demonstrate that its application of TEA-21 satisfied strict scrutiny. Id. The United States intervened to defend TEA-21’s facial constitutionality, and “unambiguously conceded that TEA-21’s race conscious measures can be constitutionally applied only in those states where the effects of discrimination are present.” Id. at 996; see also Br. for the United States at 28 (April 19, 2004) (“DOT’s regulations ... are designed to assist States in ensuring that race-conscious remedies are limited to *only* those jurisdictions where discrimination or its effects are a problem and *only* as a last resort when race-neutral relief is insufficient.” (emphasis in original)).

The court found that the Eighth Circuit was the only other court to consider an as-applied challenge to TEA-21 in Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minnesota DOT, 345 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied 124 S. Ct. 2158 (2004). Id. at 996. The Eighth Circuit did not require Minnesota and Nebraska to identify a compelling purpose for their programs independent of Congress’s nationwide remedial objective. Id. However, the Eighth Circuit did consider whether the states’ implementation of TEA-21 was narrowly tailored to achieve Congress’s remedial objective. Id. The Eighth Circuit thus looked to the states’ independent evidence of discrimination because “to be narrowly tailored, a *national*

program must be limited to those parts of the country where its race-based measures are demonstrably needed.” Id. (internal citations omitted). The Eighth Circuit relied on the states’ statistical analyses of the availability and capacity of DBEs in their local markets conducted by outside consulting firms to conclude that the states satisfied the narrow tailoring requirement. Id. at 997.

The court concurred with the Eighth Circuit and found that Washington did not need to demonstrate a compelling interest for its DBE program, independent from the compelling nationwide interest identified by Congress. Id. However, the court determined that the district court erred in holding that mere compliance with the federal program satisfied strict scrutiny. Id. Rather, the court held that whether Washington’s DBE program was narrowly tailored was dependent on the presence or absence of discrimination in Washington’s transportation contracting industry. Id. at 997-98. “If no such discrimination is present in Washington, then the State’s DBE program does not serve a remedial purpose; it instead provides an unconstitutional windfall to minority contractors solely on the basis of their race or sex.” Id. at 998. The court held that a Sixth Circuit decision to the contrary, Tennessee Asphalt Co. v. Farris, 942 F.2d 969, 970 (6th Cir. 1991), misinterpreted earlier case law. Id. at 997, n. 9.

The court found that moreover, even where discrimination is present in a state, a program is narrowly tailored only if it applies only to those minority groups who have actually suffered discrimination. Id. at 998, citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 478. The court also found that in Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 713 (9th Cir. 1997), it had “previously expressed similar concerns about the haphazard inclusion of minority groups in affirmative action programs ostensibly designed to remedy the effects of discrimination.” Id. In Monterey Mechanical, the court held that “the overly inclusive designation of benefited minority groups was a ‘red flag signaling that the statute is not, as the Equal Protection Clause requires, narrowly tailored.’” Id., citing Monterey Mechanical, 125 F.3d at 714. The court found that other courts are in accord. Id. at 998-99, citing Builders Ass’n of Greater Chi. v. County of Cook, 256 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir. 2001); Associated Gen. Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730, 737 (6th Cir. 2000); O’Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Accordingly, the court found that each of the principal minority groups benefited by Washington’s DBE program must have suffered discrimination within the State. Id. at 999.

The court found that Washington’s program closely tracked the sample USDOT DBE program. Id. WSDOT calculated its DBE participation goal by first calculating the availability of ready, willing and able DBEs in the State (dividing the number of transportation contracting firms in the Washington State Office of Minority, Women and Disadvantaged Business Enterprises Directory by the total number of transportation contracting firms listed in the Census Bureau’s Washington database, which equaled 11.17%). Id. WSDOT then upwardly adjusted the 11.17 percent base figure to 14 percent “to account for the proven capacity of DBEs to perform work, as reflected by the volume of work performed by DBEs [during a certain time period].” Id. Although DBEs performed 18 percent of work on State projects during the prescribed time period, Washington set the final adjusted figure at 14 percent because TEA-21 reduced the number of eligible DBEs in Washington by imposing more stringent certification requirements. Id. at 999, n. 11. WSDOT did not make an adjustment to account for discriminatory barriers in obtaining bonding and financing. Id. WSDOT similarly did not make any adjustment to reflect present or past discrimination “because it lacked any statistical studies evidencing such discrimination.” Id.

WSDOT then determined that it needed to achieve 5 percent of its 14 percent goal through race-conscious means based on a 9 percent DBE participation rate on state-funded contracts that did not include affirmative action components (i.e., 9% participation could be achieved through race-neutral means). Id. at 1000. The USDOT approved WSDOT goal-setting program and the totality of its 2000 DBE program. Id.

Washington conceded that it did not have statistical studies to establish the existence of past or present discrimination. Id. It argued, however, that it had evidence of discrimination because minority-owned firms had the capacity to perform 14 percent of the State's transportation contracts in 2000 but received only 9 percent of the subcontracting funds on contracts that did not include an affirmative actions component. Id. The court found that the State's methodology was flawed because the 14 percent figure was based on the earlier 18 percent figure, discussed supra, which included contracts with affirmative action components. Id. The court concluded that the 14 percent figure did not accurately reflect the performance capacity of DBEs in a race-neutral market. Id. The court also found the State conceded as much to the district court. Id.

The court held that a disparity between DBE performance on contracts with an affirmative action component and those without "does not provide any evidence of discrimination against DBEs." Id. The court found that the only evidence upon which Washington could rely was the disparity between the proportion of DBE firms in the State (11.17%) and the percentage of contracts awarded to DBEs on race-neutral grounds (9%). Id. However, the court determined that such evidence was entitled to "little weight" because it did not take into account a multitude of other factors such as firm size. Id.

Moreover, the court found that the minimal statistical evidence was insufficient evidence, standing alone, of discrimination in the transportation contracting industry. Id. at 1001. The court found that WSDOT did not present any anecdotal evidence. Id. The court rejected the State's argument that the DBE applications themselves constituted evidence of past discrimination because the applications were not properly in the record, and because the applicants were not required to certify that they had been victims of discrimination in the contracting industry. Id. Accordingly, the court held that because the State failed to proffer evidence of discrimination within its own transportation contracting market, its DBE program was not narrowly tailored to Congress's compelling remedial interest. Id. at 1002-03.

The court affirmed the district court's grant on summary judgment to the United States regarding the facial constitutionality of TEA-21, reversed the grant of summary judgment to Washington on the as-applied challenge, and remanded to determine the State's liability for damages.

The dissent argued that where the State complied with TEA-21 in implementing its DBE program, it was not susceptible to an as-applied challenge.

5. Western States Paving Co. v. Washington DOT, US DOT & FHWA, 2006 WL 1734163 (W.D. Wash. June 23, 2006) (unpublished opinion)

This case was before the district court pursuant to the Ninth Circuit's remand order in Western States Paving Co. v. Washington DOT, US DOT, and FHWA, 407 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1170 (2006). In this decision, the district court adjudicated cross Motions for Summary Judgment on plaintiff's claim for injunction and for damages under 42 U.S.C. §§1981, 1983, and §2000d.

Because the Washington Department of Transportation (“WSDOT”) voluntarily discontinued its DBE program after the Ninth Circuit decision, *supra*, the district court dismissed plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief as moot. The court found “it is absolutely clear in this case that WSDOT will not resume or continue the activity the Ninth Circuit found unlawful in *Western States*,” and cited specifically to the informational letters WSDOT sent to contractors informing them of the termination of the program.

Second, the court dismissed *Western States*’ claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 2000d against Clark County and the City of Vancouver holding neither the City or the County acted with the requisite discriminatory intent. The court held the County and the City were merely implementing the WSDOT’s unlawful DBE program and their actions in this respect were involuntary and required no independent activity. The court also noted that the County and the City were not parties to the precise discriminatory actions at issue in the case, which occurred due to the conduct of the “State defendants.” Specifically, the WSDOT — and not the County or the City — developed the DBE program without sufficient anecdotal and statistical evidence, and improperly relied on the affidavits of contractors seeking DBE certification “who averred that they had been subject to ‘general societal discrimination.’”

Third, the court dismissed plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 claims against WSDOT, finding them barred by the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity doctrine. However, the court allowed plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. §2000d claim to proceed against WSDOT because it was not similarly barred. The court held that Congress had conditioned the receipt of federal highway funds on compliance with Title VI (42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.) and the waiver of sovereign immunity from claims arising under Title VI. Section 2001 specifically provides that “a State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of ... Title VI.” The court held that this language put the WSDOT on notice that it faced private causes of action in the event of noncompliance.

The court held that WSDOT’s DBE program was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The court stressed that discriminatory intent is an essential element of a plaintiff’s claim under Title VI. The WSDOT argued that even if sovereign immunity did not bar plaintiff’s §2000d claim, WSDOT could be held liable for damages because there was no evidence that WSDOT staff knew of or consciously considered plaintiff’s race when calculating the annual utilization goal. The court held that since the policy was not “facially neutral” — and was in fact “specifically race conscious” — any resulting discrimination was therefore intentional, whether the reason for the classification was benign or its purpose remedial. As such, WSDOT’s program was subject to strict scrutiny.

In order for the court to uphold the DBE program as constitutional, WSDOT had to show that the program served a compelling interest and was narrowly tailored to achieve that goal. The court found that the Ninth Circuit had already concluded that the program was not narrowly tailored and the record was devoid of any evidence suggesting that minorities currently suffer or have suffered discrimination in the Washington transportation contracting industry. The court therefore denied WSDOT’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the §2000d claim. The remedy available to *Western States* remains for further adjudication and the case is currently pending.

6. Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minnesota DOT, and Gross Seed Company v. Nebraska Department of Road, 345 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1041 (2004)

This case is instructive in its analysis of state DOT DBE-type programs and their evidentiary basis and implementation. This case also is instructive in its analysis of the narrowly tailored requirement for state DBE programs. In upholding the challenged Federal DBE Program at issue in this case, the Eighth Circuit emphasized the race-, ethnicity- and gender-neutral elements, the ultimate flexibility of the Program, and the fact the Program was tied closely only to labor markets with identified discrimination.

In Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minnesota DOT, and Gross Seed Company v. Nebraska Department of Road, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Federal DBE Program (49 C.F.R. Part 26). The court held the Federal Program was narrowly tailored to remedy a compelling governmental interest. The court also held the federal regulations governing the states' implementation of the Federal DBE Program were narrowly tailored, and the state DOT's implementation of the Federal DBE Program was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.

Sherbrooke and Gross Seed both contended that the Federal DBE Program on its face and as applied in Minnesota and Nebraska violated the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Eighth Circuit engaged in a review of the Federal DBE Program and the implementation of the Program by the Minnesota DOT and the Nebraska Department of Roads under a strict scrutiny analysis and held that the Federal DBE Program was valid and constitutional and that the Minnesota DOT's and Nebraska DOR's implementation of the Program also was constitutional and valid. Applying the strict scrutiny analysis, the court first considered whether the Federal DBE Program established a compelling governmental interest, and found that it did. It concluded that Congress had a strong basis in evidence to support its conclusion that race-based measures were necessary for the reasons stated by the Tenth Circuit in Adarand, 228 F. 3d at 1167-76. Although the contractors presented evidence that challenged the data, they failed to present affirmative evidence that no remedial action was necessary because minority-owned small businesses enjoy non-discriminatory access to participation in highway contracts. Thus, the court held they failed to meet their ultimate burden to prove that the DBE Program is unconstitutional on this ground.

Finally, Sherbrooke and Gross Seed argued that the Minnesota DOT and Nebraska DOR must independently satisfy the compelling governmental interest test aspect of strict scrutiny review. The government argued, and the district courts' below agreed, that participating states need not independently meet the strict scrutiny standard because under the DBE Program the state must still comply with the DOT regulations. The Eighth Circuit held that this issue was not addressed by the Tenth Circuit in Adarand. The Eighth Circuit concluded that neither side's position is entirely sound.

The court rejected the contention of the contractors that their facial challenges to the DBE Program must be upheld unless the record before Congress included strong evidence of race discrimination in construction contracting in Minnesota and Nebraska. On the other hand, the court held a valid race-based program must be narrowly tailored, and to be narrowly tailored, a national program must be

limited to those parts of the country where its race-based measures are demonstrably needed to the extent that federal government delegates this tailoring function, as a state's implementation becomes relevant to a reviewing court's strict scrutiny. Thus, the court left the question of state implementation to the narrow tailoring analysis.

The court held that a reviewing court applying strict scrutiny must determine if the race-based measure is narrowly tailored, that is, whether the means chosen to accomplish the government's asserted purpose are specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose. The contractors have the ultimate burden of establishing that the DBE Program is not narrowly tailored. *Id.* The compelling interest analysis focused on the record before Congress; the narrow-tailoring analysis looks at the roles of the implementing highway construction agencies.

For determining whether a race-conscious remedy is narrowly tailored, the court looked at factors such as the efficacy of alternative remedies, the flexibility and duration of the race-conscious remedy, the relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant labor market, and the impact of the remedy on third parties. *Id.* Under the DBE Program, a state receiving federal highway funds must, on an annual basis, submit to DOT an overall goal for DBE participation in its federally-funded highway contracts. *See*, 49 C.F.R. § 26.45(f)(1). The overall goal "must be based on demonstrable evidence" as to the number of DBEs who are ready, willing, and able to participate as contractors or subcontractors on federally-assisted contracts. 49 C.F.R. § 26.45(b). The number may be adjusted upward to reflect the state's determination that more DBEs would be participating absent the effects of discrimination, including race-related barriers to entry. *See*, 49 C.F.R. § 26.45(d).

The state must meet the "maximum feasible portion" of its overall goal by race-neutral means and must submit for approval a projection of the portion it expects to meet through race-neutral means. *See*, 49 C.F.R. § 26.45(a), (c). If race-neutral means are projected to fall short of achieving the overall goal, the State must give preference to firms it has certified as DBEs. However, such preferences may not include quotas. 49 C.F.R. § 26.45(b). During the course of the year, if a state determines that it will exceed or fall short of its overall goal, it must adjust its use of race-conscious and race-neutral methods "[t]o ensure that your DBE program continues to be narrowly tailored to overcome the effects of discrimination." 49 C.F.R. § 26.51(f).

Absent bad faith administration of the program, a state's failure to achieve its overall goal will not be penalized. *See*, 49 C.F.R. § 26.47. If the state meets its overall goal for two consecutive years through race-neutral means, it is not required to set an annual goal until it does not meet its prior overall goal for a year. *See*, 49 C.F.R. § 26.51(f)(3). In addition, DOT may grant an exemption or waiver from any and all requirements of the Program. *See*, 49 C.F.R. § 26.15(b).

Like the district courts below, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the DOT regulations, on their face, satisfy the Supreme Court's narrowing tailoring requirements. First, the regulations place strong emphasis on the use of race-neutral means to increase minority business participation in government contracting. 345 F. 3d at 972. Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative, but it does require serious good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives. 345 F. 3d at 971, citing *Grutter v. Bollinger*, 539 U.S. 306.

Second, the revised DBE program has substantial flexibility. A State may obtain waivers or exemptions from any requirements and is not penalized for a good faith effort to meet its overall goal.

In addition, the program limits preferences to small businesses falling beneath an earnings threshold, and any individual whose net worth exceeds \$750,000.00 cannot qualify as economically disadvantaged. *See*, 49 C.F.R. § 26.67(b). Likewise, the DBE program contains built-in durational limits. 345 F.3d at 972. A State may terminate its DBE program if it meets or exceeds its annual overall goal through race-neutral means for two consecutive years. *Id.*; 49 C.F.R. § 26.51(f)(3).

Third, the court found, the USDOT has tied the goals for DBE participation to the relevant labor markets. The regulations require states to set overall goals based upon the likely number of minority contractors that would have received federal assisted highway contracts but for the effects of past discrimination. *See*, 49 C.F.R. § 26.45©-(d)(Steps 1 and 2). Though the underlying estimates may be inexact, the exercise requires the States to focus on establishing realistic goals for DBE participation in the relevant contracting markets. *Id.* at 972.

Finally, Congress and DOT have taken significant steps, the court held, to minimize the race-base nature of the DBE Program. Its benefits are directed at all small business owned and controlled by the socially and economically disadvantaged. While TEA-21 creates a rebuttable presumption that members of certain racial minorities fall within that class, the presumption is rebuttable, wealthy minority owners and wealthy minority-owned firms are excluded, and certification is available to persons who are not presumptably disadvantaged that demonstrate actual social and economic disadvantage. Thus, race is made relevant in the Program, but it is not a determinative factor. 345 F. 3d at 973. For these reasons, the court agreed with the district courts that the revised DBE Program is narrowly tailored on its face.

Sherbrooke and Gross Seed also argued that the DBE Program as applied in Minnesota and Nebraska is not narrowly tailored. Under the Federal Program, states set their own goals, based on local market conditions; their goals are not imposed by the federal government nor do recipients have to tie them to any uniform national percentage. 345 F. 3d at 973, citing 64 Fed. Reg. at 5102.

The court analyzed what Minnesota and Nebraska did in connection with their implementation of the Federal DBE Program. Minnesota DOT commissioned a disparity study of the highway contracting market in Minnesota. The study group determined that DBEs made up 11.4 percent of the prime contractors and subcontractors in a highway construction market. Of this number 0.6 percent were minority-owned and 10.8 percent women-owned. Based upon its analysis of business formation statistics, the consultant estimated that the number of participating minority-owned business would be 34 percent higher in a race-neutral market. Therefore, the consultant adjusted its DBE availability figure from 11.4 percent to 11.6 percent. Based on the study, Minnesota DOT adopted an overall goal of 11.6 percent DBE participation for federally-assisted highway projects. Minnesota DOT predicted that it would need to meet 9 percent of that overall goal through race and gender-conscious means, based on the fact DBE participation in State highway contracts dropped from 10.25 percent in 1998 to 2.25 percent in 1999 when its previous DBE Program was suspended by the injunction by the district court in an earlier decision in *Sherbrooke*. Minnesota DOT required each prime contract bidder to make a good faith effort to subcontract a prescribe portion of the project to DBEs, and determined that portion based on several individualized factors, including the availability of DBEs in the extent of subcontracting opportunities on the project.

The contractor presented evidence attacking the reliability of the data in the study, but it failed to establish that better data were available or that Minnesota DOT was otherwise unreasonable in

undertaking this thorough analysis and relying on its results. *Id.* The precipitous drop in DBE participation when no race-conscious methods were employed, the court concluded, supports Minnesota DOT's conclusion that a substantial portion of its overall goal could not be met with race-neutral measures. *Id.* On that record, the court agreed with the district court that the revised DBE Program serves a compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored on its face and as applied in Minnesota.

In Nebraska, the Nebraska DOR commissioned a disparity study also to review availability and capability of DBE firms in the Nebraska highway construction market. The availability study found that between 1995 and 1999, when Nebraska followed the mandatory 10 percent set-aside requirement, 9.95 percent of all available and capable firms were DBEs, and DBE firms received 12.7 percent of the contract dollars on federally assisted projects. After apportioning part of this DBE contracting to race-neutral contracting decisions, Nebraska DOR set an overall goal of 9.95 percent DBE participation and predicted that 4.82 percent of this overall goal would have to be achieved by race-and-gender conscious means. The Nebraska DOR required that prime contractors make a good faith effort to allocate a set portion of each contract's funds to DBE subcontractors. The Eighth Circuit concluded that Gross Seed, like Sherbrooke, failed to prove that the DBE Program is not narrowly tailored as applied in Nebraska. Therefore, the court affirmed the district courts' decisions in *Gross Seed* and *Sherbrooke*. (See district court opinions discussed *infra*).

7. *Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minnesota DOT*, 2001 WL 1502841, No. 00-CV-1026 (D. Minn. 2001) (unpublished opinion), *aff'd* 345 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 2003)

Sherbrooke involved a landscaping service contractor owned and operated by Caucasian males. The contractor sued the Minnesota Department of Transportation claiming the Federal DBE provisions of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century ("TEA-21") are unconstitutional. *Sherbrooke* challenged the "federal affirmative action programs," the USDOT implementing regulations, and the Minnesota DOT's participation in the DBE Program. The United States Department of Transportation and the Federal Highway Administration intervened as Federal defendants in the case. *Sherbrooke*, 2001 WL 1502841 at *1.

The United States District Court in *Sherbrooke* relied substantially on the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in *Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater*, 228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000), in holding that the Federal DBE Program is constitutional. The district court addressed the issue of "random inclusion" of various groups as being within the program in connection with whether the Federal DBE Program is "narrowly tailored." The court held that Congress cannot enact a national program to remedy discrimination without recognizing classes of people whose history has shown them to be subject to discrimination and allowing states to include those people in its DBE Program.

The court held that the Federal DBE Program attempts to avoid the "potentially invidious effects of providing blanket benefits to minorities" in part,

by restricting a state's DBE preference to identified groups actually appearing in the target state. In practice, this means Minnesota can only certify members of one or another group as potential DBEs if they are present in the local market. This minimizes the chance that individuals — simply on the basis of their birth — will benefit from

Minnesota's DBE program. If a group is not present in the local market, or if they are found in such small numbers that they cannot be expected to be able to participate in the kinds of construction work TEA-21 covers, that group will not be included in the accounting used to set Minnesota's overall DBE contracting goal.

Sherbrooke, 2001 WL 1502841 at *10 (D. Minn.).

The court rejected plaintiff's claim that the Minnesota DOT must independently demonstrate how its program comports with Croson's strict scrutiny standard. The court held that the "Constitution calls out far different requirements when a state implements a federal affirmative action program, as opposed to those occasions when a state or locality initiates the program." Id. at *11 (emphasis added). The court in a footnote ruled that TEA-21, being a federal program, "relieves the state of any burden to independently carry the strict scrutiny burden." Id. at *11 n.3. The court held states that establish DBE programs under TEA-21 and 49 C.F.R. Part 26 are implementing a Congressionally-required program and not establishing a local one. As such, the court concluded that the state need not independently prove its DBE program meets the strict scrutiny standard. Id.

8. Gross Seed Co. v. Nebraska Department of Roads, Civil Action File No. 4:00CV3073 (D. Neb. May 6, 2002), aff'd 345 F. 3d 964 (8th Cir. 2003)

The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska held in Gross Seed Co. v. Nebraska (with the United States DOT and Federal Highway Administration as Interveners), that the Federal DBE Program (codified at 49 C.F.R. Part 26) is constitutional. The court also held that the Nebraska Department of Roads ("NDOR") DBE Program adopted and implemented solely to comply with the Federal DBE Program is "approved" by the court because the court found that 49 C.F.R. Part 26 and TEA-21 were constitutional.

The court concluded, similar to the court in Sherbrooke Turf, that the State of Nebraska did not need to independently establish that its program met the strict scrutiny requirement because the Federal DBE Program satisfied that requirement, and was therefore constitutional. The court did not engage in a thorough analysis or evaluation of the NDOR Program or its implementation of the Federal DBE Program. The court points out that the NDOR Program is adopted in compliance with the Federal DBE Program, and that the USDOT approved the use of NDOR's proposed DBE goals for fiscal year 2001, pending completion of USDOT's review of those goals. Significantly, however, the court in its findings does note that the NDOR established its overall goals for fiscal year 2001 based upon an independent availability/disparity study.

The court upheld the constitutionality of the Federal DBE Program by finding the evidence presented by the federal government and the history of the federal legislation are sufficient to demonstrate that past discrimination does exist "in the construction industry" and that racial and gender discrimination "within the construction industry" is sufficient to demonstrate a compelling interest in individual areas, such as highway construction. The court held that the Federal DBE Program was sufficiently "narrowly tailored" to satisfy strict scrutiny analysis based again on the evidence submitted by the federal government as to the Federal DBE Program.

9. Geod Corporation v. New Jersey Transit Corporation, et. seq. ____ F.Supp. 2d ____, 2009 WL 2595607 (D.N.J. August 20, 2009)

Plaintiffs Geod Corporation and its officers, who are white males, sued the New Jersey Transit Corporation (“NJT”) and state officials seeking a declaration that NJT’s DBE program was unconstitutional and in violation of the United States 5th and 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of New Jersey, and seeking a permanent injunction against NJT for enforcing or utilizing its DBE program. The NJT’s DBE program was implemented in accordance with the Federal DBE Program and the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st century (“TEA-21”) and 49 C.F.R. Part 26.

The parties filed cross Motions for Summary Judgment. The plaintiff Geod challenged the constitutionality of NJT’s DBE program for multiple reasons, including alleging NJT could not justify establishing a program using race- and sex-based preferences; the NJT’s disparity study did not provide a sufficient factual predicate to justify the DBE Program; NJT’s statistical evidence did not establish discrimination; NJT did not have anecdotal data evidencing a “strong basis in evidence” of discrimination which justified a race- and sex-based program; NJT’s program was not narrowly tailored and over-inclusive; NJT could not show an exceedingly persuasive justification for gender preferences; and that NJT’s program was not narrowly tailored because race-neutral alternatives existed. In opposition, NJT filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that its DBE program was narrowly tailored because it fully complied with the requirements of the Federal DBE Program and TEA-21.

Compelling interest. The district court held that states and their agencies are entitled to adopt the federal governments’ compelling interest in enacting TEA-21 and its implementing regulations. 2009 WL 2595607 at *4. The court stated that plaintiff’s argument that NJT cannot establish the need for its DBE program was a “red herring, which is unsupported.” The plaintiff did not question the constitutionality of the compelling interest of the Federal DBE Program. The court held that all states “inherit the federal governments’ compelling interest in establishing a DBE program.” *Id.*

The court found that establishing a DBE program “is not contingent upon a state agency demonstrating a need for same, as the federal government has already done so.” *Id.* The court concluded that this reasoning rendered plaintiff’s assertions that NJT’s disparity study did not have sufficient factual predicate for establishing its DBE program, and that no exceedingly persuasive justification was found to support gender based preferences, as without merit. *Id.* The court held that NJT does not need to justify establishing its DBE program, as it has already been justified by the legislature. *Id.*

NJT’s DBE program as applied. The court noted that both plaintiff’s and defendant’s arguments were based on an alleged split in the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal. Plaintiff Geod relies on Western States Paving Company v. Washington State DOT, 407 F.3d 983(9th Cir. 2005) for the proposition that an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of a particular DBE program requires a demonstration by the recipient of federal funds that the program is narrowly tailored. *Id.* at *5. In contrast, the NJT relied primarily on Northern Contracting, Inc. v. State of Illinois, 473 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2007) for the proposition that if a DBE program complies with TEA-21, it is narrowly tailored. *Id.*

The court viewed the various Federal Circuit Court of Appeals decisions as fact specific determinations which have lead to the parties distinguishing cases without any substantive difference in the application of law. Id.

The court reviewed the decisions by the Ninth Circuit in Western States Paving and the Seventh Circuit of Northern Contracting. In Western States Paving, the district court stated that the Ninth Circuit held for a DBE program to pass constitutional muster, it must be narrowly tailored; specifically, the recipient of federal funds must evidence past discrimination in the relevant market in order to utilize race conscious DBE goals. Id. at *5. The Ninth Circuit, according to district court, made a fact specific determination as to whether the DBE program complied with TEA-21 in order to decide if the program was narrowly tailored to meet the federal regulation's requirements. The district court stated that the requirement that a recipient must evidence past discrimination "is nothing more than a requirement of the regulation." Id.

The court stated that the Seventh Circuit in Northern Contracting held a recipient must demonstrate that its program is narrowly tailored, and that generally a recipient is insulated from this sort of constitutional attack absent a showing that the state exceeded its federal authority. Id., citing Northern Contracting, 473 F.3d at 721. The district court held that implicit in Northern Contracting is the fact one may challenge the constitutionality of a DBE program, as it is applied, to the extent that the program exceeds its federal authority. Id.

The court, therefore, concluded that it must determine first whether NJT's DBE program complies with TEA-21, then whether NJT exceeded its federal authority in its application of its DBE program. In other words, the district court stated it must determine whether the NJT DBE program complies with TEA-21 in order to determine whether the program, as implemented by NJT, is narrowly tailored. Id.

The court pointed out that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Sherbrook Turf, Inc. v. Minnesota DOT, 345 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 2003) found Minnesota's DBE program was narrowly tailored because it was in compliance with TEA-21's requirements. The Eighth Circuit in Sherbrook, according to the district court, analyzed the application of Minnesota's DBE program to ensure compliance with TEA-21's requirements to ensure that the DBE program implemented by Minnesota DOT was narrowly tailored. Id. at *5.

The court held that TEA-21 delegates to each state that accepts federal transportation funds the responsibility of implementing a DBE program that comports with TEA-21. In order to comport with TEA-21, the district court stated a recipient must (1) determine an appropriate DBE participation goal, (2) examine all evidence and evaluate whether an adjustment, if any, is needed to arrive at their goal, and (3) if the adjustment is based on continuing effects of past discrimination, provide demonstrable evidence that is logically and directly related to the effect for which the adjustment is sought. Id. at *6, citing Western States Paving Company, 407 F.3d at 983, 988.

Determination of DBE goal. First, the district court stated a recipient of federal funds must determine, at the local level, the figure that would constitute an appropriate DBE involvement goal, based on their relative availability of DBEs. Id. at *6, citing 49 C.F.R. § 26.45©. In this case, the court found that NJT did determine a base figure for the relative availability of DBEs, which accounted for demonstrable evidence of local market conditions and was designed to be rationally

related to the relative availability of DBEs. Id. The court pointed out that NJT conducted a disparity study; and the disparity study utilized NJT's DBE lists from fiscal years 1995-1999 and Census Data to determine its base DBE goal. The court noted that the plaintiffs' argument that the data used in the disparity study were stale, was without merit and had no basis in law. The court found that the disparity study took into account the primary industries, primary geographic market, and race neutral alternatives, then adjusted its goal to encompass these characteristics. Id. at *6.

The court stated that the use of DBE directories and Census data are what the legislature intended for state agencies to utilize in making a base DBE goal determination. Id. Also, the court stated that "perhaps more importantly, NJT's DBE goal was approved by the USDOT every year from 2002 until 2008." Id. at *6. Thus, the court found NJT appropriately determined their DBE availability, which was approved by the USDOT, pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 26.45©. Id. at *6. The court held that NJT demonstrated its overall DBE goal is based on demonstrable evidence of the availability of ready, willing, and able DBEs relative to all businesses ready, willing, and able to participate in DOT assisted contracts and reflects its determination of the level of DBE participation it would expect absent the effects of discrimination. Id.

Also of significance, the court pointed out that plaintiffs did not provide any evidence that NJT did not set a DBE goal based upon 49 C.F. § 26.45©. The court thus held that genuine issues of material fact remain only as to whether a reasonable jury may find that the method used by NJT to determine its DBE goal was sufficiently narrowly tailored. Id. at *6.

NJT's adjustment of its DBE goal. The court pointed out that to determine what adjustment to make, the disparity study examined qualitative data such as focus groups on the pre-qualification status of DBEs, working with prime contractors, securing credit, and its effect on DBE participation, as well as procurement officer interviews to analyze, and compare and contrast their relationships with non-DBE vendors and DBE vendors. Id. at *7. This qualitative information was then compared to DBE bids and DBE goals for each year in question. NJT's adjustment to its DBE goal also included an analysis of the overall disparity ratio, as well as, DBE utilization based on race, gender and ethnicity. Id. A decomposition analysis was also performed. Id.

The court concluded that NJT provided evidence that it, at a minimum, examined the current capacity of DBEs to perform work in its DOT-assisted contracting program, as measured by the volume of work DBEs have performed in recent years, as well as utilizing the disparity study itself. The court pointed out there were two methods specifically approved by 49 C.F.R. § 26.45(d). Id.

The court also found that NJT took into account race neutral measures to ensure that the greatest percentage of DBE participation was achieved through race and gender neutral means. The district court concluded that "critically," plaintiffs failed to provide evidence of another, more perfect, method that could have been utilized to adjust NJT's DBE goal. Id. at *7. The court held that genuine issues of material fact remain only as to whether NJT's adjustment to its DBE goal is sufficiently narrowly tailored and thus constitutional. Id.

Effects of past discrimination. NJT, the court found, adjusted its DBE goal to account for the effects of past discrimination, noting the disparity study took into account the effects of past discrimination in the pre-qualification process of DBEs. Id. at *7. The court quoted the disparity

study as stating that it found non-trivial and statistically significant measures of discrimination in contract amounts awarded during the study period. *Id.* at *8.

The court found, however, that what was “gravely critical” about the finding of the past effects of discrimination is that it only took into account six groups including American Indian, Hispanic, Asian, blacks, women and “unknown,” but did not include an analysis of past discrimination for the ethnic group “Iraqi,” which is now a group considered to be a DBE by the NJT. *Id.* Because the disparity report included a category entitled “unknown,” the court held a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether “Iraqi” is legitimately within NJT’s defined DBE groups and whether a demonstrable finding of discrimination exists for Iraqis. Therefore, the court denied both plaintiffs’ and defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment as to the constitutionality of NJT’s DBE program.

Qualified immunity and Title VI. The court also held that because the law was not clearly established at the time NJT established its DBE program to comply with TEA-21, the individual state defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and their Motion for Summary Judgment as to the state officials was granted. The court, in addition, held that plaintiff’s Title VI claims were dismissed because the individual defendants were not recipients of federal funds, and that the NJT as an instrumentality of the State of New Jersey is entitled to sovereign immunity. Therefore, the court held that the plaintiff’s claims based on the violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were dismissed and NJT’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted as to that claim.

10. Klaver Construction, Inc. v. Kansas DOT, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1296 (D. Kan. 2002)

This is another case that involved a challenge to the USDOT Regulations that implement TEA-21 (49 C.F.R. Part 26), in which the plaintiff contractor sought to enjoin the Kansas Department of Transportation (“DOT”) from enforcing its DBE Program on the grounds that it violates the Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment. This case involves a direct constitutional challenge to racial and gender preferences in federally-funded state highway contracts. This case concerned the constitutionality of the Kansas DOT’s implementation of the Federal DBE Program, and the constitutionality of the gender-based policies of the federal government and the race- and gender-based policies of the Kansas DOT. The court granted the federal and state defendants (USDOT and Kansas DOT) Motions to Dismiss based on lack of standing. The court held the contractor could not show the specific aspects of the DBE Program that it contends are unconstitutional have caused its alleged injuries.

F. Recent Decisions Involving State or Local Government MBE/WBE Programs in Other Jurisdictions

Recent Decisions in Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal

1. H. B. Rowe Co., Inc. v. W. Lyndo Tippett, NCDOT, et al, F.3d 2010 WL 2871076 (4th Cir. July 22, 2010)

The State of North Carolina enacted statutory legislation that required prime contractors to engage in good faith efforts to satisfy participation goals for minority and women subcontractors on state-funded projects. (See facts as detailed in the decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina discussed below.) The plaintiff, a prime contractor, brought this action after being denied a contract because of its failure to demonstrate good faith efforts to meet the participation goals set on a particular contract that it was seeking an award to perform work with NCDOT. Plaintiff asserted that the participation goals violated the Equal Protection Clause and sought injunctive relief and money damages.

After a bench trial, the district court held the challenged statutory scheme constitutional both on its face and as applied, and the plaintiff prime contractor appealed. 2010 WL 2871076 at *1. The Court of Appeals held that the State did not meet its burden of proof in all respects to uphold the validity of the state legislation. But, the Court agreed with the district court that the State produced a strong basis in evidence justifying the statutory scheme on its face, and as applied to African American and Native American subcontractors, and that the State demonstrated that the legislative scheme is narrowly tailored to serve its compelling interest in remedying discrimination against these racial groups. The Court thus affirmed the decision of the district court in part, reversed it in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Id.

The Court found that the North Carolina statutory scheme “largely mirrored the federal Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (‘DBE’) program, with which every state must comply in awarding highway construction contracts that utilize federal funds.” 2010 WL 2871076 at *1. The Court also noted that federal courts of appeal “have uniformly upheld the federal DBE program against equal-protection challenges.” Id., at footnote 1, citing, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000).

In 2004, the State retained a consultant to prepare and issue a third study of subcontractors employed in North Carolina's highway construction industry. The study, according to the Court, marshaled evidence to conclude that disparities in the utilization of minority subcontractors persisted. 2010 WL 2871076 at *3. The Court pointed out that in response to the study, the North Carolina General Assembly substantially amended state legislation section 136-28.4 and the new law went into effect in 2006. The new statute modified the previous statutory scheme, according to the Court in five important respects. Id.

First, the amended statute expressly conditions implementation of any participation goals on the findings of the 2004 study. Second, the amended statute eliminates the 5 and 10 percent annual goals that were set in the predecessor statute. Id. at *3–*4. Instead, as amended, the statute requires the NCDOT to “establish annual aspirational goals, not mandatory goals, ... for the overall participation in contracts by disadvantaged minority-owned and women-owned businesses ... [that] shall not be applied rigidly on specific contracts or projects.” Id. at *4, quoting, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 136-

28.4(b)(2010). The statute further mandates that the NCDOT set “contract-specific goals or project-specific goals ... for each disadvantaged minority-owned and women-owned business category that has demonstrated significant disparity in contract utilization” based on availability, as determined by the study. *Id.*

Third, the amended statute narrowed the definition of “minority” to encompass only those groups that have suffered discrimination. *Id.* at *4. The amended statute replaced a list of defined minorities to any certain groups by defining “minority” as “only those racial or ethnicity classifications identified by [the study] ... that have been subjected to discrimination in the relevant marketplace and that have been adversely affected in their ability to obtain contracts with the Department.” *Id.* at *4 quoting section 136-28.4(c)(2)(2010).

Fourth, the amended statute required the Department to reevaluate the Program over time and respond to changing conditions. *Id.* Accordingly, the NCDOT must conduct a study similar to the 2004 study at least every five years. *Id.* § 136-28.4(b). Finally, the amended statute contained a sunset provision which was set to expire on August 31, 2009, but the General Assembly subsequently extended the sunset provision to August 31, 2010. *Id.* Section 136-28.4(e) (2010).

The Court also noted that the statute required only good faith efforts by the prime contractors to utilize subcontractors, and that the good faith requirement, the Court found, proved permissive in practice: prime contractors satisfied the requirement in 98.5 percent of cases, failing to do so in only 13 of 878 attempts. *Id.* at *5.

Strict scrutiny. The Court stated the strict scrutiny standard was applicable to justify a race-conscious measure, and that it is a substantial burden but not automatically “fatal in fact.” *Id.* at *6. The Court pointed out that “[t]he unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in response to it.” *Id.* at *6 quoting *Alexander v. Estep*, 95 F.3d 312, 315 (4th Cir. 1996). In so acting, a governmental entity must demonstrate it had a compelling interest in “remedying the effects of past or present racial discrimination.” *Id.* at *6, quoting *Shaw v. Hunt*, 517 U.S. 899, 909 (1996).

Thus, the Court found that to justify a race-conscious measure, a state must identify that discrimination, public or private, with some specificity, and must have a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action is necessary. *Id.* at *6 quoting *Croson*, 488 U.S. at 504 and *Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education*, 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986)(plurality opinion).

The Court significantly noted that: “There is no ‘precise mathematical formula to assess the quantum of evidence that rises to the *Croson* ‘strong basis in evidence’ benchmark.” *Id.* at *6, quoting *Rothe Dev. Corp. v. Department of Defense*, 545 F.3d 1023, 1049 (Fed.Cir. 2008). The Court stated that the sufficiency of the State’s evidence of discrimination “must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” *Id.* at *6. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court held that a state “need not conclusively prove the existence of past or present racial discrimination to establish a strong basis in evidence for concluding that remedial action is necessary.” *Id.* at *6, citing *Concrete Works*, 321 F.3d at 958. Instead, a state may meet its burden by relying on “a significant statistical disparity” between the availability of qualified, willing, and able

minority subcontractors and the utilization of such subcontractors by the governmental entity or its prime contractors. *Id.* at *6, citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 509 (plurality opinion). The Court stated that “we further require that such evidence be ‘corroborated by significant anecdotal evidence of racial discrimination.’” *Id.* at *6, quoting Maryland Troopers Association, Inc. v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072, 1077 (4th Cir. 1993).

The Court pointed out that those challenging race-based remedial measures must “introduce credible, particularized evidence to rebut” the state’s showing of a strong basis in evidence for the necessity for remedial action. *Id.* at *6, citing Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 959. Challengers may offer a neutral explanation for the state’s evidence, present contrasting statistical data, or demonstrate that the evidence is flawed, insignificant, or not actionable. *Id.* at *6 (citations omitted). However, the Court stated “that mere speculation that the state’s evidence is insufficient or methodologically flawed does not suffice to rebut a state’s showing.” *Id.* at *6, citing Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 991.

The Court held that to satisfy strict scrutiny, the state's statutory scheme must also be “narrowly tailored” to serve the state’s compelling interest in not financing private discrimination with public funds. *Id.* at *7, citing Alexander, 95 F.3d at 315 (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227).

Intermediate scrutiny. The Court held that courts apply “intermediate scrutiny” to statutes that classify on the basis of gender. *Id.* at *7. The Court found that a defender of a statute that classifies on the basis of gender meets this intermediate scrutiny burden “by showing at least that the classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.” *Id.* at *7, quoting Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982). The Court noted that intermediate scrutiny requires less of a showing than does “the most exacting” strict scrutiny standard of review. *Id.* at *7.

The Court found that its “sister circuits” provide guidance in formulating a governing evidentiary standard for intermediate scrutiny. These courts agree that such a measure “can rest safely on something less than the ‘strong basis in evidence’ required to bear the weight of a race- or ethnicity-conscious program.” *Id.* at *7, quoting Engineering Contractors, 122 F.3d at 909 (other citations omitted).

In defining what constitutes “something less” than a “strong basis in evidence,” the courts also agree that the party defending the statute must “present ... sufficient probative evidence in support of its stated rationale for enacting a gender preference, i.e., ... the evidence [must be] sufficient to show that the preference rests on evidence-informed analysis rather than on stereotypical generalizations.” *Id.* at *7 quoting Engineering Contractors, 122 F.3d at 910 and Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 959. The gender-based measures must be based on “reasoned analysis rather than on the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions.” *Id.* at *7 quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 726.

Plaintiff's burden. The Court found that when a plaintiff alleges that a statute violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied and on its face, the plaintiff bears a heavy burden. In its facial challenge, the Court held that a plaintiff “has a very heavy burden to carry, and must show that [a statutory scheme] cannot operate constitutionally under any circumstance.” *Id.* at *7, quoting West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281, 292 (4th Cir. 2002).

Statistical evidence. The Court examined the State's statistical evidence of discrimination in public-sector subcontracting, including its disparity evidence and regression analysis. The Court noted that the statistical analysis analyzed the difference or disparity between the amount of subcontracting dollars minority- and women-owned businesses actually won in a market and the amount of subcontracting dollars they would be expected to win given their presence in that market. *Id.* at *8. The Court found that the study grounded its analysis in the “disparity index,” which measures the participation of a given racial, ethnic, or gender group engaged in subcontracting. *Id.* In calculating a disparity index, the study divided the percentage of total subcontracting dollars that a particular group won by the percent that group represents in the available labor pool, and multiplied the result by 100. *Id.* The closer the resulting index is to 100, the greater that group's participation. *Id.*

The Court held that after Croson, a number of our sister circuits have recognized the utility of the disparity index in determining statistical disparities in the utilization of minority- and women-owned businesses. *Id.* (Citations to multiple federal circuit court decisions omitted.) The Court also found that generally “courts consider a disparity index lower than 80 as an indication of discrimination.” *Id.* Accordingly, the study considered only a disparity index lower than 80 as warranting further investigation. *Id.*

The Court pointed out that after calculating the disparity index for each relevant racial or gender group, the consultant tested for the statistical significance of the results by conducting standard deviation analysis through the use of t-tests. The Court noted that standard deviation analysis “describes the probability that the measured disparity is the result of mere chance.” *Id.* at *9, quoting Eng'g Contractors, 122 F.3d at 914. The consultant considered the finding of two standard deviations to demonstrate “with 95 percent certainty that disparity, as represented by either overutilization or underutilization, is actually present.” *Id.* *9, citing Eng'g Contractors, 122 F.3d at 914.

The study analyzed the participation of minority and women subcontractors in construction contracts awarded and managed from the central Department office in Raleigh, North Carolina. *Id.* *9. To determine utilization of minority and women subcontractors, the consultant developed a master list of contracts mainly from State-maintained electronic databases and hard copy files; then selected from that list a statistically valid sample of contracts, and calculated the percentage of subcontracting dollars awarded to minority- and women-owned businesses during the 5-year period ending in June 2003. (The study was published in 2004). *Id.* at *9.

The Court found that the use of data for centrally-awarded contracts was sufficient for its analysis. It was noted that data from construction contracts awarded and managed from the department divisions across the state and from preconstruction contracts, which involve work from engineering firms and architectural firms on the design of highways, was incomplete and not accurate. *Id.* at *9, n.6. These data were not relied upon in forming the opinions relating to the study. *Id.* at *9, n. 6.

To estimate availability, which the Court defined as the percentage of a particular group in the relevant market area, the consultant created a vendor list comprising: (1) subcontractors approved by the department to perform subcontract work on state-funded projects, (2) subcontractors that performed such work during the study period, and (3) contractors qualified to perform prime construction work on state-funded contracts. Id. at *9. The Court noted that prime construction work on state-funded contracts was included based on the testimony by the consultant that prime contractors are qualified to perform subcontracting work and often do perform such work. Id. The Court also noted that the consultant submitted its master list to the Department for verification. Id.

Based on the utilization and availability figures, the study prepared the disparity analysis comparing the utilization based on the percentage of subcontracting dollars over the five year period, determining the availability in numbers of firms and their percentage of the labor pool, a disparity index which is the percentage of utilization in dollars divided by the percentage of availability multiplied by 100, and a T Value. Id.

The Court concluded that the figures demonstrated prime contractors underutilized all of the minority subcontractor classifications on state-funded construction contracts during the study period. Id. at *10. The disparity index for each group was less than 80 and, thus, the Court found warranted further investigation. Id. The t-test results, however, demonstrated marked underutilization only of African American and Native American subcontractors. Id. For African Americans the t-value fell outside of two standard deviations from the mean and, therefore, was statistically significant at a 95 percent confidence level. Id. The Court found there was at least a 95 percent probability that prime contractors' underutilization of African American subcontractors was *not* the result of mere chance. Id.

For Native American subcontractors, the t-value of 1.41 was significant at a confidence level of approximately 85 percent. Id. The t-values for Hispanic American and Asian American subcontractors, demonstrated significance at a confidence level of approximately 60 percent. The disparity index for women subcontractors found that they were overutilized during the study period. The overutilization was statistically significant at a 95 percent confidence level. Id.

The consultant also conducted a regression analysis studying the influence of certain company and business characteristics — with a particular focus on owner race and gender — on a firm's gross revenues. Id. The consultant obtained the data from a telephone survey of firms that conducted or attempted to conduct business with the Department. The survey pool consisted of a random sample of such firms. Id.

The consultant used the firms' gross revenues as the dependent variable in the regression analysis to test the effect of other variables, including company age and number of full-time employees, and the owners' years of experience, level of education, race, ethnicity, and gender. Id. at *10. The analysis revealed that minority and women ownership universally had a negative effect on revenue, and African American ownership of a firm had the largest negative effect on that firm's gross revenue of all the independent variables included in the regression model. Id. These findings led to the conclusion that for African Americans the disparity in firm revenue was not due to capacity-related or managerial characteristics alone. Id.

The Court rejected the arguments by the plaintiffs attacking the availability estimates. The Court rejected the plaintiff's expert, Dr. George LaNoue, who testified that bidder data — reflecting the number of subcontractors that actually bid on Department subcontracts — estimates availability better than “vendor data.” *Id.* at *11. Dr. LaNoue conceded, however, that the State does not compile bidder data and that bidder data actually reflects skewed availability in the context of a goals program that urges prime contractors to solicit bids from minority and women subcontractors. *Id.* The Court found that the plaintiff's expert did not demonstrate that the vendor data used in the study was unreliable, or that the bidder data would have yielded less support for the conclusions reached. In sum, the Court held that the plaintiff's challenge to the availability estimate failed because it could not demonstrate that the 2004 study's availability estimate was inadequate. *Id.* at *11. The Court cited *Concrete Works*, 321 F.3d at 991 for the proposition that a challenger cannot meet its burden of proof through conjecture and unsupported criticisms of the state's evidence,” and that the plaintiff Rowe presented no viable alternative for determining availability. *Id.* at *11, citing *Concrete Works*, 321 F.3d 991 and *Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. Department of Transportation*, 345 F.3d 964, 973 (8th Cir. 2003).

The Court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that minority subcontractors participated on state-funded projects at a level consistent with their availability in the relevant labor pool, based on the state's response that evidence as to the *number* of minority subcontractors working with state-funded projects does not effectively rebut the evidence of discrimination in terms of subcontracting *dollars*. *Id.* at *11. The State pointed to evidence indicating that prime contractors used minority businesses for low-value work in order to comply with the goals, and that African American ownership had a significant negative impact on firm revenue unrelated to firm capacity or experience. *Id.* The Court concluded plaintiff did not offer any contrary evidence. *Id.*

The Court found that the State bolstered its position by presenting evidence that minority subcontractors have the capacity to perform higher-value work. *Id.* at *12. The study concluded, based on a sample of subcontracts and reports of annual firm revenue, that exclusion of minority subcontractors from contracts under \$500,000 was not a function of capacity. *Id.* at *12. Further, the State showed that over 90 percent of the Department's subcontracts were valued at \$500,000 or less, and that capacity constraints do not operate with the same force on subcontracts as they may on prime contracts because subcontracts tend to be relatively small. *Id.* at *12. The Court pointed out that the Court in *Rothe II*, 545 F.3d at 1042-45, faulted disparity analyses of total construction dollars, including prime contracts, for failing to account for the relative capacity of firms in that case. *Id.* at *12.

The Court pointed out that in addition to the statistical evidence, the State also presented evidence demonstrating that from 1991 to 1993, during the Program's suspension, prime contractors awarded substantially less subcontracting dollars to minority and women subcontractors on state-funded projects. The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that evidence of a decline in utilization does not raise an inference of discrimination. *Id.* at *12. The Court held that the very significant decline in utilization of minority and women-subcontractors — nearly 38 percent — “surely provides a basis for a fact finder to infer that discrimination played some role in prime contractors' reduced utilization of these groups during the suspension.” *Id.* at *12, citing *Adarand v. Slater*, 228 F.3d at 1174 (finding that evidence of declining minority utilization after a program has been discontinued “strongly supports the government's claim that there are significant barriers to minority competition in the public subcontracting market, raising the specter of racial discrimination.”) The Court found such an

inference is particularly compelling for minority-owned businesses because, even during the study period, prime contractors continue to underutilize them on state-funded road projects. *Id.* at *12.

Anecdotal evidence. The State additionally relied on three sources of anecdotal evidence contained in the study: a telephone survey, personal interviews, and focus groups. The Court found the anecdotal evidence showed an informal “good old boy” network of white contractors that discriminated against minority subcontractors. *Id.* at *12. The Court noted that three-quarters of African American respondents to the telephone survey agreed that an informal network of prime and subcontractors existed in the state, as did the majority of other minorities, and that more than half of African American respondents believed the network excluded their companies from bidding or awarding a contract, as did many of the other minorities. *Id.* at *12. The Court found that nearly half of non-minority male respondents corroborated the existence of an informal network; however, only 17 percent of them believed that the network excluded their companies from bidding or winning contracts. *Id.*

Anecdotal evidence also showed a large majority of African American respondents reported that double standards in qualifications and performance made it more difficult for them to win bids and contracts, that prime contractors view minority firms as being less competent than nonminority firms, and that nonminority firms change their bids when not required to hire minority firms. *Id.* at *13. In addition, the anecdotal evidence showed African American and Native American respondents believed that prime contractors sometimes dropped minority subcontractors after winning contracts. *Id.* at *13. The Court found that interview and focus-group responses echoed and underscored these reports. *Id.*

The anecdotal evidence indicated that prime contractors already know who they will use on the contract before they solicit bids; that the “good old boy network” affects business because prime contractors just pick up the phone and call their buddies, which excludes others from that market completely; that prime contractors prefer to use other less qualified minority-owned firms to avoid subcontracting with African American-owned firms; and that prime contractors use their preferred subcontractor regardless of the bid price. *Id.* at 13. Several minority subcontractors reported that prime contractors do not treat minority firms fairly, pointing to instances in which prime contractors solicited quotes the day before bids were due, did not respond to bids from minority subcontractors, refused to negotiate prices with them, or gave minority subcontractors insufficient information regarding the project. *Id.* at *13.

The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the anecdotal data was flawed because the study did not verify the anecdotal data and that the consultant oversampled minority subcontractors in collecting the data. The Court stated that the plaintiffs offered no rationale as to why a fact finder could not rely on the State’s “unverified” anecdotal data, and pointed out that a fact finder could very well conclude that anecdotal evidence need not — and indeed cannot — be verified because it “is nothing more than a witness’s narrative of an incident told from the witness’s perspective and including the witness’s perceptions.” *Id.* at *13, quoting *Concrete Works*, 321 F.3d at 989.

The Court held that anecdotal evidence simply supplements statistical evidence of discrimination. *Id.* at *13. The Court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the study oversampled representatives from minority groups, and found that surveying more non-minority men would not have advanced the inquiry. *Id.* at *13. It was noted that the samples of the minority groups were randomly selected. *Id.*

The Court found the state had compelling anecdotal evidence that minority subcontractors face race-based obstacles to successful bidding. *Id.* at *14.

Strong basis in evidence that the minority participation goals were necessary to remedy discrimination. The Court held that the State presented a “strong basis in evidence” for its conclusion that minority participation goals were necessary to remedy discrimination against African American and Native American subcontractors. *Id.* at *14. Therefore, the Court held that the State satisfied the strict scrutiny test. The Court found that the State’s data demonstrated that prime contractors grossly underutilized African American and Native American subcontractors in public sector subcontracting during the study. *Id.* at *14. The Court noted that these findings have particular resonance because since 1983, North Carolina has encouraged minority participation in state-funded highway projects, and yet African American and Native American subcontractors continue to be underutilized on such projects. *Id.* at *14.

In addition, the Court found the disparity index in the study demonstrated statistically significant underutilization of African American subcontractors at a 95 percent confidence level, and of Native American subcontractors at a confidence level of approximately 85 percent. *Id.* at *15. The Court concluded the State bolstered the disparity evidence with regression analysis demonstrating that African American ownership correlated with a significant, negative impact on firm revenue, and demonstrated there was a dramatic decline in the utilization of minority subcontractors during the suspension of the program in the 1990s. *Id.*

Thus, the Court held the State’s evidence showing a gross statistical disparity between the availability of qualified African American and Native American subcontractors and the amount of subcontracting dollars they win on public sector contracts established the necessary statistical foundation for upholding the minority participation goals with respect to these groups. *Id.* at *15. The Court then found that the State’s anecdotal evidence of discrimination against these two groups sufficiently supplemented the State’s statistical showing. *Id.* The survey in the study exposed an informal, racially exclusive network that systemically disadvantaged minority subcontractors. *Id.* at *15. The Court held that the State could conclude with good reason that such networks exert a chronic and pernicious influence on the marketplace that calls for remedial action. *Id.* The Court found the anecdotal evidence indicated that racial discrimination is a critical factor underlying the gross statistical disparities presented in the study. *Id.* at *15. Thus, the Court held that the State presented substantial statistical evidence of gross disparity, corroborated by “disturbing” anecdotal evidence.

The Court held in circumstances like these, the Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear a state can remedy a public contracting system that withholds opportunities from minority groups because of their race. *Id.* at *16.

Narrowly tailored. The Court then addressed whether the North Carolina statutory scheme was narrowly tailored to achieve the State’s compelling interest in remedying discrimination against African American and Native American subcontractors in public-sector subcontracting. The following factors were considered in determining whether the statutory scheme was narrowly tailored.

Neutral measures. The Court held that narrowly tailoring requires “serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives,” but a state need not “exhaust . . . every conceivable race-neutral alternative.” *Id.* at *16 quoting *Grutter v. Bollinger*, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003). The Court found

that the study details numerous alternative race-neutral measures aimed at enhancing the development and competitiveness of small or otherwise disadvantaged businesses in North Carolina. Id. at *16. The Court pointed out various race-neutral alternatives and measures, including a Small Business Enterprise Program; waiving institutional barriers of bonding and licensing requirements on certain small business contracts of \$500,000 or less; and the Department contracts for support services to assist disadvantaged business enterprises with bookkeeping and accounting, taxes, marketing, bidding, negotiation, and other aspects of entrepreneurial development. Id. at *16.

The Court found that plaintiff identified no viable race-neutral alternatives that North Carolina had failed to consider and adopt. The Court also found that the State had undertaken most of the race-neutral alternatives identified by the U.S. Department of Transportation in its regulations governing the Federal DBE Program. Id. at *16, citing 49 C.F.R. § 26.51(b). The Court concluded that the State gave serious good faith consideration to race-neutral alternatives prior to adopting the statutory scheme. Id.

The Court concluded that despite these race-neutral efforts, the study demonstrated disparities continue to exist in the utilization of African American and Native American subcontractors in state-funded highway construction subcontracting, and that these “persistent disparities indicate the necessity of a race-conscious remedy.” Id. at *17.

Duration. The Court agreed with the district court that the program was narrowly tailored in that it set a specific expiration date and required a new disparity study every five years. Id. at *17. The Court found that the program’s inherent time limit and provisions requiring regular reevaluation ensure it is carefully designed to endure only until the discriminatory impact has been eliminated. Id. at *17, citing *Adarand Constructors v. Slater*, 228 F.3d at 1179 (quoting *United States v. Paradise*, 480 U.S. 149, 178 (1987)).

Program’s goals related to percentage of minority subcontractors. The Court concluded that the State had demonstrated that the Program’s participation goals are related to the percentage of minority subcontractors in the relevant markets in the State. Id. at *17. The Court found that the Department had taken concrete steps to ensure that these goals accurately reflect the availability of minority-owned businesses on a project-by-project basis. Id.

Flexibility. The Court held that the Program was flexible and thus satisfied this indicator of narrow tailoring. Id. at *17. The Program contemplated a waiver of project-specific goals when prime contractors make good faith efforts to meet those goals, and that the good faith efforts essentially require only that the prime contractor solicit and consider bids from minorities. Id. The State does not require or expect the prime contractor to accept any bid from an unqualified bidder, or any bid that is not the lowest bid. Id. The Court found there was a lenient standard and flexibility of the “good faith” requirement, and noted the evidence showed only 13 of 878 good faith submissions failed to demonstrate good faith efforts. Id.

Burden on non-MWBE/DBEs. The Court rejected the two arguments presented by plaintiff that the Program created onerous solicitation and follow-up requirements, finding that there was no need for additional employees dedicated to the task of running the solicitation program to obtain MBE/WBEs, and that there was no evidence to support the claim that plaintiff was required to subcontract millions of dollars of work that it could perform itself for less money. Id. at *18. The

State offered evidence from the study that prime contractors need not submit subcontract work that they can self-perform. Id.

Overinclusive. The Court found by its own terms the statutory scheme is not overinclusive because it limited relief to only those racial or ethnicity classifications that have been subjected to discrimination in the relevant marketplace and that had been adversely affected in their ability to obtain contracts with the Department. Id. at *18. The Court concluded that in tailoring the remedy this way, the legislature did not randomly include racial groups that may never have suffered from discrimination in the construction industry, but rather, contemplated participation goals only for those groups shown to have suffered discrimination. Id.

In sum, the Court held that the statutory scheme is narrowly tailored to achieve the State’s compelling interest in remedying discrimination in public-sector subcontracting against African American and Native American subcontractors. Id. at *18.

Women-owned businesses overutilized. The study’s public-sector disparity analysis demonstrated that women-owned businesses won far more than their expected share of subcontracting dollars during the study period. Id. at *18. In other words, the Court concluded that prime contractors substantially overutilized women subcontractors on public road construction projects. Id. The Court found the public-sector evidence did not evince the “exceedingly persuasive justification” the Supreme Court requires. Id. at *18.

The Court noted that the State relied heavily on private-sector data from the study attempting to demonstrate that prime contractors significantly underutilized women subcontractors in the general construction industry statewide and in the Charlotte, North Carolina area. Id. at *19. However, because the study did not provide a t-test analysis on the private sector disparity figures to calculate statistical significance, the Court could not determine whether this private underutilization was “the result of mere chance.” Id. at *19. The Court found troubling the “evidentiary gap” that there was no evidence indicating the extent to which women-owned businesses competing on public sector road projects vied for private sector subcontracts in the general construction industry. Id. at *19. The Court also found that the State did not present any anecdotal evidence indicating that women subcontractors successfully bidding on State contracts faced private-sector discrimination. Id. In addition, the Court found missing any evidence prime contractors that discriminate against women subcontractors in the private sector nevertheless win public-sector contracts. Id.

The Court pointed out that it did not suggest that the proponent of a gender-conscious program “must always tie private discrimination to public action.” Id. at *19, FN. 11. But the Court held that where, as here, there existed substantial probative evidence of overutilization in the relevant public sector, a state must present something more than generalized private sector data unsupported by compelling anecdotal evidence to justify a gender-conscious program. Id. at *19, n. 11.

Moreover, the Court found the State failed to establish the amount of overlap between general construction and road construction subcontracting. Id. at *19. The Court said that the dearth of evidence as to the correlation between public road construction subcontracting and private general construction subcontracting severely limits the private data’s probative value in this case. Id.

Thus, the Court held that the State could not overcome the strong evidence of overutilization in the public sector in terms of gender participation goals, and that the proffered private sector data failed to establish discrimination in the particular field in question. *Id.* at *20. Further, the anecdotal evidence, the Court concluded, indicated that most women subcontractors do not experience discrimination. *Id.* Thus, the Court held that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support the Program's current inclusion of women subcontractors in setting participation goals. *Id.*

Holding. The Court held that the state legislature had crafted legislation that withstood the constitutional scrutiny. *Id.* at *21. The Court concluded that in light of the statutory scheme's flexibility and responsiveness to the realities of the marketplace, and given the State's strong evidence of discrimination against African American and Native American subcontractors in public-sector subcontracting, the State's application of the statute to these groups is constitutional. *Id.* at *21. However, the Court also held that because the State failed to justify its application of the statutory scheme to women, Asian American, and Hispanic American subcontractors, the Court found those applications were not constitutional.

Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment of the district court with regard to the facial validity of the statute, and with regard to its application to African American and Native American subcontractors. *Id.* at *21. The Court reversed the district court's judgment insofar as it upheld the constitutionality of the state legislature as applied to women, Asian American and Hispanic American subcontractors. *Id.* The Court thus remanded the case to the district court to fashion an appropriate remedy consistent with the opinion. *Id.*

Concurring opinions. It should be pointed out that there were two concurring opinions by the three Judge panel: one judge concurred in the judgment, and the other judge concurred fully in the majority opinion and the judgment.

2. Jana-Rock Construction, Inc. v. New York State Dept. of Economic Development, 438 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2006)

This recent case is instructive in connection with the determination of the groups that may be included in a MBE/WBE-type program, and the standard of analysis utilized to evaluate a local government's non-inclusion of certain groups. In this case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held racial classifications that are challenged as "under-inclusive" (i.e., those that exclude persons from a particular racial classification) are subject to a "rational basis" review, not strict scrutiny.

Plaintiff Luiere, a 70 percent shareholder of Jana-Rock Construction, Inc. ("Jana Rock") and the "son of a Spanish mother whose parents were born in Spain," challenged the constitutionality of the State of New York's definition of "Hispanic" under its local minority-owned business program. 438 F.3d 195, 199-200 (2d Cir. 2006). Under the U.S. Department of Transportation regulations, 49 C.F.R. § 26.5, "Hispanic Americans" are defined as "persons of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Central or South American, or other Spanish or Portuguese culture or origin, regardless of race." *Id.* at 201. Upon proper application, Jana-Rock was certified by the New York Department of Transportation as a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise ("DBE") under the federal regulations. *Id.*

However, unlike the federal regulations, the State of New York's local minority-owned business program included in its definition of minorities "Hispanic persons of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Dominican, Cuban, Central or South American of either Indian or Hispanic origin, regardless of

race.” The definition did not include all persons from, or descendants of persons from, Spain or Portugal. *Id.* Accordingly, Jana-Rock was denied MBE certification under the local program; Jana-Rock filed suit alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. *Id.* at 202-03. The plaintiff conceded that the overall minority-owned business program satisfied the requisite strict scrutiny, but argued that the definition of “Hispanic” was fatally under-inclusive. *Id.* at 205.

The Second Circuit found that the narrow-tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny analysis “allows New York to identify which groups it is prepared to prove are in need of affirmative action without demonstrating that no other groups merit consideration for the program.” *Id.* at 206. The court found that evaluating under-inclusiveness as an element of the strict scrutiny analysis was at odds with the United States Supreme Court decision in *City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.*, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) which required that affirmative action programs be no broader than necessary. *Id.* at 207-08. The court similarly rejected the argument that the state should mirror the federal definition of “Hispanic,” finding that Congress has more leeway than the states to make broader classifications because Congress is making such classifications on the national level. *Id.* at 209.

The court opined — without deciding — that it may be impermissible for New York to simply adopt the “federal USDOT definition of Hispanic without at least making an independent assessment of discrimination against Hispanics of Spanish Origin in New York.” *Id.* Additionally, finding that the plaintiff failed to point to any discriminatory purpose by New York in failing to include persons of Spanish or Portuguese descent, the court determined that the rational basis analysis was appropriate. *Id.* at 213.

The court held that the plaintiff failed the rational basis test for three reasons: (1) because it was not irrational nor did it display animus to exclude persons of Spanish and Portuguese descent from the definition of Hispanic; (2) because the fact the plaintiff could demonstrate evidence of discrimination that he personally had suffered did not render New York’s decision to exclude persons of Spanish and Portuguese descent irrational; and (3) because the fact New York may have relied on Census data including a small percentage of Hispanics of Spanish descent did not mean that it was irrational to conclude that Hispanics of Latin American origin were in greater need of remedial legislation. *Id.* at 213-14. Thus, the Second Circuit affirmed the conclusion that New York had a rational basis for its definition to not include persons of Spanish and Portuguese descent, and thus affirmed the district court decision upholding the constitutionality of the challenged definition.

3. Rapid Test Prods., Inc. v. Durham Sch. Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 2006)

In *Rapid Test Products, Inc. v. Durham School Services Inc.*, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (the federal anti-discrimination law) did not provide an “entitlement” in disadvantaged businesses to receive contracts subject to set aside programs; rather, § 1981 provided a remedy for individuals who were subject to discrimination.

Durham School Services, Inc. (“Durham”), a prime contractor, submitted a bid for and won a contract with an Illinois school district. The contract was subject to a set-aside program reserving some of the subcontracts for disadvantaged business enterprises (a race- and gender-conscious program). Prior to bidding, Durham negotiated with Rapid Test Products, Inc. (“Rapid Test”), made one payment to Rapid Test as an advance, and included Rapid Test in its final bid. Rapid Test

believed it had received the subcontract. However, after the school district awarded the contract to Durham, Durham gave the subcontract to one of Rapid Test's competitor's, a business owned by an Asian male. The school district agreed to the substitution. Rapid Test brought suit against Durham under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 alleging that Durham discriminated against it because Rapid's owner was a black woman.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Durham holding the parties' dealing had been too indefinite to create a contract. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "§ 1981 establishes a rule against discrimination in contracting and does not create any entitlement to be the beneficiary of a contract reserved for firms owned by specified racial, sexual, ethnic, or religious groups. Arguments that a particular set-aside program is a lawful remedy for prior discrimination may or may not prevail if a potential subcontractor claims to have been excluded, but it is to victims of discrimination rather than frustrated beneficiaries that § 1981 assigns the right to litigate."

The court held that if race or sex discrimination is the reason why Durham did not award the subcontract to Rapid Test, then § 1981 provides relief. Having failed to address this issue, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court to determine whether Rapid Test had evidence to back up its claim that race and sex discrimination, rather than a nondiscriminatory reason such as inability to perform the services Durham wanted, accounted for Durham's decision to hire Rapid Test's competitor.

4. Virdi v. DeKalb County School District, 135 Fed. Appx. 262, 2005 WL 138942 (11th Cir. 2005) (unpublished opinion)

Although it is an unpublished opinion, Virdi v. DeKalb County School District is a recent Eleventh Circuit decision reviewing a challenge to a local government MBE/WBE-type program, which is instructive to the disparity study. In Virdi, the Eleventh Circuit struck down a MBE/WBE goal program that the court held contained racial classifications. The court based its ruling primarily on the failure of the DeKalb County School District (the "District") to seriously consider and implement a race-neutral program and to the infinite duration of the program.

Plaintiff Virdi, an Asian American architect of Indian descent, filed suit against the District, members of the DeKalb County Board of Education (both individually and in their official capacities) (the "Board") and the Superintendent (both individually and in his official capacity) (collectively "defendants") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment alleging that they discriminated against him on the basis of race when awarding architectural contracts. 135 Fed. Appx. 262, 264 (11th Cir. 2005). Virdi also alleged the school district's Minority Vendor Involvement Program was facially unconstitutional. Id.

The district court initially granted the defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment on all of Virdi's claims and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. Id. On remand, the district court granted the defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the facial challenge, and then granted the defendants' motion for a judgment as a matter of law on the remaining claims at the close of Virdi's case. Id.

In 1989, the Board appointed the Tillman Committee (the "Committee") to study participation of female- and minority-owned businesses with the District. Id. The Committee met with various

District departments and a number of minority contractors who claimed they had unsuccessfully attempted to solicit business with the District. *Id.* Based upon a “general feeling” that minorities were under-represented, the Committee issued the Tillman Report (the “Report”) stating “the Committee’s impression that ‘[m]inorities ha[d] not participated in school board purchases and contracting in a ratio reflecting the minority make-up of the community.’” *Id.* The Report contained no specific evidence of past discrimination nor any factual findings of discrimination. *Id.*

The Report recommended that the District: (1) Advertise bids and purchasing opportunities in newspapers targeting minorities, (2) conduct periodic seminars to educate minorities on doing business with the District, (3) notify organizations representing minority firms regarding bidding and purchasing opportunities, and (4) publish a “how to” booklet to be made available to any business interested in doing business with the District.

Id. The Report also recommended that the District adopt annual, aspirational participation goals for women- and minority-owned businesses. *Id.* The Report contained statements indicating the selection process should remain neutral and recommended that the Board adopt a non-discrimination statement. *Id.*

In 1991, the Board adopted the Report and implemented several of the recommendations, including advertising in the AJC, conducting seminars, and publishing the “how to” booklet. *Id.* The Board also implemented the Minority Vendor Involvement Program (the “MVP”) which adopted the participation goals set forth in the Report. *Id.* at 265.

The Board delegated the responsibility of selecting architects to the Superintendent. *Id.* Virdi sent a letter to the District in October 1991 expressing interest in obtaining architectural contracts. *Id.* Virdi sent the letter to the District Manager and sent follow-up literature; he re-contacted the District Manager in 1992 and 1993. *Id.* In August 1994, Virdi sent a letter and a qualifications package to a project manager employed by Heery International. *Id.* In a follow-up conversation, the project manager allegedly told Virdi that his firm was not selected not based upon his qualifications, but because the “District was only looking for ‘black-owned firms.’” *Id.* Virdi sent a letter to the project manager requesting confirmation of his statement in writing and the project manager forwarded the letter to the District. *Id.*

After a series of meetings with District officials, in 1997, Virdi met with the newly hired Executive Director. *Id.* at 266. Upon request of the Executive Director, Virdi re-submitted his qualifications but was informed that he would be considered only for future projects (Phase III SPLOST projects). *Id.* Virdi then filed suit before any Phase III SPLOST projects were awarded. *Id.*

The Eleventh Circuit considered whether the MVP was facially unconstitutional and whether the defendants intentionally discriminated against Virdi on the basis of his race. The court held that strict scrutiny applies to all racial classifications and is not limited to merely set-asides or mandatory quotas; therefore, the MVP was subject to strict scrutiny because it contained racial classifications. *Id.* at 267. The court first questioned whether the identified government interest was compelling. *Id.* at 268. However, the court declined to reach that issue because it found the race-based participation goals were not narrowly tailored to achieving the identified government interest. *Id.*

The court held the MVP was not narrowly tailored for two reasons. Id. First, because no evidence existed that the District considered race-neutral alternatives to “avoid unwitting discrimination.” The court found that “[w]hile narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative, it does require serious, good faith consideration of whether such alternatives could serve the governmental interest at stake.” Id., citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003), and Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509-10 (1989). The court found that District could have engaged in any number of equally effective race-neutral alternatives, including using its outreach procedure and tracking the participation and success of minority-owned business as compared to non-minority-owned businesses. Id. at 268, n.8. Accordingly, the court held the MVP was not narrowly tailored. Id. at 268.

Second, the court held that the unlimited duration of the MVP’s racial goals negated a finding of narrow tailoring. Id. “[R]ace conscious ... policies must be limited in time.” Id., citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342, and Walker v. City of Mequite, TX, 169 F.3d 973, 982 (5th Cir. 1999). The court held that because the government interest could have been achieved utilizing race-neutral measures, and because the racial goals were not temporally limited, the MVP could not withstand strict scrutiny and was unconstitutional on its face. Id. at 268.

With respect to Virdi’s claims of intentional discrimination, the court held that although the MVP was facially unconstitutional, no evidence existed that the MVP or its unconstitutionality caused Virdi to lose a contract that he would have otherwise received. Id. Thus, because Virdi failed to establish a causal connection between the unconstitutional aspect of the MVP and his own injuries, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of judgment on that issue. Id. at 269. Similarly, the court found that Virdi presented insufficient evidence to sustain his claims against the Superintendent for intentional discrimination. Id.

The court reversed the district court’s order pertaining to the facial constitutionality of the MVP’s racial goals, and affirmed the district court’s order granting defendants’ motion on the issue of intentional discrimination against Virdi. Id. at 270.

5. In re City of Memphis, 293 F. 3d 345 (6th Cir. 2002)

This case is instructive to the disparity study in particular based on its holding that a local government may be prohibited from utilizing post-enactment evidence in support of a MBE/WBE-type program. The United States Court of Appeals for Sixth Circuit held that pre-enactment evidence was required to justify the City of Memphis’ MBE/WBE Program. The Sixth Circuit held that a government must have had sufficient evidentiary justification for a racially conscious statute in advance of its passage. The district court had ruled that the City could not introduce the post-enactment study as evidence of a compelling interest to justify its MBE/WBE Program. The Sixth Circuit denied the City’s application for an interlocutory appeal on the district court’s order and refused to grant the City’s request to appeal this issue.

6. Builders Ass’n of Greater Chicago v. County of Cook, Chicago, 256 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2001)

This case is instructive to the disparity study because of its analysis of the Cook County MBE/WBE program and the evidence used to support that program. The decision emphasizes the need for any race-conscious program to be based upon credible evidence of discrimination by the local

government against MBE/WBEs and to be narrowly tailored to remedy only that identified discrimination.

In Builders Ass'n of Greater Chicago v. County of Cook, Chicago, 256 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2001) the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held the Cook County, Chicago MBE/WBE Program was unconstitutional. The court concluded there was insufficient evidence of a compelling interest. The court held there was no credible evidence that Cook County in the award of construction contracts discriminated against any of the groups “favored” by the Program. The court also found that the Program was not “narrowly tailored” to remedy the wrong sought to be redressed, in part because it was over-inclusive in the definition of minorities. The court noted the list of minorities included groups that have not been subject to discrimination by Cook County.

The court considered as an unresolved issue whether a different, and specifically a more permissive, standard than strict scrutiny is applicable to preferential treatment on the basis of sex, rather than race or ethnicity. 256 F.3d at 644. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia (“VMI”), 518 U.S. 515, 532 and n.6 (1996), held racial discrimination to a stricter standard than sex discrimination, although the court in Cook County stated the difference between the applicable standards has become “vanishingly small.” *Id.* The court pointed out that the Supreme Court said in the VMI case, that “parties who seek to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive’ justification for that action ...” and, realistically, the law can ask no more of race-based remedies either.” 256 F.3d at 644, quoting in part VMI, 518 U.S. at 533. The court indicated that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the Engineering Contract Association of South Florida, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 122 F.3d 895, 910 (11th Cir. 1997) decision created the “paradox that a public agency can provide stronger remedies for sex discrimination than for race discrimination; it is difficult to see what sense that makes.” 256 F.3d at 644. But, since Cook County did not argue for a different standard for the minority and women’s “set aside programs,” the women’s program the court determined must clear the same “hurdles” as the minority program.” 256 F.3d at 644-645.

The court found that since the ordinance requires prime contractors on public projects to reserve a substantial portion of the subcontracts for minority contractors, which is inapplicable to private projects, it is “to be expected that there would be more soliciting of these contractors on public than on private projects.” *Id.* Therefore, the court did not find persuasive that there was discrimination based on this difference alone. 256 F.3d at 645. The court pointed out the County “conceded that [it] had no specific evidence of pre-enactment discrimination to support the ordinance.” 256 F.3d at 645 quoting the district court decision, 123 F.Supp. 2d at 1093. The court held that a “public agency must have a strong evidentiary basis for thinking a discriminatory remedy appropriate *before* it adopts the remedy.” 256 F.3d at 645 (emphasis in original).

The court stated that minority enterprises in the construction industry “tend to be subcontractors, moreover, because as the district court found not clearly erroneously, 123 F.Supp. 2d at 1115, they tend to be new and therefore small and relatively untested — factors not shown to be attributable to discrimination by the County.” 256 F.3d at 645. The court held that there was no basis for attributing to the County any discrimination that prime contractors may have engaged in. *Id.* The court noted that “[i]f prime contractors on County projects were discriminating against minorities and this was known to the County, whose funding of the contracts thus knowingly perpetuated the

discrimination, the County might be deemed sufficiently complicit ... to be entitled to take remedial action.” *Id.* But, the court found “of that there is no evidence either.” *Id.*

The court stated that if the County had been complicit in discrimination by prime contractors, it found “puzzling” to try to remedy that discrimination by requiring discrimination in favor of minority stockholders, as distinct from employees. 256 F.3d at 646. The court held that even if the record made a case for remedial action of the general sort found in the MWBE ordinance by the County, it would “flunk the constitutional test” by not being carefully designed to achieve the ostensible remedial aim and no more. 256 F.3d at 646. The court held that a state and local government that has discriminated just against blacks may not by way of remedy discriminate in favor of blacks and Asian Americans and women. *Id.* Nor, the court stated, may it discriminate more than is necessary to cure the effects of the earlier discrimination. *Id.* “Nor may it continue the remedy in force indefinitely, with no effort to determine whether, the remedial purpose attained, continued enforcement of the remedy would be a gratuitous discrimination against nonminority persons.” *Id.* The court, therefore, held that the ordinance was not “narrowly tailored” to the wrong that it seeks to correct. *Id.*

The court thus found that the County both failed to establish the premise for a racial remedy, and also that the remedy goes further than is necessary to eliminate the evil against which it is directed. 256 F.3d at 647. The court held that the list of “favored minorities” includes groups that have never been subject to significant discrimination by Cook County. *Id.* The court found it unreasonable to “presume” discrimination against certain groups merely on the basis of having an ancestor who had been born in a particular country. *Id.* Therefore, the court held the ordinance was overinclusive.

The court found that the County did not make any effort to show that, were it not for a history of discrimination, minorities would have 30 percent, and women 10 percent, of County construction contracts. 256 F.3d at 647. The court also rejected the proposition advanced by the County in this case—“that a comparison of the fraction of minority subcontractors on public and private projects established discrimination against minorities by prime contractors on the latter type of project.” 256 F.3d at 647-648.

7. Associated Gen. Contractors v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730 (6th Cir. 2000), affirming Case No. C2-98-943, 998 WL 812241 (S.D. Ohio 1998)

This case is instructive to the disparity study based on the analysis applied in finding the evidence insufficient to justify an MBE/WBE program, and the application of the narrowly tailored test. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals enjoined the enforcement of the state MBE program, and in so doing reversed state court precedent finding the program constitutional. This case affirmed a district court decision enjoining the award of a “set-aside” contract based on the State of Ohio’s MBE program with the award of construction contracts. The court held, among other things, that the mere existence of societal discrimination was insufficient to support a racial classification. The court found that the economic data were insufficient and too outdated. The court held the State could not establish a compelling governmental interest and that the statute was not narrowly tailored. The court held, among other things, the statute failed the narrow tailoring test because there was no evidence that the State had considered race-neutral remedies.

The court was mindful of the fact that it was striking down an entire class of programs by declaring the State of Ohio MBE statute in question unconstitutional, and noted that its decision was “not reconcilable” with the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Ritchie Produce, 707 N.E.2d 871 (Ohio 1999) (upholding the Ohio State MBE Program).

8. W.H. Scott Constr. Co. v. City of Jackson, 199 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 1999)

This case is instructive to the disparity study because the decision highlights the evidentiary burden imposed by the courts necessary to support a local MBE/WBE program. In addition, the Fifth Circuit permitted the aggrieved contractor to recover lost profits from the City of Jackson, Mississippi due to the City’s enforcement of the MBE/WBE program that the court held was unconstitutional.

The Fifth Circuit, applying strict scrutiny, held that the City of Jackson, Mississippi failed to establish a compelling governmental interest to justify its policy placing 15 percent minority participation goals for City construction contracts. In addition, the court held the evidence upon which the City relied was faulty for several reasons, including because it was restricted to the letting of prime contracts by the City under the City’s Program, and it did not include an analysis of the availability and utilization of qualified minority subcontractors, the relevant statistical pool in the City’s construction projects. Significantly, the court also held that the plaintiff in this case could recover lost profits against the City as damages as a result of being denied a bid award based on the application of the MBE/WBE program.

9. **Monterey Mechanical v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 1997)**

This case is instructive in that the Ninth Circuit analyzed and held invalid the enforcement of a MBE/WBE-type program. Although the program at issue utilized the term “goals” as opposed to “quotas,” the Ninth Circuit rejected such a distinction, holding “[t]he relevant question is not whether a statute requires the use of such measures, but whether it authorizes or encourages them.” The case also is instructive because it found the use of “goals” and the application of “good faith efforts” in connection with achieving goals to trigger strict scrutiny.

Monterey Mechanical Co. (the “plaintiff”) submitted the low bid for a construction project for the California Polytechnic State University (the “University”). 125 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 1994). The University rejected the plaintiff’s bid because the plaintiff failed to comply with a state statute requiring prime contractors on such construction projects to subcontract 23 percent of the work to MBE/WBEs or, alternatively, demonstrate good faith outreach efforts. Id. The plaintiff conducted good faith outreach efforts but failed to provide the requisite documentation; the awardee prime contractor did not subcontract any portion of the work to MBE/WBEs but did include documentation of good faith outreach efforts. Id.

Importantly, the University did not conduct a disparity study, and instead argued that because “the ‘goal requirements’ of the scheme [did] not involve racial or gender quotas, set-asides or preferences,” the University did not need a disparity study. Id. at 705. The plaintiff protested the contract award and sued the University’s trustees, and a number of other individuals (collectively the “defendants”) alleging the state law was violative of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. The district court denied the plaintiff’s motion for an interlocutory injunction and the plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id.

The defendants first argued that the statute was constitutional because it treated all general contractors alike, by requiring all to comply with the MBE/WBE participation goals. Id. at 708. The court held, however, that a minority or women business enterprise could satisfy the participation goals by allocating the requisite percentage of work to itself. Id. at 709. The court held that contrary to the district court’s finding, such a difference was not *de minimis*. Id.

The defendant’s also argued that the statute was not subject to strict scrutiny because the statute did not impose rigid quotas, but rather only required good faith outreach efforts. Id. at 710. The court rejected the argument finding that although the statute permitted awards to bidders who did not meet the percentage goals, “they are rigid in requiring precisely described and monitored efforts to attain those goals.” Id. The court cited its own earlier precedent to hold that “the provisions are not immunized from scrutiny because they purport to establish goals rather than quotas ... [T]he relevant question is not whether a statute requires the use of such measures, but whether it authorizes or encourages them.” Id. at 710-11 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The court found that the statute encouraged set asides and cited Concrete Works of Colorado v. Denver, 36 F.3d 1512 (10th Cir. 1994), as analogous support for the proposition. Id. at 711.

The court found that the statute treated contractors differently based upon their race, ethnicity and gender, and although “worded in terms of goals and good faith, the statute imposes mandatory requirements with concreteness.” Id. The court also noted that the statute may impose additional

compliance expenses upon non-MBE/WBE firms who are required to make good faith outreach efforts (e.g., advertising) to MBE/WBE firms. Id. at 712.

The court then conducted strict scrutiny (race), and an intermediate scrutiny (gender) analyses. Id. at 712-13. The court found the University presented “no evidence” to justify the race- and gender-based classifications and thus did not consider additional issues of proof. Id. at 713. The court found that the statute was not narrowly tailored because the definition of “minority” was overbroad (e.g., inclusion of Aleuts). Id. at 714, citing Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 284, n. 13 (1986) and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505-06 (1989). The court found “[a] broad program that sweeps in all minorities with a remedy that is in no way related to past harms cannot survive constitutional scrutiny.” Id. at 714, citing Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 951 (5th Cir. 1996). The court held that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause.

10. Eng’g Contractors Ass’n of S. Florida v. Metropolitan Dade County, 122 F.3d 895 (11th Cir. 1997)

Engineering Contractors Association of South Florida v. Metropolitan Engineering Contractors Association is a paramount case in the Eleventh Circuit and is instructive to the disparity study. This decision has been cited and applied by the courts in various circuits that have addressed MBE/WBE-type programs or legislation involving local government contracting and procurement.

In Engineering Contractors Association, six trade organizations (the “plaintiffs”) filed suit in the district court for the Southern District of Florida, challenging three affirmative action programs administered by Engineering Contractors Association, Florida, (the “County”) as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. 122 F.3d 895, 900 (11th Cir. 1997). The three affirmative action programs challenged were the Black Business Enterprise program (“BBE”), the Hispanic Business Enterprise program (“HBE”), and the Woman Business Enterprise program, (“WBE”), (collectively “MWBE” programs). Id. The plaintiffs challenged the application of the program to County construction contracts. Id.

For certain classes of construction contracts valued over \$25,000, the County set participation goals of 15 percent for BBEs, 19 percent for HBEs, and 11 percent for WBEs. Id. at 901. The County established five “contract measures” to reach the participation goals: (1) set asides, (2) subcontractor goals, (3) project goals, (4) bid preferences, and (5) selection factors. Once a contract was identified as covered by a participation goal, a review committee would determine whether a contract measure should be utilized. Id. The County Commission would make the final determination and its decision was appealable to the County Manager. Id. The County reviewed the efficacy of the MWBE programs annually, and reevaluated the continuing viability of the MWBE programs every five years. Id.

In a bench trial, the district court applied strict scrutiny to the BBE and HBE programs and held that the County lacked the requisite “strong basis in evidence” to support the race- and ethnicity-conscious measures. Id. at 902. The district court applied intermediate scrutiny to the WBE program and found that the “County had presented insufficient probative evidence to support its stated rationale for implementing a gender preference.” Id. Therefore, the County had failed to demonstrate a “compelling interest” necessary to support the BBE and HBE programs, and failed to demonstrate an “important interest” necessary to support the WBE program. Id. The district court assumed the

existence of a sufficient evidentiary basis to support the existence of the MWBE programs but held the BBE and HBE programs were not narrowly tailored to the interests they purported to serve; the district court held the WBE program was not substantially related to an important government interest. Id. The district court entered a final judgment enjoining the County from continuing to operate the MWBE programs and the County appealed. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 900, 903.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit considered four major issues:

1. Whether the plaintiffs had standing. [The Eleventh Circuit answered this in the affirmative and that portion of the opinion is omitted from this summary];
2. Whether the district court erred in finding the County lacked a “strong basis in evidence” to justify the existence of the BBE and HBE programs;
3. Whether the district court erred in finding the County lacked a “sufficient probative basis in evidence” to justify the existence of the WBE program; and
4. Whether the MWBE programs were narrowly tailored to the interests they were purported to serve.

Id. at 903.

The Eleventh Circuit held that the BBE and HBE programs were subject to the strict scrutiny standard enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). Id. at 906. Under this standard, “an affirmative action program must be based upon a ‘compelling government interest’ and must be ‘narrowly tailored’ to achieve that interest.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit further noted:

In practice, the interest that is alleged in support of racial preferences is almost always the same — remedying past or present discrimination. That interest is widely accepted as compelling. As a result, the true test of an affirmative action program is usually not the nature of the government’s interest, but rather the adequacy of the evidence of discrimination offered to show that interest.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

Therefore, strict scrutiny requires a finding of a “‘strong basis in evidence’ to support the conclusion that remedial action is necessary.” Id., citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 500). The requisite “‘strong basis in evidence’ cannot rest on ‘an amorphous claim of societal discrimination, on simple legislative assurances of good intention, or on congressional findings of discrimination in the national economy.’” Id. at 907, citing Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1565 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing and applying Croson). However, the Eleventh Circuit found that a governmental entity can “justify affirmative action by demonstrating ‘gross statistical disparities’ between the proportion of minorities hired ... and the proportion of minorities willing and able to do the work ... Anecdotal evidence may also be used to document discrimination, especially if buttressed by relevant statistical evidence.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

Notwithstanding the “exceedingly persuasive justification” language utilized by the Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (evaluating gender-based government action), the Eleventh Circuit held that the WBE program was subject to traditional intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 908. Under this standard, the government must provide “sufficient probative evidence” of discrimination, which is a lesser standard than the “strong basis in evidence” under strict scrutiny. Id. at 910.

The County provided two types of evidence in support of the MWBE programs: (1) statistical evidence, and (2) non-statistical “anecdotal” evidence. Id. at 911. As an initial matter, the Eleventh Circuit found that in support of the BBE program, the County permissibly relied on substantially “post-enactment” evidence (i.e., evidence based on data related to years following the initial enactment of the BBE program). Id. However, “such evidence carries with it the hazard that the program at issue may itself be masking discrimination that might otherwise be occurring in the relevant market.” Id. at 912. A district court should not “speculate about what the data *might* have shown had the BBE program never been enacted.” Id.

The statistical evidence. The County presented five basic categories of statistical evidence: (1) County contracting statistics; (2) County subcontracting statistics; (3) marketplace data statistics; (4) The Wainwright Study; and (5) The Brimmer Study. Id. In summary, the Eleventh Circuit held that the County’s statistical evidence (described more fully below) was subject to more than one interpretation. Id. at 924. The district court found that the evidence was “insufficient to form the requisite strong basis in evidence for implementing a racial or ethnic preference, and that it was insufficiently probative to support the County’s stated rationale for imposing a gender preference.” Id. The district court’s view of the evidence was a permissible one. Id.

County contracting statistics. The County presented a study comparing three factors for County non-procurement construction contracts over two time periods (1981-1991 and 1993): (1) the percentage of bidders that were MWBE firms; (2) the percentage of awardees that were MWBE firms; and (3) the proportion of County contract dollars that had been awarded to MWBE firms. Id. at 912.

The Eleventh Circuit found that notably, for the BBE and HBE statistics, generally there were no “consistently negative disparities between the bidder and awardee percentages. In fact, by 1993, the BBE and HBE bidders are being awarded *more* than their proportionate ‘share’ ... when the bidder percentages are used as the baseline.” Id. at 913. For the WBE statistics, the bidder/awardee statistics were “decidedly mixed” as across the range of County construction contracts. Id.

The County then refined those statistics by adding in the total percentage of annual County construction dollars awarded to MBE/WBEs, by calculating “disparity indices” for each program and classification of construction contract. The Eleventh Circuit explained:

[A] disparity index compares the amount of contract awards a group actually got to the amount we would have expected it to get based on that group’s bidding activity and awardee success rate. More specifically, a disparity index measures the participation of a group in County contracting dollars by dividing that group’s

contract dollar percentage by the related bidder or awardee percentage, and multiplying that number by 100 percent.

Id. at 914. “The utility of disparity indices or similar measures ... has been recognized by a number of federal circuit courts.” Id.

The Eleventh Circuit found that “[i]n general ... disparity indices of 80 percent or greater, which are close to full participation, are not considered indications of discrimination.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit noted that “the EEOC’s disparate impact guidelines use the 80 percent test as the boundary line for determining a prima facie case of discrimination.” Id., citing 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4D. In addition, no circuit that has “explicitly endorsed the use of disparity indices [has] indicated that an index of 80 percent or greater might be probative of discrimination.” Id., citing Concrete Works v. City & County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1524 (10th Cir. 1994) (crediting disparity indices ranging from 0% to 3.8%); Contractors Ass’n v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990 (3d Cir. 1993) (crediting disparity index of 4%).

After calculation of the disparity indices, the County applied a standard deviation analysis to test the statistical significance of the results. Id. at 914. “The standard deviation figure describes the probability that the measured disparity is the result of mere chance.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit had previously recognized “[s]ocial scientists consider a finding of two standard deviations significant, meaning there is about one chance in 20 that the explanation for the deviation could be random and the deviation must be accounted for by some factor other than chance.” Id.

The statistics presented by the County indicated “statistically significant underutilization of BBEs in County construction contracting.” Id. at 916. The results were “less dramatic” for HBEs and mixed as between favorable and unfavorable for WBEs. Id.

The Eleventh Circuit then explained the burden of proof:

[O]nce the proponent of affirmative action introduces its statistical proof as evidence of its remedial purpose, thereby supplying the [district] court with the means for determining that [it] had a firm basis for concluding that remedial action was appropriate, it is incumbent upon the [plaintiff] to prove their case; they continue to bear the ultimate burden of persuading the [district] court that the [defendant’s] evidence did not support an inference of prior discrimination and thus a remedial purpose, or that the plan instituted on the basis of this evidence was not sufficiently ‘narrowly tailored.’

Id. (internal citations omitted).

The Eleventh Circuit noted that a plaintiff has at least three methods to rebut the inference of discrimination with a “neutral explanation” by: “(1) showing that the statistics are flawed; (2) demonstrating that the disparities shown by the statistics are not significant or actionable; or (3) presenting contrasting statistical data.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Eleventh

Circuit held that the plaintiffs produced “sufficient evidence to establish a neutral explanation for the disparities.” Id.

The plaintiffs alleged that the disparities were “better explained by firm size than by discrimination ... [because] minority and female-owned firms tend to be smaller, and that it stands to reason smaller firms will win smaller contracts.” Id. at 916-17. The plaintiffs produced Census data indicating, on average, minority- and female-owned construction firms in Engineering Contractors Association were smaller than non-MBE/WBE firms. Id. at 917. The Eleventh Circuit found that the plaintiff’s explanation of the disparities was a “plausible one, in light of the uncontroverted evidence that MBE/WBE construction firms tend to be substantially smaller than non-MBE/WBE firms.” Id.

Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the County’s own expert admitted that “firm size plays a significant role in determining which firms win contracts.” Id. The expert stated:

The size of the firm has got to be a major determinant because of course some firms are going to be larger, are going to be better prepared, are going to be in a greater natural capacity to be able to work on some of the contracts while others simply by virtue of their small size simply would not be able to do it. Id.

The Eleventh Circuit then summarized:

Because they are bigger, bigger firms have a bigger chance to win bigger contracts. It follows that, all other factors being equal and in a perfectly nondiscriminatory market, one would expect the bigger (on average) non-MWBE firms to get a disproportionately higher percentage of total construction dollars awarded than the smaller MWBE firms. Id.

In an anticipation of such an argument, the County conducted a regression analysis to control for firm size. Id. A regression analysis is “a statistical procedure for determining the relationship between a dependent and independent variable, e.g., the dollar value of a contract award and firm size.” Id. (internal citations omitted). The purpose of the regression analysis is “to determine whether the relationship between the two variables is statistically meaningful.” Id.

The County’s regression analysis sought to identify disparities that could not be explained by firm size, and theoretically instead based on another factor, such as discrimination. Id. The County conducted two regression analyses using two different proxies for firm size: (1) total awarded value of all contracts bid on; and (2) largest single contract awarded. Id. The regression analyses accounted for most of the negative disparities regarding MBE/WBE participation in County construction contracts (i.e., most of the unfavorable disparities became statistically insignificant, corresponding to standard deviation values less than two). Id.

Based on an evaluation of the regression analysis, the district court held that the demonstrated disparities were attributable to firm size as opposed to discrimination. Id. at 918. The district court concluded that the few unexplained disparities that remained after regressing for firm size were

insufficient to provide the requisite “strong basis in evidence” of discrimination of BBEs and HBEs. Id. The Eleventh Circuit held that this decision was not clearly erroneous. Id.

With respect to the BBE statistics, the regression analysis explained all but one negative disparity, for one type of construction contract between 1989-1991. Id. The Eleventh Circuit held the district court permissibly found that this did not constitute a “strong basis in evidence” of discrimination. Id.

With respect to the HBE statistics, one of the regression methods failed to explain the unfavorable disparity for one type of contract between 1989-1991, and both regression methods failed to explain the unfavorable disparity for another type of contract during that same time period. Id. However, by 1993, both regression methods accounted for all of the unfavorable disparities, and one of the disparities for one type of contract was actually favorable for HBEs. Id. The Eleventh Circuit held the district court permissibly found that this did not constitute a “strong basis in evidence” of discrimination. Id.

Finally, with respect to the WBE statistics, the regression analysis explained all but one negative disparity, for one type of construction contract in the 1993 period. Id. The regression analysis explained all of the other negative disparities, and in the 1993 period, a disparity for one type of contract was actually favorable to WBEs. Id. The Eleventh Circuit held the district court permissibly found that this evidence was not “sufficiently probative of discrimination.” Id.

The County argued that the district court erroneously relied on the disaggregated data (i.e., broken down by contract type) as opposed to the consolidated statistics. Id. at 919. The district court declined to assign dispositive weight to the aggregated data for the BBE statistics for 1989-1991 because (1) the aggregated data for 1993 did not show negative disparities when regressed for firm size, (2) the BBE disaggregated data left only one unexplained negative disparity for one type of contract for 1989-1991 when regressed for firm size, and (3) “the County’s own expert testified as to the utility of examining the disaggregated data ‘insofar as they reflect different kinds of work, different bidding practices, perhaps a variety of other factors that could make them heterogeneous with one another.’” Id.

Additionally, the district court noted, and the Eleventh Circuit found that “the aggregation of disparity statistics for nonheterogenous data populations can give rise to a statistical phenomenon known as ‘Simpson’s Paradox,’ which leads to illusory disparities in improperly aggregated data that disappear when the data are disaggregated.” Id. at 919, n. 4 (internal citations omitted). “Under those circumstances,” the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not err in assigning less weight to the aggregated data, in finding the aggregated data for BBEs for 1989-1991 did not provide a “strong basis in evidence” of discrimination, or in finding that the disaggregated data formed an insufficient basis of support for any of the MBE/WBE programs given the applicable constitutional requirements. Id. at 919.

County subcontracting statistics. The County performed a subcontracting study to measure MBE/WBE participation in the County’s subcontracting businesses. For each MBE/WBE category (BBE, HBE, and WBE), “the study compared the proportion of the designated group that filed a subcontractor’s release of lien on a County construction project between 1991 and 1994 with the proportion of sales and receipt dollars that the same group received during the same time period.” Id.

The district court found the statistical evidence insufficient to support the use of race- and ethnicity-conscious measures, noting problems with some of the data measures. Id. at 920.

Most notably, the denominator used in the calculation of the MWBE sales and receipts percentages is based upon the total sales and receipts from all sources for the firm filing a subcontractor's release of lien with the County. That means, for instance, that if a nationwide non-MWBE company performing 99 percent of its business outside of Dade County filed a single subcontractor's release of lien with the County during the relevant time frame, all of its sales and receipts for that time frame would be counted in the denominator against which MWBE sales and receipts are compared. As the district court pointed out, that is not a reasonable way to measure Dade County subcontracting participation.

Id. The County's argument that a strong majority (72%) of the subcontractors were located in Dade County did not render the district court's decision to fail to credit the study erroneous. Id.

Marketplace data statistics. The County conducted another statistical study "to see what the differences are in the marketplace and what the relationships are in the marketplace." Id. The study was based on a sample of 568 contractors, from a pool of 10,462 firms, that had filed a "certificate of competency" with Dade County as of January 1995. Id. The selected firms participated in a telephone survey inquiring about the race, ethnicity, and gender of the firm's owner, and asked for information on the firm's total sales and receipts from all sources. Id. The County's expert then studied the data to determine "whether meaningful relationships existed between (1) the race, ethnicity, and gender of the surveyed firm owners, and (2) the reported sales and receipts of that firm." Id. The expert's hypothesis was that unfavorable disparities may be attributable to marketplace discrimination. The expert performed a regression analysis using the number of employees as a proxy for size. Id.

The Eleventh Circuit first noted that the statistical pool used by the County was substantially larger than the actual number of firms, willing, able, and qualified to do the work as the statistical pool represented all those firms merely licensed as a construction contractor. Id. Although this factor did not render the study meaningless, the district court was entitled to consider that in evaluating the weight of the study. Id. at 921. The Eleventh Circuit quoted the Supreme Court for the following proposition: "[w]hen special qualifications are required to fill particular jobs, comparisons to the general population (rather than to the smaller group of individuals who possess the necessary qualifications) may have little probative value." Id., quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 501, quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n. 13 (1977).

The Eleventh Circuit found that after regressing for firm size, neither the BBE nor WBE data showed statistically significant unfavorable disparities. Id. Although the marketplace data did reveal unfavorable disparities even after a regression analysis, the district court was not required to assign those disparities controlling weight, especially in light of the dissimilar results of the County Contracting Statistics, discussed supra. Id.

The Wainwright Study. The County also introduced a statistical analysis prepared by Jon Wainwright, analyzing “the personal and financial characteristics of self-employed persons working full-time in the Dade County construction industry, based on data from the 1990 Public Use Microdata Sample database” (derived from the decennial census). Id. The study “(1) compared construction business ownership rates of MBE/WBEs to those of non-MBE/WBEs, and (2) analyzed disparities in personal income between MBE/WBE and non-MBE/WBE business owners.” Id. “The study concluded that blacks, Hispanics, and women are less likely to own construction businesses than similarly situated white males, and MBE/WBEs that do enter the construction business earn less money than similarly situated white males.” Id.

With respect to the first conclusion, Wainwright controlled for “human capital” variables (education, years of labor market experience, marital status, and English proficiency) and “financial capital” variables (interest and dividend income, and home ownership). Id. The analysis indicated that blacks, Hispanics and women enter the construction business at lower rates than would be expected, once numerosity, and identified human and financial capital are controlled for. Id. The disparities for blacks and women (but not Hispanics) were substantial and statistically significant. Id. at 922. The underlying theory of this business ownership component of the study is that any significant disparities remaining after control of variables are due to the ongoing effects of past and present discrimination. Id.

The Eleventh Circuit held, in light of Croson, the district court need not have accepted this theory. Id. The Eleventh Circuit quoted Croson, in which the Supreme Court responded to a similar argument advanced by the plaintiffs in that case: “There are numerous explanations for this dearth of minority participation, including past societal discrimination in education and economic opportunities *as well as both black and white career and entrepreneurial choices. Blacks may be disproportionately attracted to industries other than construction.*” Id., quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 503. Following the Supreme Court in Croson, the Eleventh Circuit held “the disproportionate attraction of a minority group to non-construction industries does not mean that discrimination in the construction industry is the reason.” Id., quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 503. Additionally, the district court had evidence that between 1982 and 1987, there was a substantial growth rate of MBE/WBE firms as opposed to non-MBE/WBE firms, which would further negate the proposition that the construction industry was discriminating against minority- and women-owned firms. Id. at 922.

With respect to the personal income component of the Wainwright study, after regression analyses were conducted, only the BBE statistics indicated a statistically significant disparity ratio. Id. at 923. However, the Eleventh Circuit held the district court was not required to assign the disparity controlling weight because the study did not regress for firm size, and in light of the conflicting statistical evidence in the County Contracting Statistics and Marketplace Data Statistics, discussed *supra*, which did regress for firm size. Id.

The Brimmer Study. The final study presented by the County was conducted under the supervision of Dr. Andrew F. Brimmer and concerned only black-owned firms. Id. The key component of the study was an analysis of the business receipts of black-owned construction firms for the years of 1977, 1982 and 1987, based on the Census Bureau’s Survey of Minority- and Women-Owned Businesses, produced every five years. Id. The study sought to determine the existence of disparities between sales and receipts of black-owned firms in Dade County compared to the sales and receipts of all construction firms in Dade County. Id.

The study indicated substantial disparities in 1977 and 1987 but not 1982. Id. The County alleged that the absence of disparity in 1982 was due to substantial race-conscious measures for a major construction contract (Metrorail project), and not due to a lack of discrimination in the industry. Id. However, the study made no attempt to filter for the Metrorail project and “complete[ly] fail[ed]” to account for firm size. Id. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit found the district court permissibly discounted the results of the Brimmer study. Id. at 924.

Anecdotal evidence. In addition, the County presented a substantial amount of anecdotal evidence of perceived discrimination against BBEs, a small amount of similar anecdotal evidence pertaining to WBEs, and no anecdotal evidence pertaining to HBEs. Id. The County presented three basic forms of anecdotal evidence: “(1) the testimony of two County employees responsible for administering the MBE/WBE programs; (2) the testimony, primarily by affidavit, of twenty-three MBE/WBE contractors and subcontractors; and (3) a survey of black-owned construction firms.” Id.

The County employees testified that the decentralized structure of the County construction contracting system affords great discretion to County employees, which in turn creates the opportunity for discrimination to infect the system. Id. They also testified to specific incidents of discrimination, for example, that MBE/WBEs complained of receiving lengthier punch lists than their non-MBE/WBE counterparts. Id. They also testified that MBE/WBEs encounter difficulties in obtaining bonding and financing. Id.

The MBE/WBE contractors and subcontractors testified to numerous incidents of perceived discrimination in the Dade County construction market, including:

Situations in which a project foreman would refuse to deal directly with a black or female firm owner, instead preferring to deal with a white employee; instances in which an MWBE owner knew itself to be the low bidder on a subcontracting project, but was not awarded the job; instances in which a low bid by an MWBE was “shopped” to solicit even lower bids from non-MWBE firms; instances in which an MWBE owner received an invitation to bid on a subcontract within a day of the bid due date, together with a “letter of unavailability” for the MWBE owner to sign in order to obtain a waiver from the County; and instances in which an MWBE subcontractor was hired by a prime contractor, but subsequently was replaced with a non-MWBE subcontractor within days of starting work on the project.

Id. at 924-25.

Finally, the County submitted a study prepared by Dr. Joe E. Feagin, comprised of interviews of 78 certified black-owned construction firms. Id. at 925. The interviewees reported similar instances of perceived discrimination, including: “difficulty in securing bonding and financing; slow payment by general contractors; unfair performance evaluations that were tainted by racial stereotypes; difficulty in obtaining information from the County on contracting processes; and higher prices on equipment and supplies than were being charged to non-MBE/WBE firms.” Id.

The Eleventh Circuit found that numerous black- and some female-owned construction firms in Dade County perceived that they were the victims of discrimination and two County employees also believed that discrimination could taint the County's construction contracting process. Id. However, such anecdotal evidence is helpful "only when it [is] combined with and reinforced by sufficiently probative statistical evidence." Id. In her plurality opinion in Croson, Justice O'Connor found that "evidence of a pattern of individual discriminatory acts can, *if supported by appropriate statistical proof*, lend support to a local government's determination that broader remedial relief is justified." Id., quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 509 (emphasis added by the Eleventh Circuit). Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit held that "anecdotal evidence can play an important role in bolstering statistical evidence, but that only in the rare case will anecdotal evidence suffice standing alone." Id. at 925. The Eleventh Circuit also cited to opinions from the Third, Ninth and Tenth Circuits as supporting the same proposition. Id. at 926. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court enjoining the continued operation of the MBE/WBE programs because they did not rest on a "constitutionally sufficient evidentiary foundation." Id.

Although the Eleventh Circuit determined that the MBE/WBE program did not survive constitutional muster due to the absence of a sufficient evidentiary foundation, the Eleventh Circuit proceeded with the second prong of the strict scrutiny analysis of determining whether the MBE/WBE programs were narrowly tailored (BBE and HBE programs) or substantially related (WBE program) to the legitimate government interest they purported to serve, i.e., "remedying the effects of present and past discrimination against blacks, Hispanics, and women in the Dade County construction market." Id.

Narrow tailoring. "The essence of the 'narrowly tailored' inquiry is the notion that explicitly racial preferences ... must only be a 'last resort' option." Id., quoting Hayes v. North Side Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207, 217 (4th Cir. 1993) and citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he strict scrutiny standard ... forbids the use of even narrowly drawn racial classifications except as a last resort.").

The Eleventh Circuit has identified four factors to evaluate whether a race- or ethnicity-conscious affirmative action program is narrowly tailored: (1) "the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies; (2) the flexibility and duration of the relief; (3) the relationship of numerical goals to the relevant labor market; and (4) the impact of the relief on the rights of innocent third parties." Id. at 927, citing Ensley Branch, 31 F.3d at 1569. The four factors provide "a useful analytical structure." Id. at 927. The Eleventh Circuit focused only on the first factor in the present case "because that is where the County's MBE/WBE programs are most problematic." Id.

The Eleventh Circuit

flatly reject[ed] the County's assertion that 'given a strong basis in evidence of a race-based problem, a race-based remedy is necessary.' That is simply not the law. If a race-neutral remedy is sufficient to cure a race-based problem, then a race-conscious remedy can never be narrowly tailored to that problem." Id., citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (holding that affirmative action program was not narrowly tailored where "there does not appear to have been any consideration of the use of race-neutral means to increase minority

business participation in city contracting”) ... Supreme Court decisions teach that a race-conscious remedy is not merely one of many equally acceptable medications the government may use to treat a race-based problem. Instead, it is the strongest of medicines, with many potential side effects, and must be reserved for those severe cases that are highly resistant to conventional treatment.

Id. at 927.

The Eleventh Circuit held that the County “clearly failed to give serious and good faith consideration to the use of race- and ethnicity-neutral measures.” Id. Rather, the determination of the necessity to establish the MWBE programs was based upon a conclusory legislative statement as to its necessity, which in turn was based upon an “equally conclusory analysis” in the Brimmer study, and a report that the SBA only was able to direct 5 percent of SBA financing to black-owned businesses between 1968-1980. Id.

The County admitted, and the Eleventh Circuit concluded, that the County failed to give any consideration to any alternative to the HBE affirmative action program. Id. at 928. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit found that the testimony of the County’s own witnesses indicated the viability of race- and ethnicity-neutral measures to remedy many of the problems facing black- and Hispanic-owned construction firms. Id. The County employees identified problems, virtually all of which were related to the County’s own processes and procedures, including: “the decentralized County contracting system, which affords a high level of discretion to County employees; the complexity of County contract specifications; difficulty in obtaining bonding; difficulty in obtaining financing; unnecessary bid restrictions; inefficient payment procedures; and insufficient or inefficient exchange of information.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit found that the problems facing MBE/WBE contractors were “institutional barriers” to entry facing every new entrant into the construction market, and were perhaps affecting the MBE/WBE contractors disproportionately due to the “institutional youth” of black- and Hispanic-owned construction firms. Id. “It follows that those firms should be helped the most by dismantling those barriers, something the County could do at least in substantial part.” Id.

The Eleventh Circuit noted that the race- and ethnicity-neutral options available to the County mirrored those available and cited by Justice O’Connor in Croson:

[T]he city has at its disposal a whole array of race-neutral measures to increase the accessibility of city contracting opportunities to small entrepreneurs of all races. Simplification of bidding procedures, relaxation of bonding requirements, and training and financial aid for disadvantaged entrepreneurs of all races would open the public contracting market to all those who have suffered the effects of past societal discrimination and neglect ... The city may also act to prohibit discrimination in the provision of credit or bonding by local suppliers and banks.

Id., quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 509-10. The Eleventh Circuit found that except for some “half-hearted programs” consisting of “limited technical and financial aid that might benefit BBEs and HBEs,” the County had not “seriously considered” or tried most of the race- and ethnicity-neutral

alternatives available. Id. at 928. “Most notably ... the County has not taken any action whatsoever to ferret out and respond to instances of discrimination if and when they have occurred in the County’s own contracting process.” Id.

The Eleventh Circuit found that the County had taken no steps to “inform, educate, discipline, or penalize” discriminatory misconduct by its own employees. Id. at 929. Nor had the County passed any local ordinances expressly prohibiting discrimination by local contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, bankers, or insurers. Id. “Instead of turning to race- and ethnicity-conscious remedies as a last resort, the County has turned to them as a first resort.” Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit held that even if the BBE and HBE programs were supported by the requisite evidentiary foundation, they violated the Equal Protection Clause because they were not narrowly tailored. Id.

Substantial relationship. The Eleventh Circuit held that due to the relaxed “substantial relationship” standard for gender-conscious programs, if the WBE program rested upon a sufficient evidentiary foundation, it could pass the substantial relationship requirement. Id. However, because it did not rest upon a sufficient evidentiary foundation, the WBE program could not pass constitutional muster. Id.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court declaring the MBE/WBE programs unconstitutional and enjoining their continued operation.

11. Associated Gen. Contractors of California, Inc. v. Coalition for Econ. Equity (“AGCC”), 950 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1991)

In Associated Gen. Contractors of California, Inc. v. Coalition for Econ. Equity (“AGCC”), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the city’s bid preference program. 950 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1991). Although an older case, the court discussed the utilization of statistical evidence and anecdotal evidence in the context of the strict scrutiny analysis. Id. at 1413-18.

The City of San Francisco adopted an ordinance in 1989 providing bid preferences to prime contractors who were members of groups found disadvantaged by previous bidding practices, and specifically provided a 5 percent bid preference for LBEs, WBEs and MBEs. 950 F.2d at 1405. Local MBEs and WBEs were eligible for a 10 percent total bid preference, representing the cumulative total of the 5 percent preference given LBEs and the 5 percent preference given MBEs and WBEs. Id. The ordinance defined “MBE” as an economically disadvantaged business that was owned and controlled by one or more minority persons, which included Asians, blacks and Latinos. “WBE” was defined as an economically disadvantaged business that was owned and controlled by one or more women. Economically disadvantaged was defined as a business with average gross annual receipts that did not exceed \$14 million. Id.

The Motion for Preliminary Injunction challenged the constitutionality of the MBE provisions of the 1989 Ordinance insofar as it pertained to Public Works construction contracts. Id. at 1405. The district court denied the Motion for Preliminary Injunction on the AGC’s constitutional claim on the ground that AGC failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. Id. at 1412.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the strict scrutiny analysis following the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in City of Richmond v. Croson. The court stated that according to the U.S.

Supreme Court in Croson, a municipality has a compelling interest in redressing not only discrimination committed by the municipality itself, but also discrimination committed by private parties within the municipality legislative jurisdiction, so long as the municipality in some way perpetuated the discrimination to be remedied by the program. Id. at 1412-13, citing Croson at 488 U.S. at 491-92, 537-38. To satisfy this requirement, “the governmental actor need not be an active perpetrator of such discrimination; passive participation will satisfy this sub-part of strict scrutiny review.” Id. at 1413, quoting Coral Construction Company v. King County, 941 F.2d 910 at 916 (9th Cir. 1991). In addition, the [m]ere infusion of tax dollars into a discriminatory industry may be sufficient governmental involvement to satisfy this prong.” Id. at 1413 quoting Coral Construction, 941 F.2d at 916.

The court pointed out that the City had made detailed findings of prior discrimination in construction and building within its borders, had testimony taken at more than ten public hearings and received numerous written submissions from the public as part of its anecdotal evidence. Id. at 1414. The city departments continued to discriminate against MBEs and WBEs and continued to operate under the “old boy network” in awarding contracts, thereby disadvantaging MBEs and WBEs. Id. And, the City found that large statistical disparities existed between the percentage of contracts awarded to MBEs and the percentage of available MBEs. 950 F.2d at 1414. The court stated the City also found “discrimination in the private sector against MBEs and WBEs that is manifested in and exacerbated by the City’s procurement practices.” Id. at 1414.

The Ninth Circuit found the study commissioned by the City indicated the existence of large disparities between the award of city contracts to available non-minority businesses and to MBEs. Id. at 1414. Using the City and County of San Francisco as the “relevant market,” the study compared the number of available MBE prime construction contractors in San Francisco with the amount of contract dollars awarded by the City to San Francisco-based MBEs for a particular year. Id. at 1414. The study found that available MBEs received far fewer city contracts in proportion to their numbers than their available non-minority counterparts. Id. Specifically, the study found that with respect to prime construction contracting, disparities between the number of available local Asian-, black- and Hispanic-owned firms and the number of contracts awarded to such firms were statistically significant and supported an inference of discrimination. Id. For example, in prime contracting for construction, although MBE availability was determined to be at 49.5 percent, MBE dollar participation was only 11.1 percent. Id. The Ninth Circuit stated that in its decision in Coral Construction, it emphasized that such statistical disparities are “an invaluable tool and demonstrating the discrimination necessary to establish a compelling interest. Id. at 1414, citing to Coral Construction, 941 F.2d at 918 and Croson, 488 U.S. at 509.

The court noted that the record documents a vast number of individual accounts of discrimination, which bring “the cold numbers convincingly to life.” Id. at 1414, quoting Coral Construction, 941 F.2d at 919. These accounts include numerous reports of MBEs being denied contracts despite being the low bidder, MBEs being told they were not qualified although they were later found qualified when evaluated by outside parties, MBEs being refused work even after they were awarded contracts as low bidder, and MBEs being harassed by city personnel to discourage them from bidding on city contracts. Id. at 1415. The City pointed to numerous individual accounts of discrimination, that an “old boy network” still exists, and that racial discrimination is still prevalent within the San Francisco construction industry. Id. The court found that such a “combination of convincing anecdotal and statistical evidence is potent.” Id. at 1415 quoting Coral Construction, 941 F.2d at 919.

The court also stated that the 1989 Ordinance applies only to resident MBEs. The City, therefore, according to the court, appropriately confined its study to the city limits in order to focus on those whom the preference scheme targeted. Id. at 1415. The court noted that the statistics relied upon by the City to demonstrate discrimination in its contracting processes considered only MBEs located within the City of San Francisco. Id.

The court pointed out the City's findings were based upon dozens of specific instances of discrimination that are laid out with particularity in the record, as well as the significant statistical disparities in the award of contracts. The court noted that the City must simply demonstrate the existence of past discrimination with specificity, but there is no requirement that the legislative findings specifically detail each and every incidence that the legislative body has relied upon in support of this decision that affirmative action is necessary. Id. at 1416.

In its analysis of the "narrowly tailored" requirement, the court focused on three characteristics identified by the decision in Croson as indicative of narrow tailoring. First, an MBE program should be instituted either after, or in conjunction with, race-neutral means of increasing minority business participation in public contracting. Id. at 1416. Second, the plan should avoid the use of "rigid numerical quotas." Id. According to the Supreme Court, systems that permit waiver in appropriate cases and therefore require some individualized consideration of the applicants pose a lesser danger of offending the Constitution. Id. Mechanisms that introduce flexibility into the system also prevent the imposition of a disproportionate burden on a few individuals. Id. Third, "an MBE program must be limited in its effective scope to the boundaries of the enacting jurisdiction. Id. at 1416 quoting Coral Construction, 941 F.2d at 922.

The court found that the record showed the City considered, but rejected as not viable, specific race-neutral alternatives including a fund to assist newly established MBEs in meeting bonding requirements. The court stated that "while strict scrutiny requires serious, good faith consideration of race-neutral alternatives, strict scrutiny does not require exhaustion of every possible such alternative ... however irrational, costly, unreasonable, and unlikely to succeed such alternative may be." Id. at 1417 quoting Coral Construction, 941 F.2d at 923. The court found the City ten years before had attempted to eradicate discrimination in city contracting through passage of a race-neutral ordinance that prohibited city contractors from discriminating against their employees on the basis of race and required contractors to take steps to integrate their work force; and that the City made and continues to make efforts to enforce the anti-discrimination ordinance. Id. at 1417. The court stated inclusion of such race-neutral measures is one factor suggesting that an MBE plan is narrowly tailored. Id. at 1417.

The court also found that the Ordinance possessed the requisite flexibility. Rather than a rigid quota system, the City adopted a more modest system according to the court, that of bid preferences. Id. at 1417. The court pointed out that there were no goals, quotas, or set-asides and moreover, the plan remedies only specifically identified discrimination: the City provides preferences only to those minority groups found to have previously received a lower percentage of specific types of contracts than their availability to perform such work would suggest. Id. at 1417.

The court rejected the argument of AGCC that to pass constitutional muster any remedy must provide redress only to specific individuals who have been identified as victims of discrimination. Id. at 1417, n. 12. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that an iron-clad requirement

limiting any remedy to individuals personally proven to have suffered prior discrimination would render any race-conscious remedy “superfluous,” and would thwart the Supreme Court’s directive in Croson that race-conscious remedies may be permitted in some circumstances. Id. at 1417, n.12. The court also found that the burdens of the bid preferences on those not entitled to them appear “relatively light and well distributed.” Id. at 1417. The court stated that the Ordinance was “limited in its geographical scope to the boundaries of the enacting jurisdiction. Id. at 1418, quoting Coral Construction, 941 F.2d at 925. The court found that San Francisco had carefully limited the ordinance to benefit only those MBEs located within the City’s borders. Id. 1418.

12. Coral Construction Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991)

In Coral Construction Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit examined the constitutionality of King County, Washington’s minority and women business set-aside program in light of the standard set forth in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. The court held that although the County presented ample anecdotal evidence of disparate treatment of MBE contractors and subcontractors, the total absence of pre-program enactment statistical evidence was problematic to the compelling government interest component of the strict scrutiny analysis. The court remanded to the district court for a determination of whether the post-program enactment studies constituted a sufficient compelling government interest. Per the narrow tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny test, the court found that although the program included race-neutral alternative measures and was flexible (i.e., included a waiver provision), the over breadth of the program to include MBEs outside of King County was fatal to the narrow tailoring analysis.

The court also remanded on the issue of whether the plaintiffs were entitled to damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and in particular to determine whether evidence of causation existed. With respect to the WBE program, the court held the plaintiff had standing to challenge the program, and applying the intermediate scrutiny analysis, held the WBE program survived the facial challenge.

In finding the absence of any statistical data in support of the County’s MBE Program, the court made it clear that statistical analyses have served and will continue to serve an important role in cases in which the existence of discrimination is a disputed issue. 941 F.2d at 918. The court noted that it has repeatedly approved the use of statistical proof to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. The court pointed out that the U.S. Supreme Court in Croson held that where “gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination.” Id. at 918, quoting Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08, and Croson, 488 U.S. at 501.

The court points out that statistical evidence may not fully account for the complex factors and motivations guiding employment decisions, many of which may be entirely race-neutral. Id. at 919. The court noted that the record contained a plethora of anecdotal evidence, but that anecdotal evidence, standing alone, suffers the same flaws as statistical evidence. Id. at 919. While anecdotal evidence may suffice to prove individual claims of discrimination, rarely, according to the court, if ever, can such evidence show a systemic pattern of discrimination necessary for the adoption of an affirmative action plan. Id.

Nonetheless, the court held that the combination of convincing anecdotal and statistical evidence is potent. Id. at 919. The court pointed out that individuals who testified about their personal experiences brought the cold numbers of statistics “convincingly to life.” Id. at 919, quoting International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977). The court also pointed out that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in passing upon a minority set aside program similar to the one in King County, concluded that the testimony regarding complaints of discrimination combined with the gross statistical disparities uncovered by the County studies provided more than enough evidence on the question of prior discrimination and need for racial classification to justify the denial of a Motion for Summary Judgment. Id. at 919, citing Cone Corp. v. Hillsborough County, 908 F.2d 908, 916 (11th Cir. 1990).

The court found that the MBE Program of the County could not stand without a proper statistical foundation. Id. at 919. The court addressed whether post-enactment studies done by the County of a statistical foundation could be considered by the court in connection with determining the validity of the County MBE Program. The court held that a municipality must have *some* concrete evidence of discrimination in a particular industry before it may adopt a remedial program. Id. at 920. However, the court said this requirement of *some* evidence does not mean that a program will be automatically struck down if the evidence before the municipality at the time of enactment does not completely fulfill both prongs of the strict scrutiny test. Id. Rather, the court held, the factual predicate for the program should be evaluated based upon all evidence presented to the district court, whether such evidence was adduced before or after enactment of the MBE Program. Id. Therefore, the court adopted a rule that a municipality should have before it some evidence of discrimination before adopting a race-conscious program, while allowing post-adoption evidence to be considered in passing on the constitutionality of the program. Id.

The court, therefore, remanded the case to the district court for determination of whether the consultant studies that were performed after the enactment of the MBE Program could provide an adequate factual justification to establish a “propelling government interest” for King County’s adopting the MBE Program. Id. at 922.

The court also found that Croson does not require a showing of active discrimination by the enacting agency, and that passive participation, such as the infusion of tax dollars into a discriminatory industry, suffices. Id. at 922, citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 492. The court pointed out that the Supreme Court in Croson concluded that if the City had evidence before it, that non-minority contractors were systematically excluding minority businesses from subcontracting opportunities, it could take action to end the discriminatory exclusion. Id. at 922. The court points out that if the record ultimately supported a finding of systemic discrimination, the County adequately limited its program to those businesses that receive tax dollars, and the program imposed obligations upon only those businesses which voluntarily sought King County tax dollars by contracting with the County. Id.

The court addressed several factors in terms of the narrowly tailored analysis, and found that first, an MBE program should be instituted either after, or in conjunction with, race-neutral means of increasing minority business participation and public contracting. Id. at 922, citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 507. The second characteristic of the narrowly-tailored program, according to the court, is the use of minority utilization goals on a case-by-case basis, rather than upon a system of rigid numerical

quotas. Id. Finally, the court stated that an MBE program must be limited in its effective scope to the boundaries of the enacting jurisdiction. Id.

Among the various narrowly tailored requirements, the court held consideration of race-neutral alternatives is among the most important. Id. at 922. Nevertheless, the court stated that while strict scrutiny requires serious, good faith consideration of race-neutral alternatives, strict scrutiny does not require exhaustion of every possible such alternative. Id. at 923. The court noted that it does not intend a government entity exhaust *every* alternative, however irrational, costly, unreasonable, and unlikely to succeed such alternative might be. Id. Thus, the court required only that a state exhausts race-neutral measures that the state is authorized to enact, and that have a reasonable possibility of being effective. Id. The court noted in this case the County considered alternatives, but determined that they were not available as a matter of law. Id. The County cannot be required to engage in conduct that may be illegal, nor can it be compelled to expend precious tax dollars on projects where potential for success is marginal at best. Id.

The court noted that King County had adopted some race-neutral measures in conjunction with the MBE Program, for example, hosting one or two training sessions for small businesses, covering such topics as doing business with the government, small business management, and accounting techniques. Id. at 923. In addition, the County provided information on assessing Small Business Assistance Programs. Id. The court found that King County fulfilled its burden of considering race-neutral alternative programs. Id.

A second indicator of program's narrowly tailoring is program flexibility. Id. at 924. The court found that an important means of achieving such flexibility is through use of case-by-case utilization goals, rather than rigid numerical quotas or goals. Id. at 924. The court pointed out that King County used a "percentage preference" method, which is not a quota, and while the preference is locked at five percent, such a fixed preference is not unduly rigid in light of the waiver provisions. The court found that a valid MBE Program should include a waiver system that accounts for both the availability of qualified MBEs and whether the qualified MBEs have suffered from the effects of past discrimination by the County or prime contractors. Id. at 924. The court found that King County's program provided waivers in both instances, including where neither minority nor a woman's business is available to provide needed goods or services and where available minority and/or women's businesses have given price quotes that are unreasonably high. Id.

The court also pointed out other attributes of the narrowly tailored and flexible MBE program, including a bidder that does not meet planned goals, may nonetheless be awarded the contract by demonstrating a good faith effort to comply. Id. The actual percentages of required MBE participation are determined on a case-by-case basis. Levels of participation may be reduced if the prescribed levels are not feasible, if qualified MBEs are unavailable, or if MBE price quotes are not competitive. Id.

The court concluded that an MBE program must also be limited in its geographical scope to the boundaries of the enacting jurisdiction. Id. at 925. Here the court held that King County's MBE program fails this third portion of "narrowly tailored" requirement. The court found the definition of "minority business" included in the Program indicated that a minority-owned business may qualify for preferential treatment if the business has been discriminated against in the particular geographical areas in which it operates. The court held this definition as overly broad. Id. at 925. The court held

that the County should ask the question whether a business has been discriminated against in King County. *Id.* This determination, according to the court, is not an insurmountable burden for the County, as the rule does not require finding specific instances of discriminatory exclusion for each MBE. *Id.* Rather, if the County successfully proves malignant discrimination within the King County business community, an MBE would be presumptively eligible for relief if it had previously sought to do business in the County. *Id.*

In other words, if systemic discrimination in the County is shown, then it is fair to presume that an MBE was victimized by the discrimination. *Id.* at 925. For the presumption to attach to the MBE, however, it must be established that the MBE is, or attempted to become, an active participant in the County's business community. *Id.* Because King County's program permitted MBE participation even by MBEs that have no prior contact with King County, the program was overbroad to that extent. *Id.* Therefore, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment to King County on the MBE program on the basis that it was geographically overbroad.

The court considered the gender-specific aspect of the MBE program. The court determined the degree of judicial scrutiny afforded gender-conscious programs was intermediate scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny. *Id.* at 930. Under intermediate scrutiny, gender-based classification must serve an important governmental objective, and there must be a direct, substantial relationship between the objective and the means chosen to accomplish the objective. *Id.* at 931.

In this case, the court concluded, that King County's WBE preference survived a facial challenge. *Id.* at 932. The court found that King County had a legitimate and important interest in remedying the many disadvantages that confront women business owners and that the means chosen in the program were substantially related to the objective. *Id.* The court found the record adequately indicated discrimination against women in the King County construction industry, noting the anecdotal evidence including an affidavit of the president of a consulting engineering firm. *Id.* at 933. Therefore, the court upheld the WBE portion of the MBE program and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to King County for the WBE program.

Recent District Court Decisions

13. H.B. Rowe Corp., Inc. v. W. Lyndo Tippet, North Carolina DOT, et al; 589 F. Supp. 2d 587 (E.D.N.C. 2008), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, F.3d 2010 WL 2871076 (4th Cir. July 22, 2010)

In H.B. Rowe Company v. Tippet, North Carolina Department of Transportation, et al. ("Rowe"), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, Western Division, heard a challenge to the State of North Carolina Minority Business Enterprise and Woman Business Enterprise Program ("MBE Program" or "WBE Program"), which is a State of North Carolina "affirmative action" program administered by the North Carolina DOT ("NCDOT"). The NCDOT MWBE Program challenged in Rowe involves projects funded solely by the State of North Carolina and not funded by the Federal Department of Transportation. 589 F.Supp. 2d 587.

Background. In this case plaintiff, a family-owned road construction business, bid on a NCDOT initiated state-funded project. NCDOT rejected plaintiff's bid in favor of the next low bid that had proposed higher minority participation on the project as part of its bid. According to NCDOT,

plaintiff's bid was rejected because of plaintiff's failure to demonstrate "good faith efforts" to obtain pre-designated levels of minority participation on the project.

As a prime contractor, plaintiff Rowe was obligated under the MWBE Program to either obtain participation of specified levels of minority business enterprise and women business enterprise participation as subcontractors, or to demonstrate good faith efforts to do so. For this particular project, NCDOT had set MBE and WBE subcontractor participation goals of 10 percent and 5 percent, respectively. Plaintiff's bid included 6.6 percent WBE participation, but no MBE participation. The bid was rejected after a review of plaintiff's good faith efforts to obtain MBE participation. The next lowest bidder submitted a bid including 3.3 percent MBE participation and 9.3 percent WBE participation, and although not obtaining a specified level of MBE participation, it was determined to have made good faith efforts to do so. (Order of the District Court, dated March 29, 2007).

North Carolina's MWBE Program "largely mirrors" the Federal Disadvantage Business Enterprise ("DBE") Program, which NCDOT is required to comply with in awarding construction contracts that utilize Federal funds. (589 F.Supp. 2d 587; Order of the District Court, dated September 28, 2007). Like the Federal DBE Program, under North Carolina's MWBE Program, the goals for minority and female participation are aspirational rather than mandatory. *Id.* An individual target for MBE participation was set for each project. *Id.*

Historically, NCDOT had engaged in several disparity studies. The most recent study was done in 2004. *Id.* The 2004 study, which followed the study in 1998, concluded that disparities in utilization of MBEs persist and that a basis remains for continuation of the MWBE Program. The new statute as revised was approved in 2006, which modified the previous MBE statute by eliminating the 10 percent and 5 percent goals and establishing a fixed expiration date of 2009.

Plaintiff filed its complaint in this case in 2003 against the NCDOT and individuals associated with the NCDOT, including the Secretary of NCDOT, W. Lyndo Tippet. In its complaint, plaintiff alleged that the MWBE statute for NCDOT was unconstitutional on its face and as applied. 589 F.Supp. 2d 587.

March 29, 2007 Order of the District Court. The matter came before the district court initially on several motions, including the defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Partial Summary Judgment, defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Claim for Mootness and plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. The court in its October 2007 Order granted in part and denied in part defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for partial summary judgment; denied defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Claim for Mootness; and dismissed without prejudice plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

The court held the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars plaintiff from obtaining any relief against defendant NCDOT, and from obtaining a retrospective damages award against any of the individual defendants in their official capacities. The court ruled that plaintiff's claims for relief against the NCDOT were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and the NCDOT was dismissed from the case as a defendant. Plaintiff's claims for interest, actual damages, compensatory damages and punitive damages against the individual defendants sued in their official capacities also was held barred by the Eleventh Amendment and were dismissed. But, the court held that plaintiff was entitled to sue for an injunction to prevent state officers from violating a federal

law, and under the *Ex Parte Young* exception, plaintiff's claim for declaratory and injunctive relief was permitted to go forward as against the individual defendants who were acting in an official capacity with the NCDOT. The court also held that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, and therefore dismissed plaintiff's claim for money damages against the individual defendants in their individual capacities. Order of the District Court, dated March 29, 2007.

Defendants argued that the recent amendment to the MWBE statute rendered plaintiff's claim for declaratory injunctive relief moot. The new MWBE statute adopted in 2006, according to the court, does away with many of the alleged shortcomings argued by the plaintiff in this lawsuit. The court found the amended statute has a sunset date in 2009; specific aspirational participation goals by women and minorities are eliminated; defines "minority" as including only those racial groups which disparity studies identify as subject to underutilization in state road construction contracts; explicitly references the findings of the 2004 Disparity Study and requires similar studies to be conducted at least once every five years; and directs NCDOT to enact regulations targeting discrimination identified in the 2004 and future studies.

The court held, however, that the 2004 Disparity Study and amended MWBE statute do not remedy the primary problem which the plaintiff complained of: the use of remedial race- and gender- based preferences allegedly without valid evidence of past racial and gender discrimination. In that sense, the court held the amended MWBE statute continued to present a live case or controversy, and accordingly denied the defendants' Motion to Dismiss Claim for Mootness as to plaintiff's suit for prospective injunctive relief. Order of the District Court, dated March 29, 2007.

The court also held that since there had been no analysis of the MWBE statute apart from the briefs regarding mootness, plaintiff's pending Motion for Summary Judgment was dismissed without prejudice. Order of the District Court, dated March 29, 2007.

September 28, 2007 Order of the District Court. On September 28, 2007, the district court issued a new order in which it denied both the plaintiff's and the defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff claimed that the 2004 Disparity Study is the sole basis of the MWBE statute, that the study is flawed, and therefore it does not satisfy the first prong of strict scrutiny review. Plaintiff also argued that the 2004 study tends to prove non-discrimination in the case of women; and finally the MWBE Program fails the second prong of strict scrutiny review in that it is not narrowly tailored.

The court found summary judgment was inappropriate for either party and that there are genuine issues of material fact for trial. The first and foremost issue of material fact, according to the court, was the adequacy of the 2004 Disparity Study as used to justify the MWBE Program. Therefore, because the court found there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the 2004 Study, summary judgment was denied on this issue.

The court also held there was confusion as to the basis of the MWBE Program, and whether it was based solely on the 2004 Study or also on the 1993 and 1998 Disparity Studies. Therefore, the court held a genuine issue of material fact existed on this issue and denied summary judgment. Order of the District Court, dated September 28, 2007.

December 9, 2008 Order of the District Court (589 F.Supp. 2d 587). The district court on December 9, 2008, after a bench trial, issued an Order that found as a fact and concluded as a matter

of law that plaintiff failed to satisfy its burden of proof that the North Carolina Minority and Women's Business Enterprise program, enacted by the state legislature to affect the awarding of contracts and subcontracts in state highway construction, violated the United States Constitution.

Plaintiff, in its complaint filed against the NCDOT alleged that N.C. Gen. St. § 136-28.4 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied, and that the NCDOT while administering the MWBE program violated plaintiff's rights under the federal law and the United States Constitution. Plaintiff requested a declaratory judgment that the MWBE program is invalid and sought actual and punitive damages.

As a prime contractor, plaintiff was obligated under the MWBE program to either obtain participation of specified levels of MBE and WBE subcontractors, or to demonstrate that good faith efforts were made to do so. Following a review of plaintiff's good faith efforts to obtain minority participation on the particular contract that was the subject of plaintiff's bid, the bid was rejected. Plaintiff's bid was rejected in favor of the next lowest bid, which had proposed higher minority participation on the project as part of its bid. According to NCDOT, plaintiff's bid was rejected because of plaintiff's failure to demonstrate good faith efforts to obtain pre-designated levels of minority participation on the project. 589 F.Supp. 2d 587.

North Carolina's MWBE program. The MWBE program was implemented following amendments to N.C. Gen. Stat. §136-28.4. Pursuant to the directives of the statute, the NCDOT promulgated regulations governing administration of the MWBE program. See N.C. Admin. Code tit. 19A, § 2D.1101, et seq. The regulations had been amended several times and provide that NCDOT shall ensure that MBEs and WBEs have the maximum opportunity to participate in the performance of contracts financed with non-Federal funds. N.C. Admin. Code Tit. 19A § 2D.1101.

North Carolina's MWBE program, which affected only highway bids and contracts funded solely with state money, according to the district court, largely mirrored the Federal DBE Program which NCDOT is required to comply with in awarding construction contracts that utilize federal funds. 589 F.Supp. 2d 587. Like the Federal DBE Program, under North Carolina's MWBE program, the targets for minority and female participation were aspirational rather than mandatory, and individual targets for disadvantaged business participation were set for each individual project. N.C. Admin. Code tit. 19A § 2D.1108. In determining what level of MBE and WBE participation was appropriate for each project, NCDOT would take into account "the approximate dollar value of the contract, the geographical location of the proposed work, a number of the eligible funds in the geographical area, and the anticipated value of the items of work to be included in the contract." *Id.* NCDOT would also consider "the annual goals mandated by Congress and the North Carolina General Assembly." *Id.*

A firm could be certified as a MBE or WBE by showing NCDOT that it is "owner controlled by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals." NC Admin. Code tit. 1980, § 2D.1102.

The district court stated the MWBE program did not directly discriminate in favor of minority and women contractors, but rather "encouraged prime contractors to favor MBEs and WBEs in subcontracting before submitting bids to NCDOT." 589 F.Supp. 2d 587. In determining whether the lowest bidder is "responsible," NCDOT would consider whether the bidder obtained the level of

certified MBE and WBE participation previously specified in the NCDOT project proposal. If not, NCDOT would consider whether the bidder made good faith efforts to solicit MBE and WBE participation. N.C. Admin. Code tit. 19A§ 2D.1108.

There were multiple studies produced and presented to the North Carolina General Assembly in the years 1993, 1998 and 2004. The 1998 and 2004 studies concluded that disparities in the utilization of minority and women contractors persist, and that there remains a basis for continuation of the MWBE program. The MWBE program as amended after the 2004 study includes provisions that eliminated the 10 percent and 5 percent goals and instead replaced them with contract-specific participation goals created by NCDOT; established a sunset provision that has the statute expiring on August 31, 2009; and provides reliance on a disparity study produced in 2004.

The MWBE program, as it stood at the time of this decision, provides that NCDOT “dictates to prime contractors the express goal of MBE and WBE subcontractors to be used on a given project. However, instead of the state hiring the MBE and WBE subcontractors itself, the NCDOT makes the prime contractor solely responsible for vetting and hiring these subcontractors. If a prime contractor fails to hire the goal amount, it must submit efforts of ‘good faith’ attempts to do so.” 589 F.Supp. 2d 587.

Compelling interest. The district court held that NCDOT established a compelling governmental interest to have the MWBE program. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court in Croson made clear that a state legislature has a compelling interest in eradicating and remedying private discrimination in the private subcontracting inherent in the letting of road construction contracts. 589 F.Supp. 2d 587, citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 492. The district court found that the North Carolina Legislature established it relied upon a strong basis of evidence in concluding that prior race discrimination in North Carolina’s road construction industry existed so as to require remedial action.

The court held that the 2004 Disparity Study demonstrated the existence of previous discrimination in the specific industry and locality at issue. The court stated that disparity ratios provided for in the 2004 Disparity Study highlighted the underutilization of MBEs by prime contractors bidding on state funded highway projects. In addition, the court found that evidence relied upon by the legislature demonstrated a dramatic decline in the utilization of MBEs during the program’s suspension in 1991. The court also found that anecdotal support relied upon by the legislature confirmed and reinforced the general data demonstrating the underutilization of MBEs. The court held that the NCDOT established that, “based upon a clear and strong inference raised by this Study, they concluded minority contractors suffer from the lingering effects of racial discrimination.” 589 F.Supp. 2d 587.

With regard to WBEs, the court applied a different standard of review. The court held the legislative scheme as it relates to MWBEs must serve an important governmental interest and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. The court found that NCDOT established an important governmental interest. The 2004 Disparity Study provided that the average contracts awarded WBEs are significantly smaller than those awarded non-WBEs. The court held that NCDOT established based upon a clear and strong inference raised by the Study, women contractors suffer from past gender discrimination in the road construction industry.

Narrowly tailored. The district court noted that the Fourth Circuit of Appeals lists a number of factors to consider in analyzing a statute for narrow tailoring: (1) the necessity of the policy and the efficacy of alternative race neutral policies; (2) the planned duration of the policy; (3) the relationship between the numerical goal and the percentage of minority group members in the relevant population; (4) the flexibility of the policy, including the provision of waivers if the goal cannot be met; and (5) the burden of the policy on innocent third parties. 589 F.Supp. 2d 587, quoting Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 269 F.3d 305, 344 (4th Cir. 2001).

The district court held that the legislative scheme in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-28.4 is narrowly tailored to remedy private discrimination of minorities and women in the private subcontracting inherent in the letting of road construction contracts. The district court's analysis focused on narrowly tailoring factors (2) and (4) above, namely the duration of the policy and the flexibility of the policy. With respect to the former, the court held the legislative scheme provides the program be reviewed at least every five years to revisit the issue of utilization of MWBEs in the road construction industry. N.C. Gen. Stat. §136-28.4(b). Further, the legislative scheme includes a sunset provision so that the program will expire on August 31, 2009, unless renewed by an act of the legislature. Id. at § 136-28.4(e). The court held these provisions ensured the legislative scheme last no longer than necessary.

The court also found that the legislative scheme enacted by the North Carolina legislature provides flexibility insofar as the participation goals for a given contract or determined on a project by project basis. § 136-28.4(b)(1). Additionally, the court found the legislative scheme in question is not overbroad because the statute applies only to "those racial or ethnicity classifications identified by a study conducted in accordance with this section that had been subjected to discrimination in a relevant marketplace and that had been adversely affected in their ability to obtain contracts with the Department." § 136-28.4(c)(2). The court found that plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that indicates minorities from non-relevant racial groups had been awarded contracts as a result of the statute.

The court held that the legislative scheme is narrowly tailored to remedy private discrimination of minorities and women in the private subcontracting inherent in the letting of road construction contracts, and therefore found that § 136-28.4 is constitutional.

The decision of the district court was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the District Court. H. B. Rowe Co., Inc. v. W. Lyndo Tippett, NCDOT, et al, F.3d 2010 WL 2871076 (4th Cir. July 22, 2010) discussed above.

14. Thomas v. City of Saint Paul, 526 F. Supp. 2d 959 (D. Minn 2007), affirmed, 321 Fed. Appx. 541, 2009 WL 777932 (8th Cir. March 26, 2009) (unpublished opinion), cert. denied, ___ S.Ct. _____, 2009 WL 2496325 (U.S. October 13, 2009).

In Thomas v. City of Saint Paul, the plaintiffs are African American business owners who brought this lawsuit claiming that the City of Saint Paul, Minnesota discriminated against them in awarding publicly-funded contracts. The City moved for summary judgment, which the United States District Court granted and issued an order dismissing the plaintiff's lawsuit in December 2007.

The background of the case involves the adoption by the City of Saint Paul of a Vendor Outreach Program (the "VOP") that was designed to assist minority and other small business owners in competing for City contracts. Plaintiffs were VOP-certified minority business owners. Plaintiffs contended that the City engaged in racially discriminatory illegal conduct in awarding City contracts for publicly-funded projects. Plaintiff Thomas claimed that the City denied him opportunities to work on projects because of his race arguing that the City failed to invite him to bid on certain projects, the City failed to award him contracts and the fact independent developers had not contracted with his company. 526 F. Supp. 2d at 962. The City contended that Thomas was provided opportunities to bid for the City's work.

Plaintiff Brian Conover owned a trucking firm, and he claimed that none of his bids as a subcontractor, on 22 different projects to various independent developers were accepted. 526 F. Supp. 2d at 962. The court found that after years of discovery, plaintiff Conover offered no admissible evidence to support his claim, had not identified the subcontractors whose bids were accepted, and did not offer any comparison showing the accepted bid and the bid he submitted. *Id.* Plaintiff Conover also complained that he received bidding invitations only a few days before a bid was due, which did not allow him adequate time to prepare a competitive bid. *Id.* The court found, however, he failed to identify any particular project for which he had only a single day of bid, and did not identify any similarly situated person of any race who was afforded a longer period of time in which to submit a bid. *Id.* at 963. Plaintiff Newell claimed he submitted numerous bids on the City's projects all of which were rejected. *Id.* The court found, however, that he provided no specifics about why he did not receive the work. *Id.*

The VOP. Under the VOP, the City sets annual bench marks or levels of participation for the targeted minorities groups. *Id.* at 963. The VOP prohibits quotas and imposes various "good faith" requirements on prime contractors who bid for City projects. *Id.* at 964. In particular, the VOP requires that when a prime contractor rejects a bid from a VOP-certified business, the contractor must give the City its basis for the rejection, and evidence that the rejection was justified. *Id.* The VOP further imposes obligations on the City with respect to vendor contracts. *Id.* The court found the City must seek where possible and lawful to award a portion of vendor contracts to VOP-certified businesses. *Id.* The City contract manager must solicit these bids by phone, advertisement in a local newspaper or other means. Where applicable, the contract manager may assist interested VOP participants in obtaining bonds, lines of credit or insurance required to perform under the contract. *Id.* The VOP ordinance provides that when the contract manager engages in one or more possible outreach efforts, he or she is in compliance with the ordinance. *Id.*

Analysis and Order of the Court. The district court found that the City is entitled to summary judgment because plaintiffs lack standing to bring these claims and that no genuine issue of material fact remains. Id. at 965. The court held that the plaintiffs had no standing to challenge the VOP because they failed to show they were deprived of an opportunity to compete, or that their inability to obtain any contract resulted from an act of discrimination. Id. The court found they failed to show any instance in which their race was a determinant in the denial of any contract. Id. at 966. As a result, the court held plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the City engaged in discriminatory conduct or policy which prevented plaintiffs from competing. Id. at 965-966.

The court held that in the absence of any showing of intentional discrimination based on race, the mere fact the City did not award any contracts to plaintiffs does not furnish that causal nexus necessary to establish standing. Id. at 966. The court held the law does not require the City to voluntarily adopt “aggressive race-based affirmative action programs” in order to award specific groups publicly-funded contracts. Id. at 966. The court found that plaintiffs had failed to show a violation of the VOP ordinance, or any illegal policy or action on the part of the City. Id.

The court stated that the plaintiffs must identify a discriminatory policy in effect. Id. at 966. The court noted, for example, even assuming the City failed to give plaintiffs more than one day’s notice to enter a bid, such a failure is not, per se, illegal. Id. The court found the plaintiffs offered no evidence that anyone else of any other race received an earlier notice, or that he was given this allegedly tardy notice as a result of his race. Id.

The court concluded that even if plaintiffs may not have been hired as a subcontractor to work for prime contractors receiving City contracts, these were independent developers and the City is not required to defend the alleged bad acts of others. Id. Therefore, the court held plaintiffs had no standing to challenge the VOP. Id. at 966.

Plaintiffs claims. The court found that even assuming plaintiffs possessed standing, they failed to establish facts which demonstrated a need for a trial, primarily because each theory of recovery is viable only if the City “intentionally” treated plaintiffs unfavorably because of their race. Id. at 967. The court held to establish a prima facie violation of the equal protection clause, there must be state action. Id. Plaintiffs must offer facts and evidence that constitute proof of “racially discriminatory intent or purpose.” Id. at 967. Here, the court found that plaintiff failed to allege any single instance showing the City “intentionally” rejected VOP bids based on their race. Id.

The court also found that plaintiffs offered no evidence of a specific time when any one of them submitted the lowest bid for a contract or a subcontract, or showed any case where their bids were rejected on the basis of race. Id. The court held the alleged failure to place minority contractors in a preferred position, without more, is insufficient to support a finding that the City failed to treat them equally based upon their race. Id.

The City rejected the plaintiffs claims of discrimination because the plaintiffs did not establish by evidence that the City “intentionally” rejected their bid due to race or that the City “intentionally” discriminated against these plaintiffs. Id. at 967-968. The court held that the plaintiffs did not establish a single instance showing the City deprived them of their rights, and the plaintiffs did not produce evidence of a “discriminatory motive.” Id. at 968. The court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to show that the City’s actions were “racially motivated.” Id.

The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed the ruling of the district court. Thomas v. City of Saint Paul, 2009 WL 777932 (8th Cir. March 26, 2009)(unpublished opinion). The Eighth Circuit affirmed based on the decision of the district court and finding no reversible error.

15. Thompson Building Wrecking Co. v. Augusta, Georgia, No. 1:07CV019, 2007 WL 926153 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 2007)(Slip. Op.)

This case considered the validity of the City of Augusta’s local minority disadvantaged business enterprise (“DBE”) program. The district court enjoined the City from favoring any contract bid on the basis of racial classification and based its decision principally upon the outdated and insufficient data proffered by the City in support of its program. 2007 WL 926153 at *9-10.

The City of Augusta enacted a local DBE program based upon the results of a disparity study completed in 1994. The disparity study examined the disparity in socioeconomic status among races, compared black-owned businesses in Augusta with those in other regions and those owned by other racial groups, examined “Georgia’s racist history” in contracting and procurement, and examined certain data related to Augusta’s contracting and procurement. Id. at *1-4. The plaintiff contractors and subcontractors challenged the constitutionality of the DBE program and sought to extend a temporary injunction enjoining the City’s implementation of racial preferences in public bidding and procurement.

The City defended the DBE program arguing that it did not utilize racial classifications because it only required vendors to make a “good faith effort” to ensure DBE participation. Id. at *6. The court rejected this argument noting that bidders were required to submit a “Proposed DBE Participation” form and that bids containing DBE participation were treated more favorably than those bids without DBE participation. The court stated: “Because a person’s business can qualify for the favorable treatment based on that person’s race, while a similarly situated person of another race would not qualify, the program contains a racial classification.” Id.

The court noted that the DBE program harmed subcontractors in two ways: first, because prime contractors will discriminate between DBE and non-DBE subcontractors and a bid with a DBE subcontractor would be treated more favorably; and second, because the City would favor a bid containing DBE participation over an equal or even superior bid containing no DBE participation. Id.

The court applied the strict scrutiny standard set forth in Croson and Engineering Contractors Association to determine whether the City had a compelling interest for its program and whether the program was narrowly tailored to that end. The court noted that pursuant to Croson, the City would have a compelling interest in assuring that tax dollars would not perpetuate private prejudice. But, the court found (citing to Croson), that a state or local government must identify that discrimination, “public or private, with some specificity before they may use race-conscious relief.” The court cited the Eleventh Circuit’s position that “‘gross statistical disparities’ between the proportion of minorities hired by the public employer and the proportion of minorities hired by the public employer and the proportion of minorities willing and able to work” may justify an affirmative action program. Id. at *7. The court also stated that anecdotal evidence is relevant to the analysis.

The court determined that while the City’s disparity study showed some statistical disparities buttressed by anecdotal evidence, the study suffered from multiple issues. Id. at *7-8. Specifically, the

court found that those portions of the study examining discrimination outside the area of subcontracting (e.g., socioeconomic status of racial groups in the Augusta area) were irrelevant for purposes of showing a compelling interest. The court also cited the failure of the study to differentiate between different minority races as well as the improper aggregation of race- and gender-based discrimination referred to as Simpson's Paradox.

The court assumed for purposes of its analysis that the City could show a compelling interest but concluded that the program was not narrowly tailored and thus could not satisfy strict scrutiny. The court found that it need look no further beyond the fact of the thirteen-year duration of the program absent further investigation, and the absence of a sunset or expiration provision, to conclude that the DBE program was not narrowly tailored. *Id.* at *8. Noting that affirmative action is permitted only sparingly, the court found: "[i]t would be impossible for Augusta to argue that, 13 years after last studying the issue, racial discrimination is so rampant in the Augusta contracting industry that the City must affirmatively act to avoid being complicit." *Id.* The court held in conclusion, that the plaintiffs were "substantially likely to succeed in proving that, when the City requests bids with minority participation and in fact favors bids with such, the plaintiffs will suffer racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause." *Id.* at *9.

In a subsequent Order dated September 5, 2007, the court denied the City's motion to continue plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, denied the City's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and stayed the action for 30 days pending mediation between the parties. Importantly, in this Order, the court reiterated that the female- and locally-owned business components of the program (challenged in plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment) would be subject to intermediate scrutiny and rational basis scrutiny, respectively. The court also reiterated its rejection of the City's challenge to the plaintiffs' standing. The court noted that under *Adarand*, preventing a contractor from competing on an equal footing satisfies the particularized injury prong of standing. And showing that the contractor will sometime in the future bid on a City contract "that offers financial incentives to a prime contractor for hiring disadvantaged subcontractors" satisfies the second requirement that the particularized injury be actual or imminent. Accordingly, the court concluded that the plaintiffs have standing to pursue this action.

16. Hershell Gill Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County, 333 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (S.D. Fla. 2004)

The decision in Hershell Gill Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County, is significant to the disparity study because it applied and followed the Engineering Contractors Association decision in the context of contracting and procurement for goods and services (including architect and engineer services). Many of the other cases focused on construction, and thus Hershell Gill is instructive as to the analysis relating to architect and engineering services. The decision in Hershell Gill also involved a district court in the Eleventh Circuit imposing compensatory and punitive damages upon individual County Commissioners due to the district court's finding of their willful failure to abrogate an unconstitutional MBE/WBE Program. In addition, the case is noteworthy because the district court refused to follow the 2003 Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 321 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2003). See discussion, *infra*.

Six years after the decision in Engineering Contractors Association, two white male-owned engineering firms (the "plaintiffs") brought suit against Engineering Contractors Association (the

“County”), the former County Manager, and various current County Commissioners (the “Commissioners”) in their official and personal capacities (collectively the “defendants”), seeking to enjoin the same “participation goals” in the same MWBE program deemed to violate the Fourteenth Amendment in the earlier case. 333 F. Supp. 1305, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2004). After the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Engineering Contractors Association striking down the MWBE programs as applied to construction contracts, the County enacted a Community Small Business Enterprise (CSBE) program for construction contracts, “but continued to apply racial, ethnic, and gender criteria to its purchases of goods and services in other areas, including its procurement of A&E services.” Id. at 1311.

The plaintiffs brought suit challenging the Black Business Enterprise (BBE) program, the Hispanic Business Enterprise (HBE) program, and the Women Business Enterprise (WBE) program (collectively “MBE/WBE”). Id. The MBE/WBE programs applied to A&E contracts in excess of \$25,000. Id. at 1312. The County established five “contract measures” to reach the participation goals: (1) set asides, (2) subcontractor goals, (3) project goals, (4) bid preferences, and (5) selection factors. Id. Once a contract was identified as covered by a participation goal, a review committee would determine whether a contract measure should be utilized. Id. The County was required to review the efficacy of the MBE/WBE programs annually, and reevaluated the continuing viability of the MBE/WBE programs every five years. Id. at 1313. However, the district court found “the participation goals for the three MBE/WBE programs challenged ... remained unchanged since 1994.” Id.

In 1998, counsel for plaintiffs contacted the County Commissioners requesting the discontinuation of contract measures on A&E contracts. Id. at 1314. Upon request of the Commissioners, the county manager then made two reports (an original and a follow-up) measuring parity in terms of dollars awarded and dollars paid in the areas of A&E for blacks, Hispanics, and women, and concluded both times that the “County has reached parity for black, Hispanic, and Women-owned firms in the areas of [A&E] services.” The final report further stated “Based on all the analyses that have been performed, the County does not have a basis for the establishment of participation goals which would allow staff to apply contract measures.” Id. at 1315. The district court also found that the Commissioners were informed that “there was even less evidence to support [the MBE/WBE] programs as applied to architects and engineers than there was in contract construction.” Id. Nonetheless, the Commissioners voted to continue the MBE/WBE participation goals at their previous levels. Id.

In May of 2000 (18 months after the lawsuit was filed), the County commissioned Dr. Manuel J. Carvajal, an econometrician, to study architects and engineers in the county. His final report had four parts:

- (1) data identification and collection of methodology for displaying the research results;
- (2) presentation and discussion of tables pertaining to architecture, civil engineering, structural engineering, and awards of contracts in those areas;
- (3) analysis of the structure and empirical estimates of various sets of regression equations, the calculation of corresponding indices, and an assessment of their importance; and
- (4) a conclusion that there is discrimination against women and Hispanics — but not against blacks — in the fields of architecture and engineering.

Id. The district court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the use of the MBE/WBE programs for A&E contracts, pending the United States Supreme Court decisions in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). Id. at 1316.

The court considered whether the MBE/WBE programs were violative of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and whether the County and the County Commissioners were liable for compensatory and punitive damages.

The district court found that the Supreme Court decisions in Gratz and Grutter did not alter the constitutional analysis as set forth in Adarand and Croson. Id. at 1317. Accordingly, the race- and ethnicity-based classifications were subject to strict scrutiny, meaning the County must present “a strong basis of evidence” indicating the MBE/WBE program was necessary and that it was narrowly tailored to its purported purpose. Id. at 1316. The gender-based classifications were subject to intermediate scrutiny, requiring the County to show the “gender-based classification serves an important governmental objective, and that it is substantially related to the achievement of that objective.” Id. at 1317 (internal citations omitted). The court found that the proponent of a gender-based affirmative action program must present “sufficient probative evidence” of discrimination. Id. (internal citations omitted). The court found that under the intermediate scrutiny analysis, the County must (1) demonstrate past discrimination against women but not necessarily at the hands of the County, and (2) that the gender-conscious affirmative action program need not be used only as a “last resort.” Id.

The County presented both statistical and anecdotal evidence. Id. at 1318. The statistical evidence consisted of Dr. Carvajal’s report, most of which consisted of “post-enactment” evidence. Id. Dr. Carvajal’s analysis sought to discover the existence of racial, ethnic and gender disparities in the A&E industry, and then to determine whether any such disparities could be attributed to discrimination. Id. The study used four data sets: three were designed to establish the marketplace availability of firms (architecture, structural engineering, and civil engineering), and the fourth focused on awards issued by the County. Id. Dr. Carvajal used the phone book, a list compiled by infoUSA, and a list of firms registered for technical certification with the County’s Department of Public Works to compile a list of the “universe” of firms competing in the market. Id. For the architectural firms only, he also used a list of firms that had been issued an architecture professional license. Id.

Dr. Carvajal then conducted a phone survey of the identified firms. Based on his data, Dr. Carvajal concluded that disparities existed between the percentage of A&E firms owned by blacks, Hispanics, and women, and the percentage of annual business they received. Id. Dr. Carvajal conducted regression analyses “in order to determine the effect a firm owner’s gender or race had on certain dependent variables.” Id. Dr. Carvajal used the firm’s annual volume of business as a dependent variable and determined the disparities were due in each case to the firm’s gender and/or ethnic classification. Id. at 1320. He also performed variants to the equations including: (1) using certification rather than survey data for the experience / capacity indicators, (2) with the outliers deleted, (3) with publicly-owned firms deleted, (4) with the dummy variables reversed, and (5) using only currently certified firms.” Id. Dr. Carvajal’s results remained substantially unchanged. Id.

Based on his analysis of the marketplace data, Dr. Carvajal concluded that the “gross statistical disparities” in the annual business volume for Hispanic- and women-owned firms could be attributed to discrimination; he “did not find sufficient evidence of discrimination against blacks.” Id.

The court held that Dr. Carvajal's study constituted neither a "strong basis in evidence" of discrimination necessary to justify race- and ethnicity-conscious measures, nor did it constitute "sufficient probative evidence" necessary to justify the gender-conscious measures. Id. The court made an initial finding that no disparity existed to indicate underutilization of MBE/WBEs in the award of A&E contracts by the County, nor was there underutilization of MBE/WBEs in the contracts they were awarded. Id. The court found that an analysis of the award data indicated, "[i]f anything, the data indicates an overutilization of minority-owned firms by the County in relation to their numbers in the marketplace." Id.

With respect to the marketplace data, the County conceded that there was insufficient evidence of discrimination against blacks to support the BBE program. Id. at 1321. With respect to the marketplace data for Hispanics and women, the court found it "unreliable and inaccurate" for three reasons: (1) the data failed to properly measure the geographic market, (2) the data failed to properly measure the product market, and (3) the marketplace data survey was unreliable. Id. at 1321-25.

The court ruled that it would not follow the Tenth Circuit decision of Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 321 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2003), as the burden of proof enunciated by the Tenth Circuit conflicts with that of the Eleventh Circuit, and the "Tenth Circuit's decision is flawed for the reasons articulated by Justice Scalia in his dissent from the denial of certiorari." Id. at 1325 (internal citations omitted).

The defendant intervenors presented anecdotal evidence pertaining only to discrimination against women in the County's A&E industry. Id. The anecdotal evidence consisted of the testimony of three A&E professional women, "nearly all" of which was related to discrimination in the award of County contracts. Id. at 1326. However, the district court found that the anecdotal evidence contradicted Dr. Carvajal's study indicating that no disparity existed with respect to the award of County A&E contracts. Id.

The court quoted the Eleventh Circuit in Engineering Contractors Association for the proposition "that only in the rare case will anecdotal evidence suffice standing alone." Id. (internal citations omitted). The court held that "[t]his is not one of those rare cases." The district court concluded that the statistical evidence was "unreliable and fail[ed] to establish the existence of discrimination," and the anecdotal evidence was insufficient as it did not even reach the level of anecdotal evidence in Engineering Contractors Association where the County employees themselves testified. Id.

The court made an initial finding that a number of minority groups provided preferential treatment were in fact majorities in the County in terms of population, voting capacity, and representation on the County Commission. Id. at 1326-1329. For purposes only of conducting the strict scrutiny analysis, the court then assumed that Dr. Carvajal's report demonstrated discrimination against Hispanics (note the County had conceded it had insufficient evidence of discrimination against blacks) and sought to determine whether the HBE program was narrowly tailored to remedying that discrimination. Id. at 1330. However, the court found that because the study failed to "identify who is engaging in the discrimination, what form the discrimination might take, at what stage in the process it is taking place, or how the discrimination is accomplished ... it is virtually impossible to narrowly tailor any remedy, and the HBE program fails on this fact alone." Id.

The court found that even after the County Managers informed the Commissioners that the County had reached parity in the A&E industry, the Commissioners declined to enact a CSBE ordinance, a race-neutral measure utilized in the construction industry after Engineering Contractors Association. Id. Instead, the Commissioners voted to continue the HBE program. Id. The court held that the County's failure to even explore a program similar to the CSBE ordinance indicated that the HBE program was not narrowly tailored. Id. at 1331.

The court also found that the County enacted a broad anti-discrimination ordinance imposing harsh penalties for a violation thereof. Id. However, "not a single witness at trial knew of any instance of a complaint being brought under this ordinance concerning the A&E industry," leading the court to conclude that the ordinance was either not being enforced, or no discrimination existed. Id. Under either scenario, the HBE program could not be narrowly tailored. Id.

The court found the waiver provisions in the HBE program inflexible in practice. Id. Additionally, the court found the County had failed to comply with the provisions in the HBE program requiring adjustment of participation goals based on annual studies, because the County had not in fact conducted annual studies for several years. Id. The court found this even "more problematic" because the HBE program did not have a built-in durational limit, and thus blatantly violated Supreme Court jurisprudence requiring that racial and ethnic preferences "must be limited in time." Id. at 1332, citing Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2346. For the foregoing reasons, the court concluded the HBE program was not narrowly tailored. Id. at 1332.

With respect to the WBE program, the court found that "the failure of the County to identify who is discriminating and where in the process the discrimination is taking place indicates (though not conclusively) that the WBE program is not substantially related to eliminating that discrimination." Id. at 1333. The court found that the existence of the anti-discrimination ordinance, the refusal to enact a small business enterprise ordinance, and the inflexibility in setting the participation goals rendered the WBE unable to satisfy the substantial relationship test. Id.

The court held that the County was liable for any compensatory damages. Id. at 1333-34. The court held that the Commissioners had absolute immunity for their legislative actions; however, they were not entitled to qualified immunity for their actions in voting to apply the race-, ethnicity-, and gender-conscious measures of the MBE/WBE programs if their actions violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known ... Accordingly, the question is whether the state of the law at the time the Commissioners voted to apply [race-, ethnicity-, and gender-conscious measures] gave them 'fair warning' that their actions were unconstitutional." Id. at 1335-36 (internal citations omitted).

The court held that the Commissioners were not entitled to qualified immunity because they "had before them at least three cases that gave them fair warning that their application of the MBE/WBE programs ... were unconstitutional: Croson, Adarand and [Engineering Contractors Association]." Id. at 1137. The court found that the Commissioners voted to apply the contract measures after the Supreme Court decided both Croson and Adarand. Id. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit had already struck down the construction provisions of the same MBE/WBE programs. Id. Thus, the case law was "clearly established" and gave the Commissioners fair warning that the MBE/WBE programs were unconstitutional. Id.

The court also found the Commissioners had specific information from the County Manager and other internal studies indicating the problems with the MBE/WBE programs and indicating that parity had been achieved. *Id.* at 1338. Additionally, the Commissioners did not conduct the annual studies mandated by the MBE/WBE ordinance itself. *Id.* For all the foregoing reasons, the court held the Commissioners were subject to individual liability for any compensatory and punitive damages.

The district court enjoined the County, the Commissioners, and the County Manager from using, or requiring the use of, gender, racial, or ethnic criteria in deciding (1) whether a response to an RFP submitted for A&E work is responsive, (2) whether such a response will be considered, and (3) whether a contract will be awarded to a consultant submitting such a response. The court awarded the plaintiffs \$100 each in nominal damages and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, for which it held the County and the Commissioners jointly and severally liable.

17. Florida A.G.C. Council, Inc. v. State of Florida, 303 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fla. 2004)

This case is instructive to the disparity study as to the manner in which district courts within the Eleventh Circuit are interpreting and applying Engineering Contractors Association. It is also instructive in terms of the type of legislation to be considered by the local and state governments as to what the courts consider to be a "race-conscious" program and/or legislation, as well as to the significance of the implementation of the legislation to the analysis.

The plaintiffs, A.G.C. Council, Inc. and the South Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors brought this case challenging the constitutionality of certain provisions of a Florida statute (Section 287.09451, *et seq.*). The plaintiffs contended that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by instituting race- and gender-conscious "preferences" in order to increase the numeric representation of minority business enterprises ("MBEs") in certain industries.

According to the court, the Florida Statute enacted race-conscious and gender-conscious remedial programs to ensure minority participation in state contracts for the purchase of commodities and in construction contracts. The State created the Office of Supplier Diversity ("OSD") to assist MBEs to become suppliers of commodities, services and construction to the state government. The OSD had certain responsibilities, including adopting rules meant to assess whether state agencies have made good faith efforts to solicit business from MBEs, and to monitor whether contractors have made good faith efforts to comply with the objective of greater overall MBE participation.

The statute enumerated measures that contractors should undertake, such as minority-centered recruitment in advertising as a means of advancing the statute's purpose. The statute provided that each State agency is "encouraged" to spend 21 percent of the monies actually expended for construction contracts, 25 percent of the monies actually expended for architectural and engineering contracts, 24 percent of the monies actually expended for commodities and 50.5 percent of the monies actually expended for contractual services during the fiscal year for the purpose of entering into contracts with certified MBEs. The statute also provided that state agencies are allowed to allocate certain percentages for black Americans, Hispanic Americans and for American women, and the goals are broken down by construction contracts, architectural and engineering contracts, commodities and contractual services.

The State took the position that the spending goals were “precatory.” The court found that the plaintiffs had standing to maintain the action and to pursue prospective relief. The court held that the statute was unconstitutional based on the finding that the spending goals were not narrowly tailored to achieve a governmental interest. The court did not specifically address whether the articulated reasons for the goals contained in the statute had sufficient evidence, but instead found that the articulated reason would, “if true,” constitute a compelling governmental interest necessitating race-conscious remedies. Rather than explore the evidence, the court focused on the narrowly tailored requirement and held that it was not satisfied by the State.

The court found that there was no evidence in the record that the State contemplated race-neutral means to accomplish the objectives set forth in Section 287.09451 *et seq.*, such as “simplification of bidding procedures, relaxation of bonding requirements, training or financial aid for disadvantaged entrepreneurs of all races [which] would open the public contracting market to all those who have suffered the effects of past discrimination.” Florida A.G.C. Council, 303 F.Supp.2d at 1315, quoting Eng’g Contractors Ass’n, 122 F.3d at 928, quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 509-10.

The court noted that defendants did not seem to disagree with the report issued by the State of Florida Senate that concluded there was little evidence to support the spending goals outlined in the statute. Rather, the State of Florida argued that the statute is “permissive.” The court, however, held that “there is no distinction between a statute that is precatory versus one that is compulsory when the challenged statute ‘induces an employer to hire with an eye toward meeting ... [a] numerical target.’ Florida A.G.C. Council, 303 F.Supp.2d at 1316.

The court found that the State applies pressure to State agencies to meet the legislative objectives of the statute extending beyond simple outreach efforts. The State agencies, according to the court, were required to coordinate their MBE procurement activities with the OSD, which includes adopting a MBE utilization plan. If the State agency deviated from the Utilization Plan in two consecutive and three out of five total fiscal years, then the OSD could review any and all solicitations and contract awards of the agency as deemed necessary until such time as the agency met its utilization plan. The court held that based on these factors, although alleged to be “permissive,” the statute textually was not.

Therefore, the court found that the statute was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest, and consequently violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

18. The Builders Ass’n of Greater Chicago v. The City of Chicago, 298 F. Supp. 2d 725 (N.D. Ill. 2003)

This case is instructive because of the court’s focus and analysis on whether the City of Chicago’s MBE/WBE program was narrowly tailored. The basis of the court’s holding that the program was not narrowly tailored is instructive for any program considered because of the reasons provided as to why the program did not pass muster.

The plaintiff, the Builders Association of Greater Chicago, brought this suit challenging the constitutionality of the City of Chicago’s construction Minority- and Women-Owned Business (“MWBE”) Program. The court held that the City of Chicago’s MWBE program was unconstitutional because it did not satisfy the requirement that it be narrowly tailored to achieve a

compelling governmental interest. The court held that it was not narrowly tailored for several reasons, including because there was no “meaningful individualized review” of MBE/WBEs; it had no termination date nor did it have any means for determining a termination; the “graduation” revenue amount for firms to graduate out of the program was very high, \$27,500,000 and in fact very few firms graduated; there was no net worth threshold; and, waivers were rarely or never granted on construction contracts. The court found that the City program was a “rigid numerical quota,” a quota related not to the number of available, willing and able firms. Formulistic percentages, the court held, could not survive the strict scrutiny.

The court held that the goals plan did not address issues raised as to discrimination regarding market access and credit. The court found that a goals program does not directly impact prime contractor’s selection of subcontractors on non-goals private projects. The court found that a set-aside or goals program does not directly impact difficulties in accessing credit, and does not address discriminatory loan denials or higher interest rates. The court found the City has not sought to attack discrimination by primes directly, “but it could.” 298 F.2d 725. “To monitor possible discriminatory conduct it could maintain its certification list and require those contracting with the City to consider unsolicited bids, to maintain bidding records, and to justify rejection of any certified firm submitting the lowest bid. It could also require firms seeking City work to post private jobs above a certain minimum on a website or otherwise provide public notice ...” Id.

The court concluded that other race-neutral means were available to impact credit, high interest rates, and other potential marketplace discrimination. The court pointed to race-neutral means including linked deposits, with the City banking at institutions making loans to startup and smaller firms. Other race-neutral programs referenced included quick pay and contract downsizing; restricting self-performance by prime contractors; a direct loan program; waiver of bonds on contracts under \$100,000; a bank participation loan program; a 2 percent local business preference; outreach programs and technical assistance and workshops; and seminars presented to new construction firms.

The court held that race and ethnicity do matter, but that racial and ethnical classifications are highly suspect, can be used only as a last resort, and cannot be made by some mechanical formulation. Therefore, the court concluded the City’s MWBE Program could not stand in its present guise. The court held that the present program was not narrowly tailored to remedy past discrimination and the discrimination demonstrated to now exist.

The court entered an injunction, but delayed the effective date for six months from the date of its Order, December 29, 2003. The court held that the City had a “compelling interest in not having its construction projects slip back to near monopoly domination by white male firms.” The court ruled a brief continuation of the program for six months was appropriate “as the City rethinks the many tools of redress it has available.” Subsequently, the court declared unconstitutional the City’s MWBE Program with respect to construction contracts and permanently enjoined the City from enforcing the Program. 2004 WL 757697 (N.D. Ill 2004).

19. Associated Utility Contractors of Maryland, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 218 F. Supp. 2d 749 (D. Md. 2002)

This case is instructive because the court found the Executive Order of the Mayor of the City of Baltimore was precatory in nature (creating no legal obligation or duty) and contained no enforcement mechanism or penalties for noncompliance and imposed no substantial restrictions; the Executive Order announced goals that were found to be aspirational only.

The Associated Utility Contractors of Maryland, Inc. (“AUC”) sued the City of Baltimore challenging its ordinance providing for minority and women-owned business enterprise (“MWBE”) participation in city contracts. Previously, an earlier City of Baltimore MWBE program was declared unconstitutional. Associated Utility Contractors of Maryland, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 83 F. Supp. 2d 613 (D. Md. 2000). The City adopted a new ordinance that provided for the establishment of MWBE participation goals on a contract-by-contract basis, and made several other changes from the previous MWBE program declared unconstitutional in the earlier case.

In addition, the Mayor of the City of Baltimore issued an Executive Order that announced a goal of awarding 35 percent of all City contracting dollars to MBE/WBEs. The court found this goal of 35 percent participation was aspirational only and the Executive Order contained no enforcement mechanism or penalties for noncompliance. The Executive Order also specified many “noncoercive” outreach measures to be taken by the City agencies relating to increasing participation of MBE/WBEs. These measures were found to be merely aspirational and no enforcement mechanism was provided.

The court addressed in this case only a motion to dismiss filed by the City of Baltimore arguing that the Associated Utility Contractors had no standing. The court denied the motion to dismiss holding that the association had standing to challenge the new MBE/WBE ordinance, although the court noted that it had significant issues with the AUC having representational standing because of the nature of the MBE/WBE plan and the fact the AUC did not have any of its individual members named in the suit. The court also held that the AUC was entitled to bring an as applied challenge to the Executive Order of the Mayor, but rejected it having standing to bring a facial challenge based on a finding that it imposes no requirement, creates no sanctions, and does not inflict an injury upon any member of the AUC in any concrete way. Therefore, the Executive Order did not create a “case or controversy” in connection with a facial attack. The court found the wording of the Executive Order to be precatory and imposing no substantive restrictions.

After this decision the City of Baltimore and the AUC entered into a settlement agreement and a dismissal with prejudice of the case. An order was issued by the court on October 22, 2003 dismissing the case with prejudice.

20. Associated Utility Contractors of Maryland, Inc. v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 83 F. Supp. 2d 613 (D. Md. 2000)

The court held unconstitutional the City of Baltimore’s “affirmative action” program, which had construction subcontracting “set-aside” goals of 20 percent for MBEs and 3 percent for WBEs. The court held there was no data or statistical evidence submitted by the City prior to enactment of the Ordinance. There was no evidence showing a disparity between MBE/WBE availability and utilization in the subcontracting construction market in Baltimore. The court enjoined the City Ordinance.

21. Webster v. Fulton County, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (N.D. Ga. 1999), a’ffd per curiam 218 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2000)

This case is instructive as it is another instance in which a court has considered, analyzed, and ruled upon a race-, ethnicity- and gender-conscious program, holding the local government MBE/WBE-type program failed to satisfy the strict scrutiny constitutional standard. The case also is instructive in its application of the Engineering Contractors Association case, including to a disparity analysis, the burdens of proof on the local government, and the narrowly tailored prong of the strict scrutiny test.

In this case, plaintiff Webster brought an action challenging the constitutionality of Fulton County’s (the “County”) minority and female business enterprise program (“M/FBE”) program. 51 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1357 (N.D. Ga. 1999). [The district court first set forth the provisions of the M/FBE program and conducted a standing analysis at 51 F. Supp. 2d at 1356-62].

The court, citing Engineering Contractors Association of S. Florida, Inc. v. Metro. Engineering Contractors Association, 122 F.3d 895 (11th Cir. 1997), held that “[e]xplicit racial preferences may not be used except as a ‘last resort.’” Id. at 1362-63. The court then set forth the strict scrutiny standard for evaluating racial and ethnic preferences and the four factors enunciated in Engineering Contractors Association, and the intermediate scrutiny standard for evaluating gender preferences. Id. at 1363. The court found that under Engineering Contractors Association, the government could utilize both post-enactment and pre-enactment evidence to meet its burden of a “strong basis in evidence” for strict scrutiny, and “sufficient probative evidence” for intermediate scrutiny. Id.

The court found that the defendant bears the initial burden of satisfying the aforementioned evidentiary standard, and the ultimate burden of proof remains with the challenging party to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the M/FBE program. Id. at 1364. The court found that the plaintiff has at least three methods “to rebut the inference of discrimination with a neutral explanation: (1) demonstrate that the statistics are flawed; (2) demonstrate that the disparities shown by the statistics are not significant; or (3) present conflicting statistical data.” Id., citing Eng’g Contractors Ass’n, 122 F.3d at 916.

[The district court then set forth the Engineering Contractors Association opinion in detail.]

The court first noted that the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that disparity indices greater than 80 percent are generally not considered indications of discrimination. Id. at 1368, citing Eng’g Contractors Assoc., 122 F.3d at 914. The court then considered the County’s pre-1994 disparity study (the “Brimmer-Marshall Study”) and found that it failed to establish a strong basis in evidence necessary to support the M/FBE program. Id. at 1368.

First, the court found that the study rested on the inaccurate assumption that a statistical showing of underutilization of minorities in the marketplace as a whole was sufficient evidence of discrimination. Id. at 1369. The court cited City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 496 (1989) for the proposition that discrimination must be focused on contracting by the entity that is considering the preference program. Id. Because the Brimmer-Marshall Study contained no statistical evidence of discrimination by the County in the award of contracts, the court found the County must show that it was a “passive participant” in discrimination by the private sector. Id. The court found that the County could take remedial action if it had evidence that prime contractors were systematically excluding minority-owned businesses from subcontracting opportunities, or if it had evidence that its

spending practices are “exacerbating a pattern of prior discrimination that can be identified with specificity.” Id. However, the court found that the Brimmer-Marshall Study contained no such data. Id.

Second, the Brimmer-Marshall study contained no regression analysis to account for relevant variables, such as firm size. Id. at 1369-70. At trial, Dr. Marshall submitted a follow-up to the earlier disparity study; however, the court found the study had the same flaw in that it did not contain a regression analysis. Id. The court thus concluded that the County failed to present a “strong basis in evidence” of discrimination to justify the County’s racial and ethnic preferences. Id.

The court next considered the County’s post-1994 disparity study. Id. at 1371. The study first sought to determine the availability and utilization of minority- and female-owned firms. Id. The court explained:

Two methods may be used to calculate availability: (1) bid analysis; or (2) bidder analysis. In a bid analysis, the analyst counts the number of bids submitted by minority or female firms over a period of time and divides it by the total number of bids submitted in the same period. In a bidder analysis, the analyst counts the number of minority or female firms submitting bids and divides it by the total number of firms which submitted bids during the same period.

Id. The court found that the information provided in the study was insufficient to establish a firm basis in evidence to support the M/FBE program. Id. at 1371-72. The court also found it significant to conduct a regression analysis to show whether the disparities were either due to discrimination or other neutral grounds. Id. at 1375-76.

The plaintiff and the County submitted statistical studies of data collected between 1994 to 1997. Id. at 1376. The court found that the data were potentially skewed due to the operation of the M/FBE program. Id. Additionally, the court found that the County’s standard deviation analysis yielded non-statistically significant results (noting the Eleventh Circuit has stated that scientists consider a finding of two standard deviations significant). Id. (internal citations omitted).

The court considered the County’s anecdotal evidence, and quoted Engineering Contractors Association for the proposition that “[a]necdotal evidence can play an important role in bolstering statistical evidence, but that only in the rare case will anecdotal evidence suffice standing alone.” Id., quoting Eng’g Contractors Ass’n, 122 F.3d at 907. The Brimmer-Marshall Study contained anecdotal evidence. Id. at 1379. Additionally, the County held hearings but after reviewing the tape recordings of the hearings, the court concluded that only two individuals testified to discrimination by the County; one of them complained that the County used the M/FBE program to only benefit African Americans. Id. The court found the most common complaints concerned barriers in bonding, financing, and insurance and slow payment by prime contractors. Id. The court concluded that the anecdotal evidence was insufficient in and of itself to establish a firm basis for the M/FBE program. Id.

The court also applied a narrow tailoring analysis of the M/FBE program. “The Eleventh Circuit has made it clear that the essence of this inquiry is whether racial preferences were adopted only as a ‘last resort.’” Id. at 1380, citing Eng’g Contractors Assoc., 122 F.3d at 926. The court cited the Eleventh Circuit’s four-part test and concluded that the County’s M/FBE program failed on several grounds. First, the court found that a race-based problem does not necessarily require a race-based solution. “If a race-neutral remedy is sufficient to cure a race-based problem, then a race-conscious remedy can never be narrowly tailored to that problem.” Id., quoting Eng’g Contractors Ass’n, 122 F.3d at 927. The court found that there was no evidence of discrimination by the County. Id. at 1380.

The court found that even though a majority of the Commissioners on the County Board were African American, the County had continued the program for decades. Id. The court held that the County had not seriously considered race-neutral measures:

There is no evidence in the record that any Commissioner has offered a resolution during this period substituting a program of race-neutral measures as an alternative to numerical set-asides based upon race and ethnicity. There is no evidence in the record of any proposal by the staff of Fulton County of substituting a program of race-neutral measures as an alternative to numerical set-asides based upon race and ethnicity. There has been no evidence offered of any debate within the Commission about substituting a program of race-neutral measures as an alternative to numerical set-asides based upon race and ethnicity Id.

The court found that the random inclusion of ethnic and racial groups who had not suffered discrimination by the County also mitigated against a finding of narrow tailoring. Id. The court found that there was no evidence that the County considered race-neutral alternatives as an alternative to race-conscious measures nor that race-neutral measures were initiated and failed. Id. at 1381. The court concluded that because the M/FBE program was not adopted as a last resort, it failed the narrow tailoring test. Id.

Additionally, the court found that there was no substantial relationship between the numerical goals and the relevant market. Id. The court rejected the County’s argument that its program was permissible because it set “goals” as opposed to “quotas,” because the program in Engineering Contractors Association also utilized “goals” and was struck down. Id.

Per the M/FBE program’s gender-based preferences, the court found that the program was sufficiently flexible to satisfy the substantial relationship prong of the intermediate scrutiny standard. Id. at 1383. However, the court held that the County failed to present “sufficient probative evidence” of discrimination necessary to sustain the gender-based preferences portion of the M/FBE program. Id.

The court found the County’s M/FBE program unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction in favor of the plaintiff. Id. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed per curiam, stating only that it affirmed on the basis of the district court’s opinion. Webster v. Fulton County, Georgia, 218 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2000).

22. Associated Gen. Contractors v. Drabik, 50 F. Supp. 2d 741 (S.D. Ohio 1999)

In this decision, the district court reaffirmed its earlier holding that the State of Ohio's MBE program of construction contract awards is unconstitutional. The court cited to F. Buddie Contracting v. Cuyahoga Community College, 31 F. Supp. 2d 571 (N.D. Ohio 1998), holding a similar local Ohio program unconstitutional. The court repudiated the Ohio Supreme Court's holding in Ritchey Produce, 707 N.E. 2d 871 (Ohio 1999), which held that the State's MBE program as applied to the state's purchase of non-construction-related goods and services was constitutional. The court found the evidence to be insufficient to justify the MBE program. The court held that the program was not narrowly tailored because there was no evidence that the State had considered a race-neutral alternative.

This opinion underscored that governments must show four factors to demonstrate narrow tailoring: (1) the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies, (2) flexibility and duration of the relief, (3) relationship of numerical goals to the relevant labor market, and (4) impact of the relief on the rights of third parties. The court held the Ohio MBE program failed to satisfy this test.

23. Phillips & Jordan, Inc. v. Watts, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (N.D. Fla. 1998)

This case is instructive because it addressed a challenge to a state and local government MBE/WBE-type program and considered the requisite evidentiary basis necessary to support the program. In Phillips & Jordan, the district court for the Northern District of Florida held that the Florida Department of Transportation's ("FDOT") program of "setting aside" certain highway maintenance contracts for African American- and Hispanic-owned businesses violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The parties stipulated that the plaintiff, a non-minority business, had been excluded in the past and may be excluded in the future from competing for certain highway maintenance contracts "set aside" for business enterprises owned by Hispanic and African American individuals. The court held that the evidence of statistical disparities was insufficient to support the Florida DOT program.

The district court pointed out that Florida DOT did not claim that it had evidence of intentional discrimination in the award of its contracts. The court stated that the essence of FDOT's claim was that the two year disparity study provided evidence of a disparity between the proportion of minorities awarded FDOT road maintenance contracts and a portion of the minorities "supposedly willing and able to do road maintenance work," and that FDOT did not itself engage in any racial or ethnic discrimination, so FDOT must have been a passive participant in "somebody's" discriminatory practices.

Since it was agreed in the case that FDOT did not discriminate against minority contractors bidding on road maintenance contracts, the court found that the record contained insufficient proof of discrimination. The court found the evidence insufficient to establish acts of discrimination against African American- and Hispanic-owned businesses.

The court raised questions concerning the choice and use of the statistical pool of available firms relied upon by the disparity study. The court expressed concern about whether it was appropriate to use Census data to analyze and determine which firms were available (qualified and/or willing and able) to bid on FDOT road maintenance contracts.

Recent State Court Decisions

24. Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 169 Ohio App. 3d 627, 864 N.E.2d 116 (2006), cert. denied 128 S. Ct. 379 (U.S. 2007)

On appeal from Cleveland Construction, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, WL 4880918, Case No. A042683 (Ohio Court of Common Pleas, July 13, 2005 and August 29, 2005) (at Section V©(2a.), *infra*), the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's entry of a directed verdict against Cleveland Construction on the issue of lost profits, remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of liability and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and affirmed the trial court in all other respects. 864 N.E.2d 116, 133 (Ohio App. 2006).

On appeal, both parties below raised multiple enumerations of error with the trial court's decision. In the decision below, the trial court ruled that the City's SBE Program created constitutionally impermissible race- and gender-based classifications. (See 2005 Decision, at Section V©(2a.), *infra*). In its fourth enumeration of error, the city argued that its SBE Program should not be subject to strict scrutiny (for race-based classification) or intermediate scrutiny (for gender-based classification). The City argued that its SBE Program did not create race- or gender-based classifications because the City merely gathered availability estimates "for information purposes only" and bidders were required only to document their good faith efforts at obtaining minority- and women-owned business participation. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument holding that rigid quotas or set-asides are not a prerequisite to a finding of a racial classification: "[w]here regulations pressure or encourage contractors to hire minority subcontractors, courts must apply strict scrutiny." 864 N.E.2d at 126. The court noted that in Adarand I, although the challenged regulations did not require contractors to hire minority subcontractors, they offered a financial incentive to do so, and the regulations were thus subject to strict scrutiny. *Id.* at 127, citing Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995).

The Court of Appeals determined that it had to look beyond the SBE Program's "ostensibly neutral labels such as 'outreach program' and 'participation goals'" to determine whether the SBE Program imposed racial classifications. *Id.* at 127. The court found that under the SBE Program, bidders were required to use good faith efforts to promote opportunities for minority- and women-owned businesses to the extent of their availability as determined by the City, and to submit detailed descriptions of those good faith efforts. The court held that "[w]here the city's SBE program required documentation of a bidder's specific efforts to achieve the participation of minority subcontractors to the extent of their availability as predetermined by the city, the program undeniably pressured bidders to implement racial preferences. Therefore, the program's rules must be subject to strict scrutiny." *Id.* at 127. The court held that to the extent the SBE Program pressured contractors to utilize female-owned subcontractors, that portion was subject to intermediate scrutiny. Because the City conceded that its SBE Program could not survive either standard of heightened scrutiny, the court affirmed the trial court's finding holding unconstitutional those portions of the SBE Program causing bidders to use racial- or gender-based preferences. The court also overruled the City's enumeration of error over the trial court's award of prevailing party attorneys' fees to the plaintiff.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's entry of a directed verdict for the city on the plaintiff's claim for lost profit damages. The court confirmed that under Ohio law, a disappointed bidder cannot recover lost profit damages when a municipality violates competitive-bidding laws. But, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a disappointed bidder may recover their lost profits as damages; the court cited to Adarand, W.H. Scott Construction Co. v. Jackson, and Hershell Gill Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. Miami-Dade

County, Fla. in support of that proposition. The court reversed the entry of a directed verdict and remanded to the trial court for a new trial on the issue of Section 1983 liability and damages.

Finally, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that the named city officials sued in their individual capacities were entitled to qualified immunity. The court determined that due to complex nature of the issues, the city officials could not have reasonably known that their conduct was unconstitutional (required on order to overcome a qualified immunity defense).

The city subsequently applied for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 9, 2007. 128 S. Ct. 379 (Oct. 9, 2007).

25. Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, Case No. A042683, WL 4880918 (Ohio Court of Common Pleas, July 13, 2005 and August 29, 2005)

This case is instructive as it addresses the validity of the City of Cincinnati's program involving contracting with MBE/WBEs, information that a city may gather as to MBE/WBE participation, information that a city may track as to MBE/WBE participation, and the type of legislation the local or state governments may consider adopting. Cleveland Construction, Inc. (the "plaintiff") challenged the City of Cincinnati's (the "City") Small Business Enterprise Program (the "Program"), and a related SBE Subcontracting Outreach Program which applied to City-funded construction projects valued in excess of \$100,000. Case No. A0402638 (Ohio Common Pleas Court, July 13, 2005) at 5. The Program required prime contractors to subcontract a minimum percentage of their bid (20% or greater on some construction contracts) to qualified available minority subcontractors. Id.

The City stipulated that it lacked the necessary factual basis to withstand a strict scrutiny analysis, or even an intermediate scrutiny analysis, of its Program. Id. at 10-11. The court then considered whether the Program imposed classifications subject to such analyses. Id. The court found that "the law does not prohibit governmental entities from recording statistics relating to race or gender, or from tracking the progress of groups as identified by such categories, or from seeking to ascertain whether any impermissible, discriminatory barriers are hampering the advancement of individuals within groups as defined by race or gender." Id. at 12. Accordingly, the court found that the City could use MBE/WBE annual participation goals in conjunction with such a tracking program, and other outreach efforts, as long as such efforts included no "further mechanism to promote or effectuate or encourage others to meet such goals in any particular context." Id. (internal citations omitted).

However, the court found that where outreach efforts operate as "a *sub rosa* preference — that is, where their administration 'indisputably pressures' contractors to hire minority subcontractors — courts must apply strict scrutiny." Id. at 12-13. The court found that the Program contained a number of race- and gender-classification provisions and "indisputably pressures" contractors to recruit minority subcontractors, including requisite documentation of good faith outreach efforts and potential investigation of recruitment efforts by the Office of Contract Compliance; accordingly, the Program was subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 13-14. Because the City conceded that the Program could not survive a strict scrutiny analysis, the court found the Program facially unconstitutional and ordered the City to take prompt action to remove all such unconstitutional provisions. Id. at 15. However, the court found the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that the unconstitutional aspects of the Program caused him to lose the contract award at issue. Id. at 18.

G. Recent Decisions and Authorities Involving Federal Procurement That May Impact MBE/WBE and DBE Programs

1. Rothe Development Corp. v. U.S. Department of Defense, 545 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2008)

Although this case does not involve the Federal DBE Program (49 C.F.R. Part 26), it is an analogous case that may impact the legal analysis and law related to the validity of programs implemented by recipients of federal funds, including the Federal DBE Program. Additionally, it underscores the requirement that race-, ethnic- and gender-based programs of any nature must be supported by substantial evidence. In Rothe, an unsuccessful bidder on a federal defense contract brought suit alleging that the application of an evaluation preference, pursuant to a federal statute, to a small disadvantaged bidder (SDB) to whom a contract was awarded, violated the Equal Protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. The federal statute challenged is Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1987 and as reauthorized in 2003. The statute provides a goal that 5 percent of the total dollar amount of defense contracts for each fiscal year would be awarded to small businesses owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. 10 U.S.C. § 2323. Congress authorized the DOD to adjust bids submitted by non-socially and economically disadvantaged firms upwards by 10 percent (the “Price Evaluation Adjustment Program” or “PEA”).

The district court held the federal statute, as reauthorized in 2003, was constitutional on its face. The court held the 5 percent goal and the PEA program as reauthorized in 1992 and applied in 1998 was unconstitutional. The basis of the decision was that Congress considered statistical evidence of discrimination that established a compelling governmental interest in the reauthorization of the statute and PEA program in 2003. Congress had not documented or considered substantial statistical evidence that the DOD discriminated against minority small businesses when it enacted the statute in 1992 and reauthorized it in 1998. The plaintiff appealed the decision.

The Federal Circuit found that the “analysis of the facial constitutionality of an act is limited to evidence before Congress prior to the date of reauthorization.” 413 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005)(affirming in part, vacating in part, and remanding 324 F. Supp. 2d 840 (W.D. Tex. 2004). The court limited its review to whether Congress had sufficient evidence in 1992 to reauthorize the provisions in 1207. The court held that for evidence to be relevant to a strict scrutiny analysis, “the evidence must be proven to have been before Congress prior to enactment of the racial classification.” The Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in relying on the statistical studies without first determining whether the studies were before Congress when it reauthorized section 1207. The Federal Circuit remanded the case and directed the district court to consider whether the data presented was so outdated that it did not provide the requisite strong basis in evidence to support the reauthorization of section 1207.

On August 10, 2007 the Federal District Court for the Western District of Texas in Rothe Development Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, 499 F.Supp.2d 775 (W.D.Tex. Aug 10, 2007) issued its Order on remand from the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Rothe, 413 F.3d 1327 (Fed Cir. 2005). The district court upheld the constitutionality of the 2006 Reauthorization of Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1987 (10 USC § 2323), which permits the U.S. Department of Defense to provide preferences in selecting bids submitted by small businesses owned by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals (“SDBs”). The district

court found the 2006 Reauthorization of the 1207 Program satisfied strict scrutiny, holding that Congress had a compelling interest when it reauthorized the 1207 Program in 2006, that there was sufficient statistical and anecdotal evidence before Congress to establish a compelling interest, and that the reauthorization in 2006 was narrowly tailored.

The district court, among its many findings, found certain evidence before Congress was “stale,” that the plaintiff (Rothe) failed to rebut other evidence which was not stale, and that the decisions by the Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits in the decisions in Concrete Works, Adarand Constructors, Sherbrooke Turf and Western States Paving (discussed above and below) were relevant to the evaluation of the facial constitutionality of the 2006 Reauthorization.

2007 Order of the District Court (499 F.Supp. 2d 775). In the Section 1207 Act, Congress set a goal that 5 percent of the total dollar amount of defense contracts for each fiscal year would be awarded to small businesses owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. In order to achieve that goal, Congress authorized the DOD to adjust bids submitted by non-socially and economically disadvantaged firms up to 10 percent (the “Price Evaluation Adjustment Program” or “PEA”) 10 U.S.C. § 2323(e)(3). Rothe, 499 F.Supp.2d. at 782. Plaintiff Rothe did not qualify as an SDB because it was owned by a Caucasian female. Although Rothe was technically the lowest bidder on a DOD contract, its bid was adjusted upward by 10 percent, and a third party, who qualified as a SDB, became the “lowest” bidder and was awarded the contract. Id. Rothe claims that the 1207 Program is facially unconstitutional because it takes race into consideration in violation of the Equal Protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 782-83. The district court’s decision only reviewed the facial constitutionality of the 2006 Reauthorization of the 2007 Program.

The district court initially rejected six legal arguments made by Rothe regarding strict scrutiny review based on the rejection of the same arguments by the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeal in the Sherbrooke Turf, Western States Paving, Concrete Works, Adarand VII cases, and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeal in Rothe. Rothe at 825-833.

The district court discussed and cited the decisions in Adarand VII (2000), Sherbrooke Turf (2003), and Western States Paving (2005), as holding that Congress had a compelling interest in eradicating the economic roots of racial discrimination in highway transportation programs funded by federal monies, and concluding that the evidence cited by the government, particularly that contained in *The Compelling Interest* (a.k.a. the *Appendix*), more than satisfied the government’s burden of production regarding the compelling interest for a race-conscious remedy. Rothe at 827. Because the Urban Institute Report, which presented its analysis of 39 state and local disparity studies, was cross-referenced in the *Appendix*, the district court found the courts in Adarand VII, Sherbrooke Turf, and Western States Paving, also relied on it in support of their compelling interest holding. Id. at 827.

The district court also found that the Tenth Circuit decision in Concrete Works IV, 321 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2003), established legal principles that are relevant to the court’s strict scrutiny analysis. First, Rothe’s claims for declaratory judgment on the racial constitutionality of the earlier 1999 and 2002 Reauthorizations were moot. Second, the government can meet its burden of production without conclusively proving the existence of past or present racial discrimination. Third, the government may establish its own compelling interest by presenting evidence of its own direct participation in racial discrimination or its passive participation in private discrimination. Fourth,

once the government meets its burden of production, Rothe must introduce “credible, particularized” evidence to rebut the government’s initial showing of the existence of a compelling interest. Fifth, Rothe may rebut the government’s statistical evidence by giving a race-neutral explanation for the statistical disparities, showing that the statistics are flawed, demonstrating that the disparities shown are not significant or actionable, or presenting contrasting statistical data. Sixth, the government may rely on disparity studies to support its compelling interest, and those studies may control for the effect that pre-existing affirmative action programs have on the statistical analysis. Id. at 829-32.

Based on Concrete Works IV, the district court did not require the government to conclusively prove that there is pervasive discrimination in the relevant market, that each presumptively disadvantaged group suffered equally from discrimination, or that private firms intentionally and purposefully discriminated against minorities. The court found that the inference of discriminatory exclusion can arise from statistical disparities. Id. at 830-31.

The district court held that Congress had a compelling interest in the 2006 Reauthorization of the 1207 Program, which was supported by a strong basis in the evidence. The court relied in significant part upon six state and local disparity studies that were before Congress prior to the 2006 Reauthorization of the 1207 Program. The court based this evidence on its finding that Senator Kennedy had referenced these disparity studies, discussed and summarized findings of the disparity studies, and Representative Cynthia McKinney also cited the same six disparity studies that Senator Kennedy referenced. The court stated that based on the content of the floor debate, it found that these studies were put before Congress prior to the date of the Reauthorization of Section 1207. Id. at 838.

The district court found that these six state and local disparity studies analyzed evidence of discrimination from a diverse cross-section of jurisdictions across the United States, and “they constitute prima facie evidence of a nation-wide pattern or practice of discrimination in public and private contracting.” Id. at 838-39. The court found that the data used in these six disparity studies is not “stale” for purposes of strict scrutiny review. Id. at 839. The court disagreed with Rothe’s argument that all the data was stale (data in the studies from 1997 through 2002), “because this data was the most current data available at the time that these studies were performed.” Id. The court found that the governmental entities should be able to rely on the most recently available data so long as that data is reasonably up-to-date. Id. The court declined to adopt a “bright-line rule for determining staleness.” Id.

The court referred to the reliance by the Ninth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit on the *Appendix* to affirm the constitutionality of the United States Department of Transportation MBE [now DBE] Program, and rejected five years as a bright-line rule for considering whether data is “stale.” Id. at n.86. The court also stated that it “accepts the reasoning of the *Appendix*, which the court found stated that for the most part “the federal government does business in the same contracting markets as state and local governments. Therefore, the evidence in state and local studies of the impact of discriminatory barriers to minority opportunity in contracting markets throughout the country is relevant to the question whether the federal government has a compelling interest to take remedial action in its own procurement activities.” Id. at 839, quoting 61 Fed.Reg. 26042-01, 26061 (1996).

The district court also discussed additional evidence before Congress that it found in Congressional Committee Reports and Hearing Records. Id. at 865-71. The court noted SBA Reports that were before Congress prior to the 2006 Reauthorization. Id. at 871.

The district court found that the data contained in the *Appendix*, the Benchmark Study, and the Urban Institute Report was “stale,” and the court did not consider those reports as evidence of a compelling interest for the 2006 Reauthorization. *Id.* at 872-75. The court stated that the Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits relied on the *Appendix* to uphold the constitutionality of the Federal DBE Program, citing to the decisions in *Sherbrooke Turf*, *Adarand VII*, and *Western States Paving*. *Id.* at 872. The court pointed out that although it does not rely on the data contained in the *Appendix* to support the 2006 Reauthorization, the fact the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits relied on this data to uphold the constitutionality of the Federal DBE Program as recently as 2005, convinced the court that a bright-line staleness rule is inappropriate. *Id.* at 874.

Although the court found that the data contained in the *Appendix*, the Urban Institute Report, and the Benchmark Study was stale for purposes of strict scrutiny review regarding the 2006 Reauthorization, the court found that Rothe introduced no concrete, particularized evidence challenging the reliability of the methodology or the data contained in the six state and local disparity studies, and other evidence before Congress. The court found that Rothe failed to rebut the data, methodology or anecdotal evidence with “concrete, particularized” evidence to the contrary. *Id.* at 875. The district court held that based on the studies, the government had satisfied its burden of producing evidence of discrimination against African Americans, Asian Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Native Americans in the relevant industry sectors. *Id.* at 876.

The district court found that Congress had a compelling interest in reauthorizing the 1207 Program in 2006, which was supported by a strong basis of evidence for remedial action. *Id.* at 877. The court held that the evidence constituted prima facie proof of a nationwide pattern or practice of discrimination in both public and private contracting, that Congress had sufficient evidence of discrimination throughout the United States to justify a nationwide program, and the evidence of discrimination was sufficiently pervasive across racial lines to justify granting a preference to all five purportedly disadvantaged racial groups. *Id.*

The district court also found that the 2006 Reauthorization of the 1207 Program was narrowly tailored and designed to correct present discrimination and to counter the lingering effects of past discrimination. The court held that the government’s involvement in both present discrimination and the lingering effects of past discrimination was so pervasive that the Department of Defense and Department of Air Force had become passive participants in perpetuating it. *Id.* The court stated it was law of the case and could not be disturbed on remand that the Federal Circuit in *Rothe III* had held that the 1207 Program was flexible in application, limited in duration and it did not unduly impact on the rights of third parties. *Id.*, quoting *Rothe III*, 262 F.3d at 1331.

The district court thus conducted a narrowly tailored analysis that reviewed three factors:

1. The efficacy of race-neutral alternatives;
2. Evidence detailing the relationship between the stated numerical goal of 5 percent and the relevant market; and
3. Over- and under-inclusiveness.

Id. The court found that Congress examined the efficacy of race-neutral alternatives prior to the enactment of the 1207 Program in 1986 and that these programs were unsuccessful in remedying the effects of past and present discrimination in the federal procurement. Id. The court concluded that Congress had attempted to address the issues through race-neutral measures, discussed those measures, and found that Congress' adoption of race-conscious provisions were justified by the ineffectiveness of such race-neutral measures in helping minority-owned firms overcome barriers. Id. The court found that the government seriously considered and enacted race-neutral alternatives, but these race-neutral programs did not remedy the widespread discrimination that affected the federal procurement sector, and that Congress was not required to implement or exhaust every conceivable race-neutral alternative. Id. at 880. Rather, the court found that narrow tailoring requires only "serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives." Id.

The district court also found that the 5 percent goal was related to the minority business availability identified in the six state and local disparity studies. Id. at 881. The court concluded that the 5 percent goal was aspirational, not mandatory. Id. at 882. The court then examined and found that the regulations implementing the 1207 Program were not over-inclusive for several reasons.

November 4, 2008 decision by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. On November 4, 2008, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the district court in part, and remanded with instructions to enter a judgment (1) denying Rothe any relief regarding the facial constitutionality of Section 1207 as enacted in 1999 or 2002, (2) declaring that Section 1207 as enacted in 2006 (10 U.S.C. § 2323) is facially unconstitutional, and (3) enjoining application of Section 1207 (10 U.S.C. § 2323).

The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held that Section 1207, on its face, as reenacted in 2006, violated the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment right to due process. The court found that because the statute authorized the Department of Defense to afford preferential treatment on the basis of race, the court applied strict scrutiny, and because Congress did not have a "strong basis in evidence" upon which to conclude that the Department of Defense was a passive participant in pervasive, nationwide racial discrimination — at least not on the evidence produced by the Department of Defense and relied on by the district court in this case — Section 1207 failed to meet this strict scrutiny test. 545 F.3d at 1050.

Strict scrutiny framework. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that the Supreme Court has held a government may have a compelling interest in remedying the effects of past or present racial discrimination. 545 F.3d at 1036. The court cited the decision in Croson, 488 U.S. at 492, that it is "beyond dispute that any public entity, state or federal, has a compelling interest in assuring that public dollars, drawn from the tax contributions of all citizens, do not serve to finance the evil of private prejudice." 545 F.3d. at 1036, quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 492.

The court held that before resorting to race-conscious measures, the government must identify the discrimination to be remedied, public or private, with some specificity, and must have a strong basis of evidence upon which to conclude that remedial action is necessary. 545 F.3d at 1036, quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 500, 504. Although the party challenging the statute bears the ultimate burden of persuading the court that it is unconstitutional, the Federal Circuit stated that the government first bears a burden to produce strong evidence supporting the legislature's decision to employ race-conscious action. 545 F.3d at 1036.

Even where there is a compelling interest supported by strong basis in evidence, the court held the statute must be narrowly tailored to further that interest. *Id.* The court noted that a narrow tailoring analysis commonly involves six factors: (1) the necessity of relief; (2) the efficacy of alternative, race-neutral remedies; (3) the flexibility of relief, including the availability of waiver provisions; (4) the relationship with the stated numerical goal to the relevant labor market; (5) the impact of relief on the rights of third parties; and (6) the overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness of the racial classification. *Id.*

Compelling interest – strong basis in evidence. The Federal Circuit pointed out that the statistical and anecdotal evidence relied upon by the district court in its ruling below included six disparity studies of state or local contracting. The Federal Circuit also pointed out that the district court found that the data contained in the Appendix, the Urban Institute Report, and the Benchmark Study were stale for purposes of strict scrutiny review of the 2006 Authorization, and therefore, the district court concluded that it would not rely on those three reports as evidence of a compelling interest for the 2006 reauthorization of the 1207 Program. 545 F.3d 1023, citing to *Rothe VI*, 499 F.Supp. 2d at 875. Since the Department of Defense did not challenge this finding on appeal, the Federal Circuit stated that it would not consider the Appendix, the Urban Institute Report, or the Department of Commerce Benchmark Study, and instead determined whether the evidence relied on by the district court was sufficient to demonstrate a compelling interest. *Id.*

Six state and local disparity studies. The Federal Circuit found that disparity studies can be relevant to the compelling interest analysis because, as explained by the Supreme Court in *Croson*, “[w]here there is a significant statistical disparity between the number of qualified minority contractors willing and able to perform a particular service and the number of such contractors actually engaged by [a] locality or the locality’s prime contractors, an inference of discriminatory exclusion could arise.” 545 F.3d at 1037-1038, quoting *Croson*, 488 U.S.C. at 509. The Federal Circuit also cited to the decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in *W.H. Scott Constr. Co. v. City of Jackson*, 199 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 1999) that given *Croson*’s emphasis on statistical evidence, other courts considering equal protection challenges to minority-participation programs have looked to disparity indices, or to computations of disparity percentages, in determining whether *Croson*’s evidentiary burden is satisfied. 545 F.3d at 1038, quoting *W.H. Scott*, 199 F.3d at 218.

The Federal Circuit noted that a disparity study is a study attempting to measure the difference- or disparity- between the number of contracts or contract dollars actually awarded minority-owned businesses in a particular contract market, on the one hand, and the number of contracts or contract dollars that one would expect to be awarded to minority-owned businesses given their presence in that particular contract market, on the other hand. 545 F.3d at 1037.

Staleness. The Federal Circuit declined to adopt a per se rule that data more than five years old is stale per se, which rejected the argument put forth by *Rothe*. 545 F.3d at 1038. The court pointed out that the district court noted other circuit courts have relied on studies containing data more than five years old when conducting compelling interest analyses, citing to *Western States Paving v. Washington State Department of Transportation*, 407 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 2005) and *Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minnesota Department of Transportation*, 345 F.3d 964, 970 (8th Cir. 2003)(relying on the Appendix, published in 1996).

The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that Congress “should be able to rely on the most recently available data so long as that data is reasonably up-to-date.” 545 F.3d at 1039. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the data analyzed in the six disparity studies was not stale at the relevant time because the disparity studies analyzed data pertained to contracts awarded as recently as 2000 or even 2003, and because Rothe did not point to more recent, available data. *Id.*

Before Congress. The Federal Circuit found that for evidence to be relevant in the strict scrutiny analysis, it “must be proven to have been before Congress prior to enactment of the racial classification.” 545 F.3d at 1039, quoting *Rothe V*, 413 F.3d at 1338. The Federal Circuit had issues with determining whether the six disparity studies were actually before Congress for several reasons, including that there was no indication that these studies were debated or reviewed by members of Congress or by any witnesses, and because Congress made no findings concerning these studies. 545 F.3d at 1039-1040. However, the court determined it need not decide whether the six studies were put before Congress, because the court held in any event that the studies did not provide a substantially probative and broad-based statistical foundation necessary for the strong basis in evidence that must be the predicate for nation-wide, race-conscious action. *Id.* at 1040.

The court did note that findings regarding disparity studies are to be distinguished from formal findings of discrimination by the Department of Defense “which Congress was emphatically not required to make.” *Id.* at 1040, footnote 11 (emphasis in original). The Federal Circuit cited the *Dean v. City of Shreveport* case that the “government need not incriminate itself with a formal finding of discrimination prior to using a race-conscious remedy.” 545 F.3d at 1040, footnote 11 quoting *Dean v. City of Shreveport*, 438 F.3d 448, 445 (5th Cir. 2006).

Methodology. The Federal Circuit found that there were methodological defects in the six disparity studies. The court found that the objections to the parameters used to select the relevant pool of contractors was one of the major defects in the studies. 545 F.3d at 1040-1041.

The court stated that in general, “[a] disparity ratio less than 0.80” — i.e., a finding that a given minority group received less than 80 percent of the expected amount — “indicates a relevant degree of disparity,” and “might support an inference of discrimination.” 545 F.3d at 1041, quoting the district court opinion in *Rothe VI*, 499 F.Supp. 2d at 842; and citing *Engineering Contractors Association of South Florida, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County*, 122 F.3d 895, 914 (11th Cir. 1997). The court noted that this disparity ratio attempts to calculate a ratio between the expected contract amount of a given race/gender group and the actual contract amount received by that group. 545 F.3d at 1041.

The court considered the availability analysis, or benchmark analysis, which is utilized to ensure that only those minority-owned contractors who are qualified, willing and able to perform the prime contracts at issue are considered when performing the denominator of a disparity ratio. 545 F.3d at 1041. The court cited to an expert used in the case that a “crucial question” in disparity studies is to develop a credible methodology to estimate this benchmark share of contracts minorities would receive in the absence of discrimination and the touchstone for measuring the benchmark is to determine whether the firm is ready, willing, and able to do business with the government. 545 F.3d at 1041-1042.

The court concluded the contention by Rothe, that the six studies misapplied this “touchstone” of Croson and erroneously included minority-owned firms that were deemed willing or potentially willing and able, without regard to whether the firm was qualified, was not a defect that substantially undercut the results of four of the six studies, because “the bulk of the businesses considered in these studies were identified in ways that would tend to establish their qualifications, such as by their presence on city contract records and bidder lists.” 545 F.3d at 1042. The court noted that with regard to these studies available prime contractors were identified via certification lists, willingness survey of chamber membership and trade association membership lists, public agency and certification lists, utilized prime contractor, bidder lists, county and other government records and other type lists. Id.

The court stated it was less confident in the determination of qualified minority-owned businesses by the two other studies because the availability methodology employed in those studies, the court found, appeared less likely to have weeded out unqualified businesses. Id. However, the court stated it was more troubled by the failure of five of the studies to account officially for potential differences in size, or “relative capacity,” of the business included in those studies. 545 F.3d at 1042-1043.

The court noted that qualified firms may have substantially different capacities and thus might be expected to bring in substantially different amounts of business even in the absence of discrimination. 545 F.3d at 1043. The Federal Circuit referred to the Eleventh Circuit explanation similarly that because firms are bigger, bigger firms have a bigger chance to win bigger contracts, and thus one would expect the bigger (on average) non-MWBE firms to get a disproportionately higher percentage of total construction dollars awarded than the smaller MWBE firms. 545 F.3d at 1043 quoting Engineering Contractors Association, 122 F.3d at 917. The court pointed out its issues with the studies accounting for the relative sizes of contracts awarded to minority-owned businesses, but not considering the relative sizes of the businesses themselves. Id. at 1043.

The court noted that the studies measured the availability of minority-owned businesses by the percentage of firms in the market owned by minorities, instead of by the percentage of total marketplace capacity those firms could provide. Id. The court said that for a disparity ratio to have a significant probative value, the same time period and metric (dollars or numbers) should be used in measuring the utilization and availability shares. 545 F.3d at 1044, n. 12.

The court stated that while these parameters relating to the firm size may have ensured that each minority-owned business in the studies met a capacity threshold, these parameters did not account for the relative capacities of businesses to bid for more than one contract at a time, which failure rendered the disparity ratios calculated by the studies substantially less probative on their own, of the likelihood of discrimination. Id. at 1044. The court pointed out that the studies could have accounted for firm size even without changing the disparity ratio methodologies by employing regression analysis to determine whether there was a statistically significant correlation between the size of a firm and the share of contract dollars awarded to it. 545 F.3d at 1044 citing to Engineering Contractors Association, 122 F.3d at 917. The court noted that only one of the studies conducted this type of regression analysis, which included the independent variables of a firm-age of a company, owner education level, number of employees, percent of revenue from the private sector and owner experience for industry groupings. Id. at 1044-1045.

The court stated, to “be clear,” that it did not hold that the defects in the availability and capacity analyses in these six disparity studies render the studies wholly unreliable for any purpose. *Id.* at 1045. The court said that where the calculated disparity ratios are low enough, the court does not foreclose the possibility that an inference of discrimination might still be permissible for some of the minority groups in some of the studied industries in some of the jurisdictions. *Id.* The court recognized that a minority-owned firm’s capacity and qualifications may themselves be affected by discrimination. *Id.* The court held, however, that the defects it noted detracted dramatically from the probative value of the six studies, and in conjunction with their limited geographic coverage, rendered the studies insufficient to form the statistical core of the strong basis and evidence required to uphold the statute. *Id.*

Geographic coverage. The court pointed out that whereas municipalities must necessarily identify discrimination in the immediate locality to justify a race-based program, the court does not think that Congress needs to have had evidence before it of discrimination in all 50 states in order to justify the 1207 program. *Id.* The court stressed, however, that in holding the six studies insufficient in this particular case, “we do not necessarily disapprove of decisions by other circuit courts that have relied, directly or indirectly, on municipal disparity studies to establish a federal compelling interest.” 545 F.3d at 1046. The court stated in particular, the Appendix relied on by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits in the context of certain race-conscious measures pertaining to federal highway construction, references the Urban Institute Report, which itself analyzed over 50 disparity studies and relied for its conclusions on over 30 of those studies, a far broader basis than the six studies provided in this case. *Id.*

Anecdotal evidence. The court held that given its holding regarding statistical evidence, it did not review the anecdotal evidence before Congress. The court did point out, however, that there was not evidence presented of a single instance of alleged discrimination by the Department of Defense in the course of awarding a prime contract, or to a single instance of alleged discrimination by a private contractor identified as the recipient of a prime defense contract. 545 F.3d at 1049. The court noted this lack of evidence in the context of the opinion in Croson that if a government has become a passive participant in a system of racial exclusion practiced by elements of the local construction industry, then that government may take affirmative steps to dismantle the exclusionary system. 545 F.3d at 1048, citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 492.

The Federal Circuit pointed out that the Tenth Circuit in Concrete Works noted the City of Denver offered more than dollar amounts to link its spending to private discrimination, but instead provided testimony from minority business owners that general contractors who use them in city construction projects refuse to use them on private projects, with the result that Denver had paid tax dollars to support firms that discriminated against other firms because of their race, ethnicity and gender. 545 F.3d at 1049, quoting Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 976-977.

In concluding, the court stated that it stressed its holding was grounded in the particular items of evidence offered by the Department of Defense, and “should not be construed as stating blanket rules, for example about the reliability of disparity studies. As the Fifth Circuit has explained, there is no ‘precise mathematical formula to assess the quantum of evidence that rises to the Croson ‘strong basis in evidence’ benchmark.” 545 F.3d at 1049, quoting W.H. Scott Constr. Co., 199 F.3d at 218 n.11.

Narrowly tailoring. The Federal Circuit only made two observations about narrowly tailoring, because it held that Congress lacked the evidentiary predicate for a compelling interest. First, it noted that the 1207 Program was flexible in application, limited in duration, and that it did not unduly impact on the rights of third parties. 545 F.3d at 1049. Second, the court held that the absence of strongly probative statistical evidence makes it impossible to evaluate at least one of the other narrowly tailoring factors. Without solid benchmarks for the minority groups covered by the Section 1207, the court said it could not determine whether the 5 percent goal is reasonably related to the capacity of firms owned by members of those minority groups — i.e., whether that goal is comparable to the share of contracts minorities would receive in the absence of discrimination.” 545 F.3d at 1049-1050.

2. Dynalantic Corp. v. United States Dept. of Defense, 503 F. Supp. 2d 262 (D.D.C. 2007)

Dynalantic Corp. involves a recent challenge to the Department of Defense’s (“DOD”) utilization of the Small Business Administration’s (“SBA”) 8(a) Business Development Program (the “8(a) Program”). In its Order of August 23, 2007, the district court denied both parties’ Motions for Summary Judgment because there was no information in the record regarding the evidence before Congress supporting its 2006 reauthorization of the program in question; the court directed the parties to propose future proceedings to supplement the record. 503 F. Supp. 2d 262, 263 (D.D.C. 2007).

The court first explained that the 8(a) Program sets a goal that no less than 5 percent of total prime federal contract and subcontract awards for each fiscal year be awarded to socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. Id. Each federal government agency is required to establish its own goal for contracting but the goals are not mandatory and there is no sanction for failing to meet the goal. Upon application and admission into the 8(a) Program, small businesses owned and controlled by disadvantaged individuals are eligible to receive technological, financial, and practical assistance, and support through preferential award of government contracts. For the past few years, the 8(a) Program was the primary preferential treatment program the DOD used to meet its 5 percent goal. Id. at 264.

This case arose from a Navy contract that the DOD decided to award exclusively through the 8(a) Program. The plaintiff owned a small company that would have bid on the contract but for the fact it was not a participant in the 8(a) Program. After multiple judicial proceedings the D.C. Circuit dismissed the plaintiff’s action for lack of standing but granted the plaintiff’s motion to enjoin the contract procurement pending the appeal of the dismissal order. The Navy cancelled the proposed procurement but the D.C. Circuit allowed the plaintiff to circumvent the mootness argument by amending its pleadings to raise a facial challenge to the 8(a) program as administered by the SBA and utilized by the DOD. The D.C. Circuit held the plaintiff had standing because of the plaintiff’s inability to compete for DOD contracts reserved to 8(a) firms, the injury was traceable to the race-conscious component of the 8(a) Program, and the plaintiff’s injury was imminent due to the likelihood the government would in the future try to procure another contract under the 8(a) Program for which the plaintiff was ready, willing, and able to bid. Id. at 264-65.

On remand, the plaintiff amended its complaint to challenge the constitutionality of the 8(a) Program and sought an injunction to prevent the military from awarding any contract for military simulators based upon the race of the contractors. Id. at 265. The district court first held that the plaintiff’s complaint could be read only as a challenge to the DOD’s implementation of the 8(a) Program

[pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 2323] as opposed to a challenge to the program as a whole. *Id.* at 266. The parties agreed that the 8(a) Program uses race-conscious criteria so the district court concluded it must be analyzed under the strict scrutiny constitutional standard. The court found that in order to evaluate the government’s proffered “compelling government interest,” the court must consider the evidence that Congress considered at the point of authorization or reauthorization to ensure that it had a strong basis in evidence of discrimination requiring remedial action. The court cited to Western States Paving in support of this proposition. *Id.* The court concluded that because the DOD program was reauthorized in 2006, the court must consider the evidence before Congress in 2006.

The court cited to the recent Rothe decision as demonstrating that Congress considered significant evidentiary materials in its reauthorization of the DOD program in 2006, including six recently published disparity studies. The court held that because the record before it in the present case did not contain information regarding this 2006 evidence before Congress, it could not rule on the parties’ Motions for Summary Judgment. The court denied both motions and directed the parties to propose future proceedings in order to supplement the record. *Id.* at 267.

3. “Federal Procurement After Adarand” (USCCR Report September, 2005)

In September of 2005, the United States Commission on Civil Rights (the “Commission”) issued its report entitled “Federal Procurement After Adarand” setting forth its findings pertaining to federal agencies’ compliance with the constitutional standard enunciated in Adarand. United States Commission on Civil Rights: Federal Procurement After Adarand (Sept. 2005), [available at http://www.usccr.gov](http://www.usccr.gov), citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237-38. The following is a brief summary of the report.

In 1995, the United States Supreme Court decided Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), which set forth the constitutional standard for evaluating race-conscious programs in federal contracting. The Commission states in its report that the Court in Adarand held that racial classifications imposed by federal, state and local governments are subject to strict scrutiny and the burden is upon the government entity to show that the racial classification is the least restrictive way to serve a “compelling public interest;” the government program must be narrowly tailored to meet that interest. The Court held that narrow tailoring requires, among other things, that “agencies must first consider race-neutral alternatives before using race conscious measures.” [p. ix]

Scope and methodology of the Commission’s report. The purpose of the Commission’s study was to examine the race-neutral programs and strategies implemented by agencies to meet the requirements set forth in Adarand. Accordingly, the study considered the following questions:

- Do agencies seriously consider workable race-neutral alternatives, as required by Adarand?
- Do agencies sufficiently promote and participate in race-neutral practices such as mentor-protégé programs, outreach, and financial and technical assistance?
- Do agencies employ and disclose to each other specific best practices for consideration of race-neutral alternatives?
- How do agencies measure the effects of race-neutral programs on federal contracting?
- What race-neutral mechanisms exist to ensure government contracting is not discriminatory?

The Commission's staff conducted background research, reviewing government documents, federal procurement and economic data, federal contracting literature, and pertinent statutes, regulations and court decisions. The Commission selected seven agencies to study in depth and submitted interrogatories to assess the agencies' procurement methods. The agencies selected for evaluation procure relatively large amounts of goods and services, have high numbers of contracts with small businesses, SDBs, or HUBZone firms, or play a significant support or enforcement role: the Small Business Administration (SBA), and the Departments of Defense (DOD), Transportation (DOT), Education (DOEd), Energy (DOEn), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and State (DOS).

The report did not evaluate existing disparity studies or assess the validity of data suggesting the persistence of discrimination. It also did not seek to identify whether, or which, aspects of the contracting process disparately affect minority-owned firms.

Findings and recommendations. The Commission concluded that “among other requirements, agencies must consider race-neutral strategies before adopting any that allow eligibility based, even in part, on race.” [p. ix] The Commission further found “that federal agencies have not complied with their constitutional obligation, according to the Supreme Court, to narrowly tailor programs that use racial classifications by considering race-neutral alternatives to redress discrimination.” [p. ix]

The Commission found that “agencies have largely failed to apply the Supreme Court’s requirements, or [the U.S. Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”)] guidelines, to their contracting programs.” [p. 70] The Commission found that agencies “have not seriously considered race-neutral alternatives, relying instead on SBA-run programs, without developing new initiatives or properly assessing the results of existing programs.” [p. 70]

The Commission identified four elements that underlie “serious consideration” of race-neutral efforts, ensure an inclusive and fair race-neutral system, and tailor race-conscious programs to meet a documented need: “Element 1: Standards — Agencies must develop policy, procedures, and statistical standards for evaluating race-neutral alternatives; Element 2: Implementation — Agencies must develop or identify a wide range of race-neutral approaches, rather than relying on only one or two generic government-wide programs; Element 3: Evaluation — Agencies must measure the effectiveness of their chosen procurement strategies based on established empirical standards and benchmarks; Element 4: Communication — Agencies should communicate and coordinate race-neutral practices to ensure maximum efficiency and consistency government-wide.” [p. xi]

The Commission found that “despite the requirements that Adarand imposed, federal agencies fail to consider race-neutral alternatives in the manner required by the Supreme Court’s decision.” [p. xiii] The Commission also concluded that “[a]gencies engage in few race-neutral strategies designed to make federal contracting more inclusive, but do not exert the effort associated with serious consideration that the Equal Protection Clause requires. Moreover, they do not integrate race-neutral strategies into a comprehensive procurement approach for small and disadvantaged businesses.” [p. xiii]

Serious consideration [P. 71]

Finding: Most agencies could not demonstrate that they consider race-neutral alternatives before resorting to race-conscious programs. Due to the lack of specific guidance from the DOJ, “agencies

appear to give little thought to their legal obligations and disagree both about what the law requires and about the legal ramifications of their actions.”

Recommendation: Agencies must adopt and follow guidelines to ensure consideration of race-neutral alternatives, which system could include: (1) identifying and evaluating a wide range of alternatives; (2) articulating the underlying facts that demonstrate whether race-neutral plans work; (3) collecting empirical research to evaluate success; (4) ensuring such assessments are based on current, competent and comprehensive data; (5) periodically reviewing race conscious plans to determine their continuing need; and (6) establishing causal relationships before concluding that a race-neutral plan is ineffective. Best practices could include: (1) statistical standards by which agencies would determine when to abandon race race-conscious efforts; (2) ongoing data collection, including racial and ethnic information, by which agencies would assess effectiveness; and (3) policies for reviewing what constitutes disadvantaged status and the continued necessity for strategies to increase inclusiveness.

Antidiscrimination policy and enforcement [P. 72]

Finding: The federal government lacks an appropriate framework for enforcing nondiscrimination in procurement. Limited causes of action are available to contractors and subcontractors, but the most accessible mechanisms are restricted to procedural complaints about bidding processes.

Recommendation: The enactment of legislation expressly prohibiting discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, and disability, in federal contracting and procurement. Such legislation should include protections for both contractors and subcontractors and establish clear sanctions, remedies and compliance standards. Enforcement authority should be delegated to each agency with contracting capabilities.

Finding: Most agencies do not have policies or procedures to prevent discrimination in contracting. Generally, agencies are either unaware of or confused about whether federal law protects government contractors from discrimination.

Recommendation: The facilitation of agency development and implementation of civil rights enforcement policies for contracting. Agencies must establish strong enforcement systems to provide individuals a means to file and resolve complaints of discriminatory conduct. Agencies must also adopt clear compliance review standards and delegate authority for these functions to a specific, high-level component. Once agencies adopt nondiscrimination policies, they should conduct regular compliance reviews of prime and other large contract recipients, such as state and local agencies. Agencies should widely publicize complaint procedures, include them with bid solicitations, and codify them in acquisition regulations. Civil rights personnel in each agency should work with procurement officers to ensure that contractors understand their rights and responsibilities and implement additional policies upon legislative action.

Finding: Agencies generally employ systems for reviewing compliance with subcontracting goals made at the bidding stage, but do not establish norms for the number of reviews they will conduct, nor the frequency with which they will do so.

Recommendation: Good faith effort policies should be rooted in race-neutral outreach. Agencies should set standards for and carry out regular on-site audits and formal compliance reviews of SDB subcontracting plans to make determinations of contractors' good faith efforts to achieve established goals. Agencies should develop and disseminate clear regulations for what constitutes a good faith effort, specific to individual procurement goals and procedures. Agencies should also require that all prime contractors be subject to audits, and require prime contractors to demonstrate all measures taken to ensure equal opportunity for SDBs to compete, paying particular attention to contractors that have not achieved goals expressed in their offers.

Ongoing review [P. 73]

Finding: Narrow tailoring requires regular review of race-conscious programs to determine their continued necessity and to ensure that they are focused enough to serve their intended purpose. However, no agency reported policies, procedures, or statistical standards for when to use race-conscious instead of race-neutral strategies, nor had agencies established procedures to reassess presumptions of disadvantage.

Recommendation: Agencies must engage in regular, systematic reviews (perhaps biennial) of race-conscious programs, including those that presume race-based disadvantage. They should develop and document clear policies, standards and justifications for when race-conscious programs are in effect. Agencies should develop and implement standards for the quality of data they collect and use to analyze race-conscious and race-neutral programs and apply these criteria when deciding effectiveness. Agencies should also evaluate whether race-neutral alternatives could reasonably generate the same or similar outcomes, and should implement such alternatives whenever possible.

Data and measurement [P. 73-75]

Finding: Agencies have neither conducted race disparity studies nor collected empirical data to assess the effects of procurement programs on minority-owned firms.

Recommendation: Agencies should conduct regular benchmark studies which should be tailored to each agency's specific contracting needs; and the results of the studies should be used in setting procurement goals.

Finding: The current procurement data does not evaluate the effectiveness or continuing need for race-neutral and/or race-conscious programs.

Recommendation: A task force should determine what data is necessary to implement narrow tailoring and assess whether (1) race-conscious programs are still necessary, and (2) the extent to which race-neutral strategies are effective as an alternative to race-conscious programs.

Finding: Agencies do not assess the effectiveness of individual race-neutral strategies (e.g., whether contract unbundling is a successful race-neutral strategy).

Recommendation: Agencies should measure the success of race-neutral strategies independently so they can determine viability as alternatives to race-conscious measures (e.g., agencies could track the number and dollar value of contracts broken apart, firms to which smaller contracts are awarded, and the effect of such efforts on traditionally excluded firms).

Communication and collaboration [P. 75]

Finding: Agencies do not communicate effectively with each other about efforts to strengthen procurement practices (e.g., there is no exchange of race-neutral best practices).

Recommendation: Agencies should engage in regular meetings with each other to share information and best practices, coordinate outreach, and develop measurement strategies.

Outreach [P. 76]

Finding: Even though agencies engage in outreach efforts, there is little evidence that their efforts to reach small and disadvantaged businesses are successful. They do not produce planning or reporting documents on outreach activities, nor do they apply methods for tracking activities, expenditures, or the number and types of beneficiaries.

Recommendation: Widely broadcast information on the Internet and in popular media is only one of several steps necessary for a comprehensive and effective outreach program. Agencies can use a variety of formats — conferences, meetings, forums, targeted media, Internet, printed materials, ad campaigns, and public service announcements — to reach appropriate audiences. In addition, agencies should capitalize on technological capabilities, such as listservs, text messaging, audio subscription services, and new technologies associated with portable listening devices, to circulate information about contracting opportunities. Agencies should include outreach in budget and planning documents, establish goals for conducting outreach activities, track the events and diversity of the audience, and train staff in outreach strategies and skills.

Conclusion. The Commission found that 10 years after the Supreme Court’s Adarand decision, federal agencies have largely failed to narrowly tailor their reliance on race-conscious programs and have failed to seriously consider race-neutral decisions that would effectively redress discrimination. Although some agencies employ some race-neutral strategies, the agencies fail “to engage in the basic activities that are the hallmarks of serious consideration,” including program evaluation, outcomes measurement, reliable empirical research and data collection, and periodic review.

The Commission found that most federal agencies have not implemented “even the most basic race-neutral strategy to ensure equal access, i.e., the development, dissemination, and enforcement of clear, effective antidiscrimination policies. Significantly, most agencies do not provide clear recourse for contractors who are victims of discrimination or guidelines for enforcement.”

One Commission member, Michael Yaki, filed an extensive Dissenting Statement to the Report. [pp. 79-170]. This Dissenting Statement by Commissioner Yaki was referred to and discussed by the district court in Rothe Development Corp. v. US DOD, 499 F.Supp.2d 775, 864-65 (W.D. Tex. August 10, 2007), **reversed** on appeal, Rothe, 545 F.3d 1023 (Fed.Cir 2008), (see discussion of Rothe above at Section VII, 1.). In his dissent, Commissioner Yaki criticized the Majority Opinion, including noting that his statistical data was “*deleted*” from the original version of the draft Majority Opinion that was received by all Commissioners. The district court in Rothe considered the data discussed by Yaki.